This paper extends the benchmark macro-finance (MF) model by introducing, next to the standard macroeconomic factors, additional liquidity-related and return-forecasting factors. Liquidity factors are obtained from a decomposition of the money market spread, while the return-forecasting (risk premium) factor is extracted by imposing a single-factor structure on the 1-period expected excess holding return. The model is estimated on U.S. data using Markov chain Monte Carlo techniques. Two findings stand out. First, the model significantly outperforms most structural and nonstructural MF yield curve models in terms of the cross-sectional fit of the yield curve. Second, financial shocks have a statistically and economically significant impact on the yield curve.

This paper proposes a measure of ex ante equity premium, IPOFDR, which is the average difference between the initial public offering (IPO) offer price and the 1st-trading-day close price. I test the idea in 3 ways. First, there is a positive relation between IPOFDR and future market returns. Second, changes in IPOFDR help explain the cross section of stock returns. Third, the predictive power of IPOFDR for stock returns reflects mainly its close relation with market variance and average idiosyncratic variance—arguably measures of systematic risk. These results cast doubt on the notion that the IPO 1st-day return is a measure of investor sentiment.

This study extends the Grullon, Michaely, and Swaminathan (2002) analysis by incorporating default risk. Using data for firms that either increased or initiated cash dividend payments during the 23-year period 1986–2008, we find reduction in default risk. This reduction is shown to be a priced risk factor beyond the Fama and French (1993) risk measures, and it explains the dividend payment decision and the positive market reaction around dividend increases and initiations. Further analysis reveals that the reduction in default risk is a significant factor in explaining the 3-year excess returns following dividend increases and initiations.

This study investigates whether investors see through materially misstated earnings, and whether they anticipate earnings restatements. For firms that restate at least one annual report, we find that investors are misled by mistakes in reported earnings at the time of initial earnings announcements. Investors react positively to the component of the favorable earnings surprise that will subsequently be restated, and they attach the same valuation to it as to the true earnings surprise. We also find that investors anticipate the subsequent downward restatements and start marking stock prices down several months before a restatement announcement, so that the full impact of a restatement is about three times as large as the restatement announcement effect. Indeed, we show that investors punish restating firms because the stock price gains that shareholders enjoy when firms initially announce overstated earnings are more than reversed by the time of the restatement announcement.