This issue of the Israel Law Review comprises three parts. The bulk of the issue is devoted to a collection of articles resulting from the international conference entitled “Human Rights and Justice in Immigration: National and International Perspectives,” held by the Minerva Center for Human Rights at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem in May 2009. The conference was the culmination of the work of an interdisciplinary research group, which had been working together at the Minerva Center since early 2007, and it was held with the cooperation of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung and the Hebrew University's Bruce W. Wayne Chair of International Law.

This Article considers the impact, or tremors, of paragraph 70 of the decision on interlocutory appeal on jurisdiction of the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in Prosecutor v. Tadić, which was delivered in October 1995. It establishes, and seeks to make clear, that the commitment of the Appeals Chamber in paragraph 70 of that decision was to provide definitions for both of the concepts of international and non-international armed conflicts, even though some impressions might be that the Appeals Chamber tended to run together these different concepts in order to provide a singular and overarching definition of “armed conflict.” In separate and successive turns, the Article explores the specific components of each concept as identified by the Appeals Chamber—first, for international armed conflicts, and, then, for non-international armed conflicts—before testing them against particular facts from practice as well as hypothetical examples, but the Article also makes use of a comparative investigation as to what the Appeals Chamber said for each form of armed conflict when contrasted with each other. We examine the extent to which these components have threaded themselves through subsequent practice—specifically the relationship of the 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court with the concept of non-international armed conflict—so as to chart the full progress of the jurisprudence of the Appeals Chamber in the afterlife of Tadić: hence the designation of the “tremors” of Tadić.

The main thesis of this Article is that the tendency to sweepingly use the human rights discourse in immigration contexts may be misguided. Moreover, the expansion of the human rights discourse beyond its natural and critical scope may have negative results and encourage states to act in ways that may harm important interests of immigrants. The unsuitability of applying human rights discourse to many of the core issues of immigration policy derives from three main reasons: First, is the immanent tension between the moral claims that rights are universal and apply to all individuals, and the fact that actual protection of human rights is the primary responsibility of states. Second, is the related distinction between the basic recognition of a human right and the processes of identifying the nature and scope of the duties such recognition involves. Third, are the institutional implications of choosing between the human rights discourse and discussion of policy questions. Issues determined by rights that have already been regulated can and should ordinarily be decided by independent courts; while issues of policy, especially ones that involve extensive enforcement and administrative structures, should be debated, resolved, and implemented by political players. While there are important aspects of immigration that do belong to core human rights in the strongest sense, most typical immigration issues are not, at this stage, matters of universal human rights.

This Article discusses the Palermo Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons. In the first part it offers a critical discussion of what is entailed by speaking of a “shortfall” of enforcement in dealing with the social problem of human trafficking. It then goes on to show that there are two competing narratives of this problem and of the way it is being responded to, and explains why we need to learn more about the interests and values that condition the “law in action.” In the last section the Article discusses the potential relevance of the idea of the “legal culture” for explaining the patterns of “law in action” in different countries and different agencies. The Article's overall aim is to show the existence of a link between the manner in which the problem of trafficking is socially defined in practice, and the role of legal culture in shaping this link.

On December 29, 2009, the Israeli Supreme Court, sitting as the High Court of Justice, delivered its judgment in Abu Safiya v. The Minister of Defense, annulling an order issued by an Israeli Military Commander, which completely barred Palestinians from travelling on Route 443, a major road in the West Bank. This note criticizes the Abu Safiya judgment as indicative, notwithstanding its specific outcome, of the Supreme Court's ongoing willingness to expand the ratione materiae and ratione personae of occupation law and to allow the military authorities to protect the interests of Israelis in the West Bank, even at the expense of the stronger rights conferred upon the local Palestinian population by the lex specialis—the laws of belligerent occupation.

Contemporary immigration has reinforced calls for minority rights in liberal states, which accrue to immigrants (but also to citizens) qua member of an ethnic minorify group. It is often overlooked that such minority rights may be of two kinds: multicultural rights that protect cultural differences or antidiscrimination rights that attack discrimination on these grounds. I argue that the importance of multicultural rights has been greatly exaggerated, and that much of the work attributed to them has in fact been accomplished by group-indifferent individual rights. By contrast, antidiscrimination rights are growing stronger; even in Europe. However, to the degree that it tackles indirect discrimination, antidiscrimination cannot but be factually group-making, even in states that reject multiculturalism.

This Article draws a distinction between two types of exercise of universal criminal jurisdiction with a view to demonstrating that one of them is deeply detrimental to domestic IHL enforcement mechanisms, and especially zeroes in on contemporay unilateral exercises of universal criminal jurisdiction, arguing that their unilateral character deprives domestic enforcement procedures of their legitimacy and efficacy. It begins by distinguishing between unilateral and multilateral uses of criminal universal jurisdiction. It then explains why unilateral exercises of universal jurisdiction and the absence of conventional basis do not, per se, stir any problems of legality. Its last part shows that unilateral exercises of universal jurisdiction, while not generating any problem of legality, fuel problems of legitimacy because of the discourse that generally accompanies such proceedings as well as the impossibility to relate such exercises to the consent of the State of nationality of the accused or that where the crime was committed. On this occasion, it is shown that the perceived illegitimacy of unilateral exercises of jurisdiction can prove harmful to the legitimacy and efficacy of domestic IHL enforcement procedures as a whole.

Given the burgeoning literature on the devaluation of national citizenship and the effects of globalization, the sources and beneficiaries of individual legal rights assume increased importance. This Article seeks to distinguish those legal rights that states should confine to their own citizens from those that flow from residence, immigration status, territorial presence, or simply personhood. Section I examines the very reasons for states to distribute citizenship in the first place. These reasons relate to participatory democracy, immigration privileges, other rights and disabilities, personal emotional fulfillment, building community, continuity over time, sovereignty, and the world order. It finds unconvincing those reasons that rest on the municipal interests of states but, given the present world order, finds those reasons that are rooted in international relations more compelling. Building on those conclusions, Section II considers a second normative question: What are the key variables that should determine whether a given legal right should be confined to citizens rather than made more generally available to all persons or at least selected classes of noncitizens? Section III then illustrates how one country—the United States—parcels out legal rights and examines whether its decisions comport with the demands of international human rights law.

This Article discusses the competences and powers of the UN Security Council in securing compliance with international humanitarian law, in particular through the adoption of the measures provided in Chapter VII of the Charter: The competence of the Council in this field can be founded on several legal grounds: on a broad interpretation of the notion of “threat to the peace” (Article 39 of the Charter), on Article 94(2) with regard to the International Court of Justice's judgments establishing violations of the jus in bello and also on the customary duty to ensure respect for international humanitarian law as reflected in Article 1 Common to the 1949 Geneva Conventions on the Protection of the Victims of War. In particular, such customary provision empowers the Security Council to react to any violation of international humanitarian law regardless of a nexus with concerns of international stability. Although the Council has adopted a variety of measures in relation to violations of the laws of war, the most incisive ones are those provided in Articles 41 and 42 of Chapter VII, which however are not without problems. The role the Security Council has played in the enforcement of international humanitarian law has been criticized because of its selective and opportunistic approach, which is due to the political nature of the organ. Also, in several instances the Council, far from securing compliance with the jus in bello, has instead interfered with its application. However selective and imperfect the Council's approach might be, though, its power to adopt decisions binding on UN members and its competence to take or authorize coercive measures involving the use of force make it potentially a formidable instrument against serious violations of international humanitarian law, partly remedying the lack of enforcing mechanisms in the treaties on the laws of war.

The language of morality and legality infuses every aspect of the Middle East conflict. From repeated assertions by officials that Israel has “the most moral army in the world” to justifications for specific military tactics and operations by reference to self-defense and proportionality, the public rhetoric is one of legal right and moral obligation. Less often heard are the voices of those on the ground whose daily experience is lived within the legal quagmire portrayed by their leaders in such uncompromising terms. This Article explores the opaque normative boundaries surrounding the actions of a specific group within the Israeli military, soldiers returning from duty in Hebron in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. By examining interviews with these soldiers by an Israeli NGO, it identifies different narratives of legality and illegality which inform their conduct, contrasting their failure to adhere to conventional legal discourses with the broader “legalization” of military activities. Seeking an explanation for this disjunction, it explores the ways in which the soldiers' stories nonetheless reflect attempts to negotiate various normative and legal realities. It places these within the legal landscape of the Occupied Palestinian Territories which has been normatively re-imagined by various forces in Israeli society, from the judicially-endorsed discourse of deterrence manifested in the day-to-day practices of brutality, intimidation and “demonstrating power,” to the growing influence of nationalist-religious interpretations of self-defense and the misuse of post-modernist theory by the military establishment to “smooth out” the moral and legal urban architectures of occupation. The Article concludes by considering the hope for change evident in the very act of soldiers telling ethically-oriented stories about their selves, and in the existence of a movement willing to provide the space for such reflections in an attempt to confront Israeli society with the day-to-day experiences of the soldier in the Occupied Palestinian Territories.

A fairly common premise in academic research about Israel is that the State of Israel has expropriated large tracts of land from Arabs, whether citizens or Palestinian refugees. This premise does not distinguish between the taking of property, which was expropriated from Arab refugees during the War of Independence, and the expropriation of land during the State's “regular course of business.” Blurring the distinction between land belonging to refugees and land belonging to citizens creates the impression that the State of Israel has expropriated large tracts of land as a regular “course of business.” This research isolates and clarifies the extent of “regular” expropriations on the national level according to the Lands (Acquisition for Public Purposes) Ordinance 1943—the main and permanent tool for large scale expropriations in Israel It shows that the common premise about expropriation of Arab citizens ‘land is highly exaggerated. The Arab population's share in the burden of expropriation was fairly small in absolute terms and is not significantly greater than the Jewish population's share.

While a quantitative analysis of the expropriations cannot in itself produce a conclusion about harmful and unjustified influences of the expropriations on Arab citizens, a quantitative analysis of each expropriation may produce information on which to make such a conclusion. Moreover, arguing against all expropriation of lands—which actually results in the transfer of resources from Arabs to Jews, irrespective of its scope and circumstances—may entail an a priori negation of Israel's right to use land resources and police powers to answer real public needs of the Jewish majority and can entail an a priori negation of the nature of Israel as a Jewish and democratic State—rather than a legitimate criticism on the merits of each expropriation.

The United Nations Security Council's recent involvement in the protection of children in armed conflict, particularly by seeking to prevent the recruitment and use of child soldiers, has attracted little attention from international lawyers. However, the process, initiated by Council Resolution 1612, has interesting parallels with non-compliance mechanisms in international environmental law and can be seen as an innovative attempt to harness the Security Council's “soft power” to engage both State and non-State parties to conflicts.

Singapore's immigration discourse is deeply influenced by its need to “right-size” its population. As a society that has and remains in need of immigration, contemporary immigration and globalization have rigorously challenged the conventional thinking and understanding of citizenship, as well as notions of who belongs and who does not. Nevertheless, international marriages and pervasive in-and out-migration for purposes of employment, study, and family, conspire to make more pronounced the decoupling of citizenship and residence in Singapore. This transnational dimension sits uncomfortably with the policy makers' desire for, and the imperatives of, state sovereignty, control, and jurisdiction.

Although one quarter of people living in Singapore are foreigners, concerns of human rights and justice are largely peripheral, if not absent from the immigration discourse. This is seen most clearly in employment issues pertaining to foreign female domestic workers (FDWs), most of who come from other parts of Southeast Asia. ‘Rights talk’ is largely absent even as activists seek to engage the key stakeholders through the subtle promotion of rights for such workers.

The government, however, has resisted framing the FDW issues as one of rights but instead has focused on promotional efforts that seek to enhance the regulatory framework. This dovetails with the reality that immigration law also functions as quasi-family law in which the freedom of FDWs and other foreign menial workers to marry Singapore citizens and permanent residents are severely restricted. As such, the immigration regime's selectivity functions as a draconian gatekeeper. Justice and human rights are but tangential concerns.

Global justice is a relatively new concept that is being developed both by scholars, who belong to the political school of thought, and by others, who define themselves as cosmopolitans. Whereas political scholars believe that the global implications of justice contemplate states or peoples, cosmopolitans refer to the individual as the subject of justice even when dealing with it on a global scale.

Despite the differences between the two schools, this Article shows that none has clearly called for the imposition of additional obligations upon states that would force them to allow immigrants to enter those states' territory. Further, our survey shows that the five scholars examined believe that considerations of global justice should compel developed states to offer at least some assistance to burdened or poor states in order to reduce the causes of migration. All differ regarding the type and scope of assistance but agree that the reasons for migration should be reduced in the state of origin.

What is missing in the scholarly works on global justice is a solution to the forced migration of masses of people. This problem cannot be solved, at least in the short run, solely by assisting the state of origin. As long as the lives of the migrants are threatened, states must open their gates to save them and agree that an international body will administer this issue and ensure that the burden is shared proportionally among the various states of the world. Such an international body will also be competent to promote programs of assistance to states, which will in turn reduce the need to migrate.

This Article focuses on the approach of the European Court of Human Rights, based in Strasbourg, concerning the relationship between secularism and freedom of religion and the application of the “margin of appreciation doctrine.” Through the investigation of the relevant jurisprudence of the Court dealing with religious freedom and the principle of secularism (the Şahin, Dahlab, and Lautsi cases), the Author demonstrates that Court jurisprudence is moving from the application of principles of “pluralist secularism” toward a “fundamentalist approach” to secularism. Having evaluated the modus operandi of the Court in the light of the competing interests at stake, the Author suggests that in deciding cases where secularism and freedom to manifest religion collide, the Court should follow a case-by-case approach primarily aimed at protecting individual liberties and has to consider the political and cultural background of each situation and the effective impact on the State's life of the individual behavior.

The European Union as a prominent regional organization is increasingly expected to contribute positively in terms of the promotion of certain values, both by European Union citizens and by the international community. These values include the promotion and development of international law, including international humanitarian law. The focus of this Article is on the influence, actual and potential, of the European Union in terms of promoting humanitarian law externally, and on ensuring respect of humanitarian law by third States. It briefly discusses the evolution of the duty to ensure respect and outlines the relevance of international humanitarian law to the external action of the European Union. The European Union Guidelines on Promoting Compliance with International Humanitarian Law are introduced and the background, content, and potential are explored. While not constituting binding law, these guidelines represent the position of the European Union in relation to promoting humanitarian law externally and reflect the responsibilities of European Union Member States with regard to ensuring respect for humanitarian law.

Israel still maintains the personal status system (millet) that it inherited from the Ottoman Empire under which the courts of fourteen ethno-religious communities are granted exclusive jurisdiction over matters of marriage and divorce and concurrent jurisdiction with the civil courts in regard to such matters as maintenance and inheritance. But, why Israel, as a highly centralized and democratic polity, has maintained the old millet system which applies different laws to people from different ethno-religious backgrounds and holds men and women to different legal standards? And, how has such a plural application of law affected fundamental rights and freedoms of Israeli citizens? In brief, the Article argues that Israel utilized the old millet system in the nation-building process as an instrument of vertical segmentation and horizontal homogenization. However, the system has encountered with some serious challenges in producing its intended goals. This becomes particularly visible when we take a closer look at the field of human rights where individuals constantly challenge the legitimacy of Stateimposed religious laws, and seek to advance rights and liberties which are denied to them under the current system by engaging in various strategies of resistance.

I argue in this Article that states have two types of moral duties with regard to their intake of immigrants. First, they have a duty to accept quotas of immigrants who have no individual rights to entrance prior to the determination of specific immigration criteria applicable in their case. Second, they have a duty to admit immigrants who are entitled to enter as individuals, namely, refugees and immigrants, who wish to enter the state for family reunification. However, under certain conditions, states could be justified in limiting the entrance of refugees and family reunification immigrants, who might eventually be eligible for naturalization by means of various qualifications and even quotas.

Initially, I defend the complex thesis stated above by rejecting two positions supported by contemporary liberal immigration theorists. One position advocates a cosmopolitan human right to immigration, namely, every single individual's right to immigrate into any country of his/her choosing. The other position claims that states have a universal right to lock their gates to immigration. Finally, I argue for the middle-ground position stated above.