The Gaza war, which started on 7 October 2023 through the horrendous attack by Hamas on Israel, has caused a depressing measure of human suffering on all sides. As far as Israel’s use of force is concerned, this war also constitutes a challenging case for the application of the jus contra bellum. This chiefly arises from the genuine legal uncertainty concerning the applicability of the right of self-defence when an armed attack by a non-state organisation emanates from the territory of a state that has proven unable to prevent said armed attack. Arguably, the situation in the Gaza Strip on 7 October 2023 presents the rare variation of such an ‘unable host state scenario’ where the non-state armed attack (by Hamas) against a state (Israel) has originated from a territory (the Gaza Strip) destined for the realisation of the right to self-determination of a people (the Palestinian people). In such a case, the dilemmatic conflict that underlies the uncertainty about the applicability of the right of self-defence is between the legally protected interests of the state that is the victim of the armed attack and those of the ‘host people’ of the non-state attacker.

This article discusses the potential influence of the existence of an underlying armed conflict in Gaza on the applicability and application of jus ad bellum. It rejects the Israeli ‘displacement’ approach whereby jus ad bellum does not play a role during an ongoing armed conflict as it finds no support in the sources of international law, in particular state practice. The article then provides possible explanations for the Israeli reliance on ‘displacement’ regardless of its shaky foundations: namely, the preference to provide overall justification for the operation, to avoid difficult political topics, and to allow Israel freedom of action in other arenas (such as Lebanon and Syria). Regardless of such findings, the article acknowledges that jus ad bellum faces challenges to its application during hostilities. It analyses the right of self-defence, as Israel has relied on such right to justify its use of force in Gaza, addressing relatively briefly jus ad bellum necessity while focusing on the various approaches to jus ad bellum proportionality, and the differences between such approaches when it comes to the legality of the use of force in self-defence in Gaza. Ultimately, the article argues that states must provide clear pronouncements on this issue to prevent the adoption of an overly permissive approach to the regulation of jus ad bellum during hostilities.

This article examines whether states may use force in self-defence against non-state actors operating from the territory of another state. It first maps the prevailing approaches to self-defence in response to non-state armed attacks, focusing on attribution, Article 3(g) of the United Nations General Assembly’s Definition of Aggression, and the ‘unable or unwilling’ doctrine. It argues that these approaches give rise to normative, methodological and practical difficulties and often leave states without an effective right to defend themselves. The article then goes on to explain the morphology of the right of self-defence. It contends that self-defence is a primary rule of international law permitting the use of force in response to an armed attack as a factual occurrence, irrespective of its perpetrator. It further argues that self-defence is neither an exception to Article 2(4), nor a legal sanction. On this basis, the right of self-defence extends to armed attacks by non-state actors, even when they operate from within the territory of another state. In such cases, self-defence as a circumstance precluding wrongfulness excuses the responsibility of the defending state for incidental violations of the territorial state’s sovereignty in the course of defensive action.

This article seeks to detail what Israel owes the people who live in the Gaza Strip with respect to water. It also highlights the opportunity for Israeli security presented by the provision of reliable water resources and infrastructure to the Gaza Strip. I argue that continued provision of water is required by both international law and ethics; additionally, it is the most prudent policy choice. This was true before the terrorist attacks of 7 October 2023, during the armed conflict that followed, and will be true after the armed conflict ends. It also asserts that Israel’s actions that damage the water infrastructure of the Gaza Strip are legally restricted. Further, it is in Israel’s interest to build a sustainable water solution for the people of the Gaza Strip. Once that self-interest is realised and internalised, the demands of law and ethics may become politically possible as well. Realising that self-interest requires overcoming the powerful dehumanising discourse that is currently dominating ‘pro-Israel’ and ‘pro-Palestine’ communities, humanising action (such as the provision of water security) is the best way to overcome such dehumanising narratives.

This article examines how the obligation to take precautionary measures to verify targets under international humanitarian law (IHL) can be applied with artificial intelligence decision support systems (AI-DSS). It uses the reported deployment of systems like ‘Lavender’ and ‘Where's Daddy?’ by Israel in the Gaza War as an illustrative example, breaks down the use of AI-DSS into stages – legal qualification, classification, and identification/location – and evaluates how precautions to verify can reduce the risk of false positives in each of these stages. It argues that precautions to verify must be applied at all stages, and discusses factors that affect their feasibility. The article concludes that while human oversight remains essential, precautions specific to AI-DSS outside the realm of the human operator are possible, and at times, necessary to ensure compliance with IHL.

This article critiques the assessment by exporting states of assurances that exported arms will not be misused by recipient states, with a focus on the Gaza conflict. First, the article develops a transferable framework for evaluating assurances. Building on the arms export obligations in the Geneva Conventions, and the implementation of those export obligations in the Arms Trade Treaty and EU Common Position, the article synthesises a due diligence test. It also draws on assurance assessment in another field where assurances are routinely given to overcome risk: when assurances attempt to address the risk of mistreatment to an expelled person implicating non-refoulement. The methodology for assurances assessments in risk prediction has been developed extensively in that area and closely resembles a similar approach emerging for arms exports. The article articulates the relevant criteria for assessing assurances when completing a due diligence risk assessment for arms exports and then applies that framework to the US arms exports in relation to the Gaza conflict. Under National Security Memorandum 20, the United States released a public report on its assurances assessment, offering a rare partial glimpse into the use of assurances in arms exports and an opportunity to examine whether assurances are being assessed in alignment with international practice. The result of the article is a clear practical checklist for lawful reliance on assurances and a tentative conclusion that the assessment by the US was not in compliance with international standards.

This article analyses the October 7th 2023 Hamas attack on Israel through the lens of the Genocide Convention, arguing that these actions constitute genocide under international law. Drawing on international case law, the analysis demonstrates how Hamas’ actions meet both the physical element and specific intent requirements for genocide, evidenced by its ideology, systematic policies and leadership statements. The article also examines how reverse accusations of genocide against Israel have functioned as a rhetorical shield to deflect recognition of Hamas’ own genocidal actions. It analyses the legal implications for state parties and the international community.

The article demonstrates that the orders of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in the Gaza Strip are highly problematic from a legal perspective. There are strong indications that the ICJ acted outside the scope of its authority by adopting a very vague but progressive interpretation of the Genocide Convention combined with a novel application of Article 41 of the ICJ Statute, which allowed the ICJ to adopt specific interim measures in the first, second and third orders. Finally, an overall analysis indicates that the ICJ has begun to act as the ultimate genocide prevention body in attempting to enforce a general duty to minimise human suffering in Gaza. While this might be seen as a laudable exercise to protect civilians, it seems to be beyond the scope of the Genocide Convention and the judicial authority of the ICJ.