Division of labor is thought to imply increasing returns to scale, which in turn implies that wages rise continually with economic growth. Yet the price theory of Wealth of Nations rests upon the assumption that the “natural” price of labor (and capital) is determined at any steady-state rate of balanced growth. There would seem, therefore, to be an irreconcilable contradiction between Smith’s exposition of the division of labor in Book I, chapters 1 to 3, and his price theory as set out in Book I, chapters 6 to 9.

The year 1966 was central to the history of the Coase theorem debates, featuring the entry of the idea of a ‘Coase theorem’ into economic discourse and the eruption of the controversy over the the correctness of Coase’s negotiation result. This paper examines economists’ treatments of Coase’s result in 1966 and through the remainder of the decade, a period during which its place in the professional discourse began to solidify and three ‘camps’ began to develop around it: those who believed Coase’s result correct but of limited real-world applicability, those who found it relevant for explaining and devising policy with regard to a wide swath of externality-related phenomena, and those who argued and purported to demonstrate that this result was simply incorrect or wrong-headed on one or another grounds.

Since its birth in 1944, the World Bank has had a strong focus on development projects. Yet, a project evaluation function was not made operational until the early 1970s. An early attempt to conceptualize project appraisal had been initiated in the 1960s by Albert Hirschman, whose undertaking raised high expectations at the Bank. Yet, Hirschman’s conclusions—published first in internal Bank reports and finally as a book in 1967—disappointed many at the Bank, primarily because they were found impractical. Hirschman attempted to offer the Bank a new Weltanschauung by transforming the Bank’s approach to project design, project management, and project appraisal. Instead, what the Bank expected from Hirschman was not a revolution, but rather an examination of the Bank’s projects and advice on how to make project design and management more measurable, more controllable, and more suitable for replication.

The history of this failed collaboration gives useful insights on the unstable equilibrium between operations and evaluation within the Bank. In addition, it shows that the Bank was active in the development economics debates of the 1960s. These insights should be of interest for those development economists today who reflect on the future of the discipline and emphasize the need for a non-dogmatic approach to the study of development issues. It should also be of interest for the Bank itself, with its renewed attention to the importance of evaluation for effective development policies. The history of the practice of development economics, together with the use of archival material, can bring new perspectives that contribute to a better understanding of the evolution of this discipline.

The paper investigates how Arthur Pigou came to adopt the reasoning essentially based on the working of the IS-LM model and to admit that money wage cuts are neutral to employment under the liquidity trap. This occurred through his involvement in the controversy with John Maynard Keynes in 1937–38. In the first instance, Pigou used a simple model to oppose Keynes’s assertion on such neutrality. Pigou (and Keynes too) applied verbal logical analysis to the model to derive his conclusions. Submitting a paper to the Economic Journal, Nicholas Kaldor analyzed Pigou’s model in mathematical terms and asserted that Pigou derived inconsistent conclusions from his model. Kaldor’s method eventually convinced Pigou, Keynes, and Dennis Robertson (who participated in the debate in correspondence). The paper thus argues that the controversy was concluded when one form of model analysis replaced another; specifically, when mathematical analysis replaced verbal logical analysis. This study provides a case study to the first category of Mary Morgan’s two functions of economic modeling: models as an object to inquire into and models as an object with which to inquire.

This paper considers the distinction made by David Ricardo between “permanent” and “temporary” causes, which he sometimes refers to also as “stable” and “accidental” causes (see The Works and Correspondence of David Ricardo [hereinafter Works] I: 86, 88, 92; VI: 154), to derive implications useful to distinguish his approach from subsequent developments of the notions of short-period and long-period equilibrium. In particular, I trace the change of focus in the concept of “permanent” forces brought about by Alfred Marshall—from whose insights Alfred Kahn and John Maynard Keynes drew inspiration for their short-period analysis—which paved the way to fundamental changes in the method and theory.

It is argued that Ricardo’s distinction maintains an heuristic value, in particular vis-à-vis the distinction between short and long period, which is part of the common language in standard economics.

Ronald Coase was in his early twenties when he developed his groundbreaking theory of the firm. This theory represented a new approach with no obvious precursors, but from where did it arise? This article traces the origins of Coase’s theory of the firm and provides a context for its formation. I argue that Coase’s arguments were rooted in the exchange of ideas in the Socialist Calculation Debate, and that, in this context, one could read his theory of the firm as an argument in defense of economic planning.

This article is an addition to the revisited history of financial economics. While Markowitz (1952, 1959), Roy (1952), and Tobin (1958) are recognized as the founding fathers of Modern Portfolio Theory, we recall that its origins should be traced prior to 1914. We consider two, turn-of-the-century, French, financial analysts and suggest that notions such as risk aversion and risk premium, international diversification and correlation, specific and systematic risks and arbitrage were common sense for Leroy-Beaulieu (1906) and Neymarck (1913). The contribution of these authors to the development of Modern Portfolio Theory—long before the 1950s—should not be underestimated.

Based on archival evidence, this paper demonstrates that Keynes did not borrow the concept of the marginal efficiency of capital from Fisher, but, rather, developed it himself.

This paper explores the neglected theory of entrepreneurial profit proposed by Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk. Although historians of thought often dismiss Böhm-Bawerk’s writings on this topic, we argue that he did develop a coherent theory of entrepreneurial decision making and profit distinct from his theory of interest. We first discuss Böhm-Bawerk’s ideas about futurity, uncertainty, and expectations in his theory of goods, which help form the foundation of his theory of entrepreneurship. Further, we connect his notion of uncertainty with his thoughts on money. We then turn to several of Böhm-Bawerk’s ideas about entrepreneurial profit. Entrepreneurs purchase and allocate factors of production; these decisions are speculative because production takes time, and therefore entrepreneurs bear the uncertainty of the market. Their judgment thus yields profits or losses based upon the ability to anticipate the future state of consumer demand. Finally, we discuss the views of several of Böhm-Bawerk’s contemporaries, in order to place his theory in historical context.

The usual internalization of externality ‘by the market’ can be thought of through two different exchange modes: competitive markets, with Kenneth J. Arrow (1969); or bargaining, with Ronald H. Coase (1960). Although, in both cases, ‘externality’ refers to a non-exchanged effect that produces suboptimalities, these authors are working with two different, implicit conceptions of externality, rooted in different analytical worlds and calling for different institutions—parametric prices for the former but not for the latter. Moreover, while both start out with different theoretical frameworks, the authors share a concern for realism and unite when they introduce transaction costs, both advocating a policy design that calls for taking into account the costs of the different solutions. Nevertheless, this introduction of transaction costs does not itself escape consistency problems, since they do both maintain a reference to their respective ideal worlds.

Wild price swings following World War I motivated some economists and their allies to start a stable money campaign. John R. Commons joined this campaign, and the story of his participation opens a window into an historical learning episode in which the campaign, though it failed, sparked intellectual efforts and interacted with events in ways that changed beliefs about relations between central bank actions, on the one hand, and unemployment, inflation, and economic growth, on the other. The paper dwells on Commons’ role and on the long learning experience that led participants to conclusions they could not have anticipated when they embarked on their campaign.

In a series of papers, Mark Blaug has accused modern, mainstream economic theory of sterility because of the abandonment of “competition as a process,” tracing the cause to the Formalist Revolution of the 1950s. The paper agrees with the criticism but disagrees on the cause, which is, rather, to be found in the shift from the treatment of capital as a single factor of variable ‘form’ to a Walrasian specification of the capital endowment as a given vector, a datum incompatible with the role of equilibrium as a center of gravitation of time-consuming adjustments. The shift was due, as shown by Pierangelo Garegnani, to unease in the 1930s with the conception of capital as a single factor, a fact neglected by Blaug but historically evident and a cause of great uncertainty in capital theory in subsequent decades. The conclusion is that, to avoid the sterility of neo-Walrasian equilibria, one cannot return to Alfred Marshall with his inconsistent notion of capital as a single factor, but Blaug himself indicates another possible direction.

The significance of Haavelmo’s “The Probability Approach in Econometrics” (1944), the foundational document of modern econometrics, has been interpreted in widely different ways. Some regard it as a blueprint for a provocative (but ultimately unsuccessful) program dominated by the need for a priori theoretical identification of econometric models. Others focus more on statistical adequacy than on theoretical identification. They see its deepest insights as unduly neglected. The present article uses bibliometric techniques and a close reading of econometrics articles and textbooks to trace the way in which the economics profession received, interpreted, and transmitted Haavelmo’s ideas. A key irony is that the first group calls for a reform of econometric thinking that goes several steps beyond Haavelmo’s initial vision; the second group argues that essentially what the first group advocates was already in Haavelmo’s “Probability Approach” from the beginning.

Following the publication of The Logic of Collective Action by Mancur Olson in 1965, the notion of free riding gained wide currency in economics. The idea of enjoying the benefits of collective action without incurring the corresponding costs seemed to shed light on a number of major issues in American society at a time when social ills of various kinds prompted policy makers to reconsider the conditions of social cohesion. Gradually, free riding became to be regarded as the standard behavior of people placed in certain circumstances rather than the exception confirming the rule that people pay for what they get.

In this article, after reviewing the various meanings associated with the term free riding (and free rider), I follow the notion from the late 1930s to the early 1970s. I show that though it was used to tackle problems in fields as diverse as finance and labor—the study of which betrays the usual tensions between the free market and government intervention—from the mid-1960s, the notion increasingly conveyed a message about society as a whole. That an economic notion could serve such a purpose is another indication of the permeation of society by economic reasoning.

This paper examines the arguments of Colonel Robert Torrens against the hypothetical prospect that rising corn prices might result in higher farmers’ profits by reducing the real costs of manufactured articles used in the crop-growing activity. First, it shows how this idea evolved through time in Malthus’ writings on rent. Next, it scrutinizes Torrens’ approach to the subject of value, from its origins to the more elaborate version built up in some of his early inquiries regarding political economy. The outcome of his effort was a simplified image of the mutual interaction among the productive sectors, similar to modern input–output models, composed of an interdependent system with prices and a uniform profit rate determined simultaneously. Finally, some applications for this innovative analytical device are presented, but with an emphasis on the refutation of Malthus’ proposition. The concluding remarks stress Torrens’ ability to devise a proper quantitative answer to the parson’s theoretical challenge despite the scanty technical resources available to classical economists at that time.

This paper examines James Buchanan’s earliest writings within the context of post-WWII public finance theory and his education at Chicago. Public choice scholars have long recognized their ties to Chicago, but few have examined Chicago’s role in serving as the primordial soup for Buchanan’s later work in public choice. Thus, we know very little about the subdiscipline of public finance at Chicago and its institutional and intellectual traditions in the immediate post-war period. As the influence of Frank Knight, price theory, and catallactics on Buchanan have been well explored, the focus here is on Buchanan’s graduate training in public finance, the departmental emphasis on product differentiation of ideas, and the general acceptance in ‘Old Chicago School’ economics of the importance of institutions and institutional design. I find that while he maintained a high degree of intellectual affinity with Chicago economics generally, Buchanan broke decisively with orthodox public finance (including that taught at Chicago) on several substantive issues early in his career, including the importance of expenditure theory and the relevance of the benefit principle and voluntary exchange.

The scholastic intellectual tradition was the dominant scientific paradigm for nearly five centuries in western Europe. That the economic issues of interest to these scholars were similar throughout the period is undisputable, but were the individual views on these issues also similar? This is a pertinent question, upon which an evaluation of the evolution of this intellectual tradition, which often has been considered as monolithic, can be based.

This paper focuses on the analysis of the so-called “natural law case” against usury, and tracks how the lines of intellectual reasoning subtly evolved between early and late scholastics. While the issues, methods, and purposes of scholastic thought remained the same in this period, there also was a systematic evolution within this tradition that makes the essence of the scholastic doctrines conformable to economic realities.