The literature on inventors has traditionally focused on entrepreneurs who exploited their ideas in their own businesses and on researchers who worked in large firms' R&D laboratories. For most of US history, however, it was as common for inventors to profit from their ideas by selling off or licensing the patent rights. This article traces the different ways in which inventors resolved the information problems involved in marketing their patents. We focus in particular on the patent attorneys who emerged during the last third of the nineteenth century to help inventors find buyers for their intellectual property.

Thomas K. McCraw is justly admired as a consummate prose stylist, a talented editor, a perceptive historian of the United States, and an inspiring teacher whose mastery of the biographical form led to a string of elegantly written prize-winning publications that are widely read and often taught. The publication one month before McCraw's death in November 2012 of his last book, The Founders and Finance, provides the occasion for this essay, which contends that McCraw also deserves to be remembered as a founder of two thriving academic subfields—policy history and the history of capitalism—despite the fact that he trained relatively few history PhD students, and rarely appeared in public during the final years of his life as the result of a debilitating illness that greatly limited his mobility.

More than forty years ago (in the autumn of 1974), Business History Review had a special issue on multinational enterprise (MNE). With two exceptions, the authors in this new special issue were not yet born or were toddlers when that issue was published. Whereas in 1974 relatively few individuals were writing on topics directly related to the history of multinational enterprise, in 2015 numerous authors are considering subjects that fall under this rubric. Still, by the mid-1970s the study of the history of multinationals was not virgin territory. Glenn Porter, then editor of Business History Review, wrote in a preface to the 1974 issue, “Most of the contributions here underscore the deep historical roots of multinational business and point to the importance of an awareness of the past in understanding the present.”

The recent surge of emerging-economy multinational enterprises (EMNEs) has prompted a debate on whether existing international business theory—particularly internalization theory—can accommodate this phenomenon. Our view is that no new, EMNE-centric theory is required to study EMNEs. Using historical evidence, we argue that “new” internalization theory is sufficient to address the complexity of EMNEs, and we illustrate our argument with examples of ten successful EMNEs from Asia and the Americas. We further argue that a business history lens can illuminate the behavior of developed-economy multinationals. We show how management scholars can advance their research agendas by engaging with business history and how business historians can use internalization theory to analyze the history of multinationals.

The study of cartels is important to economists as well as business historians, but, on the whole, there has been little cross cultivation between the two academic fields. This article examines cartel theory developed by economists in the context of the historical case of international aluminum cartels in existence before 1940. By analyzing three basic theoretical questions—when cartels appear, when they break down, and when they are successful—in light of the empirical evidence of the aluminum industry, the article argues that economics and history, although they have very different approaches, can profit from using each other's methods when studying cartels.

This article focuses on the construction of turnkey hospitals in Latin America by the German electromedical equipment maker Siemens-Reiniger-Werke (SRW) in the 1950s and 1960s. After World War II, SRW was unable to return to the overseas markets it had lost during the war through only the export of goods. Hospital construction was thus a way to reenter these markets, offering local governments a new form of service and product: a German hospital. In order to achieve this strategy, SRW organized and directed an informal association called Deutsche Hospitalia, which gathered together some thirty German manufacturers involved in the process of building a fully equipped hospital. This article argues that SRW, by diffusing a standardized hospital model in Latin America, contributed to the globalization of medicine.

Prizes for innovations are currently experiencing a renaissance, following their marked decline during the nineteenth century. Debates about such incentive mechanisms tend to employ canonical historical anecdotes to motivate and support the analysis and policy proposals. Daguerre's “patent buyout,” the Longitude Prize, inducement prizes for butter substitutes and billiard balls, the activities of the Royal Society of Arts and other “encouragement” institutions—all comprise potentially misleading case studies. The article surveys and summarizes extensive empirical research using samples drawn from Britain, France, and the United States, including “great inventors” and their ordinary counterparts, and prizes at industrial exhibitions. The results suggest that administered systems of rewards to innovators suffered from a number of disadvantages in design and practice, which might be inherent to their nonmarket orientation.

In this study of lending in the emergence of a modern steel industry in the United States, I analyze the evolving interaction between borrowers and lenders in historical context. I show how “relationship lending” (that is, credit allocation in which personal contacts play a major role) can go wrong, despite good intentions at the outset, and that institutional conditions exert an important influence on how lenders and borrowers negotiate conflicts. Particularly important in the case of Moses Taylor and Joliet Iron & Steel Company were the uncertain jurisdictions and political maneuvering that stemmed from structural peculiarities of the U.S. legal system, peculiarities that belie claims of its efficacy for protecting creditor interests. Although this failure of relationship lending might seem to imply negative consequences for economic development, I show that, at least in this case, the opposite interpretation is more compelling.

This article addresses the issue of whether large shareholders in Victorian public companies were active in the control of companies or were simply wealthy rentiers. Using ownership records for 890 firm-years, we examine the control rights, socio-occupational background, and wealth of large shareholders. We find that many large shareholders had limited voting rights and neither they nor family members were directors. This implies that the majority of public companies in the second half of the nineteenth century cannot be characterized as family companies and that large shareholders are better viewed as wealthy gentlemen capitalists rather than entrepreneurs.

Executives of today's public companies face a considerably different set of opportunities and constraints than did their counterparts in the managerial capitalism era, which reached its apex in the 1950s and 1960s. The growing importance of corporate governance featured prominently as circumstances changed for those running public companies. This article explores these developments, taking into account high-profile corporate scandals occurring in the first half of the 1970s and the early 2000s, the 1980s “Deal Decade,” the “imperial” chief executive phenomenon, and changes to the roles played by directors and shareholders of public companies.