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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 19 March 2012
This Article draws a distinction between two types of exercise of universal criminal jurisdiction with a view to demonstrating that one of them is deeply detrimental to domestic IHL enforcement mechanisms, and especially zeroes in on contemporay unilateral exercises of universal criminal jurisdiction, arguing that their unilateral character deprives domestic enforcement procedures of their legitimacy and efficacy. It begins by distinguishing between unilateral and multilateral uses of criminal universal jurisdiction. It then explains why unilateral exercises of universal jurisdiction and the absence of conventional basis do not, per se, stir any problems of legality. Its last part shows that unilateral exercises of universal jurisdiction, while not generating any problem of legality, fuel problems of legitimacy because of the discourse that generally accompanies such proceedings as well as the impossibility to relate such exercises to the consent of the State of nationality of the accused or that where the crime was committed. On this occasion, it is shown that the perceived illegitimacy of unilateral exercises of jurisdiction can prove harmful to the legitimacy and efficacy of domestic IHL enforcement procedures as a whole.
1 See the preamble of the Resolution of the Institut de Droit international on Universal criminal jurisdiction with regard to the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes adopted in Krakow on Aug. 26, 2005, http://www.idi-iil.org/idiE/resolutionsE/2005_kra_03_3en.pdf.
2 See O'Keefe, Roger, Universal Jurisdiction: Clarifying the Basic Concept, 2 J. Int'l Crim. Just 735 (2004)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
3 Belgium has constituted a classical example. On the evolution of the Belgian legislation pertaining to universal jurisdiction, see d'Argent, Pierre, L'experience belge de la compétence universelle: Beaucoup de bruit pour rien? 108 Revue Générale de Droit International Public 597–632 (2004)Google Scholar; see also the unconditional universality adopted by the Spanish Constitutional Tribunal reversal of the decisions of the National High Court and the Supreme Court in the case of the Guatemalan Generals on Sept. 26, 2005, www.tribunalconstitucional.es. See Ascensio, Hervé, The Spanish Constitutional Tribunal's Decision in the Guatemalan Generals: Unconditional Universality is Back, 4 J. Int'l Crim. Just. 586–94 (2006)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
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5 On the idea of representation behind universal jurisdiction, see Abi-Saab, Georges, The Proper Role of Universal Jurisdiction, 1 J. Int'l Crim. Just. 596 (2003)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
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7 On the diverging understandings of criminal jurisdiction in the literature, see Dissenting Opinion of Judge ad hoc van den Wyngaert in the Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium), 2002, I.C.J. 3, para. 44 (Feb. 14) [hereinafter Arrest Warrant case].
8 For similar understanding, see Kress, Claus, Universal Jurisdiction over International Crimes and the Institut de Droit International, 4 J. Int'l Crim. Just. 561, 565 (2006)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
9 In the same sense, see Abi-Saab, supra note 5, at 600.
10 Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal), 2009 (Feb. 19), http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=3&code=bs&case=144&k=5e.
11 Certain Criminal Proceedings in France (Republic of Congo v. France), 2003 (Apr. 13), Certain Criminal Proceedings in France (Congo v. Fr.), 2003 I.C.J. 102 (Provisional Measure Order of June 17), http://icj-cij.org/common/print.php?pr=65&p1=3&p2=1&case=129&p3=6.
13 Public Sitting, (Rwanda v. Belgium), 2001 (Oct. 19), CR 2001/10, at 11, http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/121/4219.pdf?PHPSESSID=44b1ea02554d6a14c3326e674ee6f16e.
14 For some early comments on this decision, see d'Aspremont, Jean & Dopagne, Frédéric, La loi de compétence universelle devant la Cour internationale de Justice, Journal des Tribunaux 284 (2002)Google Scholar.
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17 On this distinction, see O'Keefe, Roger, The Grave Breaches Regime and Universal Jurisdiction, 7 J. Int'l Crim. Just. 811, 817, 827 (2009)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
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20 Convention for the Suppression of the Illicit Traffic in Dangerous Drugs, June 26, 1936, 198 LNTS 301; see also Starke, Joseph G., The Convention of 1936 for the Suppression of the Illicit Traffic in Dangerous Drugs, 31 Am. J. Int'l L. 31 (1937)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
21 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277. Draft Article VII reads: “The High Contracting Parties pledge themselves to punish any offender under this Convention within any territory under their jurisdiction, irrespective of the nationality of the offender or the place where the offence has been committed.” Article VI of the Convention now reads “Persons charged with genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in Article 3 shall be tried by a competent tribunal of the State in the territory of which the act was committed, or by such international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction with respect to those Contracting Parties which shall have accepted its jurisdiction.” On the drafting of the Genocide Convention, see generally Lippman, Matthew, The Drafting of the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 3 B.U. Int'l L. J. 1 (1985)Google Scholar.
22 See O'Keefe, supra note 17.
23 Among many examples of international treaties providing for the exercise of a criminal universal jurisdiction if the accused is found on the territory, see 1970 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft or the 1984 Convention against Torture, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85; see also the four 1949 Geneva Conventions: Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949,75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 28.
24 See the Report of the ILC Special Rapporteur Zdzislaw Galicki on the Obligation to Extradite or Prosecute (aut dedere aut judicare), U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/571, at 5 et seq. (July 12, 2006) [hereinafter Report on Obligation to Extradite or Prosecute]. The difference of wording does however not change the substance of the obligation. See Plachta, Michael, Aut Dedere Aut Judicare: An Overview of Modes of Implementation and Approaches, 6 Maastricht J. Eur. & Comp. L. 332 (1999)Google Scholar.
25 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, art. 7, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85. For a particular application of that provision, see The Pinochet Case: Origins, Progress and Implications (Davis, Madeleine ed., 2003)Google Scholar; The Pinochet case: A Legal and Constitutional Analysis (Woodhouse, Diana ed., 2000)Google Scholar; see Millett, Lord, The Pinochet Case: some Personal Reflections, in International Law 7–10 (Evans, Malcolm ed., 2d ed. 2006)Google Scholar; Jennings, Robert, The Pinochet Extradition Case in the English Courts, in The International Legal System in Quest of Equity and Universality 677–98 (de Chazoumes, Laurence Boisson & Gowlland-Debbas, Vera eds., 2001)Google Scholar; Horowitz, Jodi, Regina v. Bartle and the Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis and Others ex parte Pinochet: Universal Jurisdiction and Sovereign Immunity for Jus Cogens Violations, 23 Fordham Int'l L. J. 489–527 (1999)Google Scholar.
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27 convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft [Hijacking Convention], Dec. 16, 1970, 860 U.N.T.S. 105; see Kress, supra note 8, at 567-68.
28 For an earlier form of these try-or-extradite clauses, see Articles 49,50, 129, & 146 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions as well as Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, art. 85.1, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3.
29 See Grotius, supra note 18. On the differences between how Grotius designed the mechanism and its subsequent conventional implementation, see Report on Obligation to Extradite or Prosecute, supra note 23, at 2 et seq.
30 See O'Keefe, supra note 17, at 828.
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32 Reydams, Luc, Universal Jurisdiction: International and Municipal Legal Perspective 28 et seq. (2003)Google Scholar.
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34 The expression is from O'Keefe, supra note 17, at 825-26.
35 See O'Keefe, supra note 2, at 751.
36 Among others, see Inazumi, Mitzsue, Universal Jurisdiction in Modern International Law: Expansion of National Jurisdiction for Prosecuting Serious Crimes under International Law (2005)Google Scholar; Reydams, supra note 32, Universal Jurisdiction: International and Municipal Legal Perspective; Ana Peyro Lopis, La compétence universelle en matière de crimes contre l'humanité (2003).
37 By virtue of Article 17 of the Statute of the International Criminal Court, the exercise of universal jurisdiction could render inadmissible any prosecution on the same matter before the International Criminal Court; see Reydams, supra note 32, Universal Jurisdiction: International and Municipal Legal Perspective, supra note 36, at 221; d'Argent, supra note 3, at 602.
38 For a very radical view, see Fletcher, George P., Against Universal Jurisdiction, 1 J. Int'l Crim. Just. 580–84 (2003)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. A similar uneasiness has also been expressed toward international criminal proceedings in abstentia. See, e.g., Prosecutor v Blaskić, Case No. IT-95-14-AR, Review of the Decision of Trial Chamber II of 29 October 1997, para. 59 (July 18, 1997). On the question of human rights in international criminal proceedings, see Zappala, Salvatore, Human Rights in International Criminal Proceeding (2003)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
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47 ILA, Report of the 69th Conference 403–31 (2000).
48 AU-EU Expert Report on the Principle of Universal Jurisdiction, supra note 15, at 7 ff.
49 See, e.g., International Federation of Human Rights, Position Paper to the United Nations General Assembly at its 64th Session, October 2009, http://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/FIDH_Position_Paper_to_the_GA_-_64.pdfGoogle Scholar.
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51 Arrest Warrant case, supra note 7.
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55 See Arrest Warrant case, supra note 7, para. 61.
Thirdly, after a person ceases to hold the office of Minister for Foreign Affairs, he or she will no longer enjoy all of the immunities accorded by international law in other States. Provided that it has jurisdiction under international law, a court of one State may try a former Minister for Foreign Affairs of another State in respect of acts committed prior or subsequent to his or her period of office, as well as in respect of acts committed during that period of office in a private capacity.
56 See Advisory opinion on the accordance with international law of the unilateral declaration of independence in respect of Kosovo, July 22, 2010 (not yet published) the declaration of Judge Simma, at 1-3.
57 Id. paras. 50-56 & 79-84.
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The exploration and use of the moon shall be the province of all mankind and shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific development. Due regard shall be paid to the interests of present and future generations as well as to the need to promote higher standards of living and conditions of economic and social progress and development in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.
94 Antarctic Treaty, Dec.1, 1959, 402 U.N.T.S. 71 and Protocol on Environment Protection to the Antarctic Treaty, Oct. 4, 1991, 30 ILM 1461 (1991). See Verhoeven, Joe, Sands, Philippe, & Bruce, Maxwell, The Antarctic Environment and International Law (1992)Google Scholar; Pinto, M. C. W., The International Community and Antarctica, 33 U. Miami L. Rev. 475 (1979)Google Scholar; Pinto, M. C. W., Governance in Antarctica, in Essays in Honour of Wang Tieya 587 (MacDonald, Ronald ed., 1994)Google Scholar.
95 See The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Montego Bay, Dec. 10, 1982 499 U.N.T.S. 311, part. IX.
96 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, Mar.22, 1985, 26 ILM 529 (1987).
97 See Pardo, Arvid & Christol, Carl Q., The Common Interest: Tension Between the Whole and the Parts, in The Structure and Process of International Law 643, 647 (McDonald, John and Johnston, Douglas eds., 1983)Google Scholar.
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102 Moravcsik, Andrew, The Origin of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Postwar Europe, 54 Int'l Org. 217, 220 et. seq. (2000)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. (He construes human rights as the result of instrumental calculations about domestic policies. Drawing on the experience of postwar European democratization, Moravcsik argues that States are ready to relinquish a part of their sovereignty by adhering to a human rights regime in order to constrain the behaviour of subsequent domestic governments. Applying his theory beyond the European framework, he claims that newly established democracies use human rights regimes—in the broad sense—to “lock in” credible domestic policies through international commitments).
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105 See Ghai, Yash, Universalism and Relativism: Human Rights as a Framework for Negotiating Interethnic Claims, 21 Cardozo L. Rev. 1095, 1095 (2000)Google Scholar. On conflict prevention strategies, see generally, Quane, Helen, Rights in Conflict? The Rationale and Implications of Using Human Rights in Conflict Prevention Strategies, 47 Vand. J. Int'l L. 463 (2007)Google Scholar.
106 This idea can also be found in Donnelly, J., Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice 63–64 (2003)Google Scholar.
107 Yasuaki, Onuma, In Quest for Intercivilizational Human Rights, 1 Asia-Pacific J. Hum. Rts. & L. 53–88, 76–77 (2000)Google Scholar.
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109 See Mégret, Frédéric, The Politics of International Criminal Justice, 13 Eur. J. Int'l L. 1261 (2002)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See also Beigbeder, Yves, Judging War Criminals: The Politics of International Justic (1999)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For an account of International Humanitarian Law based on self-serving parameters, see Posner, Eric, A Theory of the Laws of War, Chicago John M. Olin Law & Economics Working Paper No. 160, http://www.law.uchicago.edu/lawecon/index.htmlGoogle Scholar. See the rejection of that approach by George Fletcher, P., Parochial versus Universal Criminal Law, 3 J. Int'l Crim. Just. 20, 25–26 (2005)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
110 Sornarajah, Muthu, An Overview of the Asian Approaches to International Humanitarian Law, 9 Aust. Y. B. Int'l L. 238 (1985)Google Scholar. On the contribution of Asian scholars to this debate, see generally, d'Aspremont, Jean, International Law in Asia: the Limits to the Western Constitutionalist and Liberal Doctrines, 13 Asian Y.B. Int'l L. 89 (2008)Google Scholar.
111 Corfu Channel (UK v. Albania), 1995, I.C.J. 4, at 22.
112 Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. 1951 15, at 23 (May 28):
The Convention was manifestly adopted for a purely humanitarian and civilizing purpose. It is indeed difficult to imagine a convention that might have this dual character to a greater degree, since its object, on the one hand, is to safeguard the very existence of certain human groups and, on the other, to confirm and endorse the most elementary principle of morality. In such a convention, the contracting States do not have any interests of their own; they merely have, one and all, a common interest, the accomplishment of those high purposes which are the raison d'être of the convention. Consequently, in a convention of this type, one cannot speak of individual advantages or disadvantages to States, or of the maintenance of a perfect contractual balance between rights and duties.
113 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. US), 1986, I.C.J. 14 at 112-14 (June 27)
114 South West Africa (Ethiopia and Liberia v. South Africa) (Second Phase), 1966, I.C.J. 6, at 34 (July 18).
115 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), 2007, I.C.J. para. 147 (Feb. 26).
116 d'Aspremont, Jean, The Foundations of the International Legal Order, 18 Finnish Y.B. Int'l L. 219 (2007)Google Scholar.
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119 This is why Kelsen argued that opinio juris is a fiction to disguise law-creating powers of judges. See Kelsen, Hans, Théorie du droit international coutumier, 10 Revue Internationale de la théorie du droit 253 (1939)Google Scholar. This indeterminacy and the correlative leeway of judges has led some scholars to call for an abandonment of custom as a source of customary international law. See Dunbar, N. C. H., The Myth of Customary International Law, 8 Aust. Y.B. Int'l L. 1 (1983)Google Scholar. For a criticism of this position, see contra Tasioulas, John, Opinio Juris and the Genesis of Custom: A Solution to the ‘Paradox’, 26 Aust. Y.B. Int'l L. 199 (2007)Google Scholar.
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122 Principle 12: Inclusion of Universal Jurisdiction in Future Treaties.
123 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-95-16-T, para. 527 (Jan.14,2000).
124 See Henckaerts, Jean-Marie, Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law: a Contribution to the Understanding and Respect for the Rule of law in Armed Conflict, 87 Int'l Rev. Red Cross 175 (2005)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See the critique of Boyle, Alan & Chinkin, Christine The Making of International Law 36 (2007)Google Scholar. See also the critique expressed by Bellinger, J. B. and Haynes, William J., A U.S. Government Response to the International Committee of the Red Cross Study Customary International Humanitarian Law Study, 46 ILM 514 (2007), http://www.defenselink.mil/home/pdf/Customary_International_Humanitiarian_Law.pdfGoogle Scholar; see the reaction of Henckaerts, Jean-Marie, Customary International Humanitarian Law—a Response to US Comments, 89 Int'l Rev. Red Cross 473 (2007)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
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126 In the same sense, see Abi-Saab, supra note 125, at 63–64.
127 I owe this argument to some interesting discussions with Professor Yuval Shany.
128 See for instance the Alakrana Ship case. The ship was captured in the Indian Ocean and later freed by a Spanish vessel. See Cala, Andrés, Spain Arraigns Somalis Suspected of Piracy, Int'l Herald Trib., Oct. 14, 2009, at 3Google Scholar (noting justifications put forward by Spain when transferring the pirates to Spain). On the recent proceedings engaged against Somali pirates in the United States, see Rivera, Ray, Somali Man Pleads Guilty in 2009 Hijacking of Ship, N.Y. Times, May 18, 2010Google Scholar; Weiser, Benjamin, Somali ‘Man Accused in ‘09 Piracy May Plead Guilty, N.Y. Times, Apr. 12, 2010Google Scholar; Weiser, Benjamin, Pirate Suspect Charged as Adult in New York, N.Y. Times, Apr. 21, 2009Google Scholar.
129 See Rubin, Alfred P., The Law of Piracy 391 (2d ed. 1998)Google Scholar.
130 Dec. 10, 1982, 516 U.N.T.S. 205
131 See contra the 2d principle of the 2001 Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction, supra note 16.
132 See, e.g., Verhoeven, J., Droit International Public 136 (2000)Google Scholar. See also Reydams, supra note 4.
133 Security Council Resolution 1816, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1816 (June 2, 2008) of the Security Council has extended the entitlement of State to seize non-State actors having committed acts of piracy or armed robbery to the territorial waters of Somalia.
134 See id. preamble.
