A country with weak and untried institutions may rely on multinational institutions to help insulate parts of its legal system from the opportunistic behavior of insiders. This can help consolidate democracy if the external conditions improve the position of otherwise excluded groups or strengthen domestic democratic structures. However, deference to external pressure is a controversial strategy because it seems a challenge to local sovereignty and popular control. There is something paradoxical about a democratically elected government succumbing to outsiders' demands as a means to increase its democratic legitimacy. This can create special difficulties in Central Europe where the external pressure is exerted by the European Union (EU), a body that is an evolving democracy much like the countries of Central Europe.

Citizens in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) often view their governments as ineffective and biased. Politicians have trouble convincing voters that nominally independent oversight or regulatory agencies will operate in a nonpartisan manner. Thus, there seems to be room for external constraints to help consolidate democracy. Reformers justify submitting to external constraints not simply as an unfortunate necessity but as a welcome limit on parochial, self-serving behavior. This is, however, a risky position to adopt because “the popularity of government … might be (negatively) affected if competence that the society had long hoped to achieve is freely delegated internationally” (Salzberger and Voight 2002).

A country's politicians may comply with external rules if the benefits of delegation exceed the costs. However, compliance does not necessarily further the consolidation of democracy.