Reading through the various accounts presented in this book of how local politicians in India and elsewhere foment ethnic riots in order to win elections, some readers might begin to feel pessimistic about the prospects for stability in multiethnic democracies. My findings about the relationship between political competition and communal violence in India might seem to lend empirical support to Rabushka and Shepsle's argument that “The plural society, constrained by the preferences of its citizens, does not provide fertile soil for democratic values or stability.” Much recent research in development economics and political science has indeed found that ethnic heterogeneity is generally associated with higher levels of political instability and violence, as well as lower levels of economic growth (which is in turn is linked to more instability and violence).

However what this book ultimately shows, I believe, is that violence is far from being an inevitable by-product of electoral competition in plural societies. My central finding is that high levels of electoral competition can reduce as well as precipitate ethnic violence. This is consistent with other research that has found the interparty competition for minority votes (what Horowitz terms “vote-pooling” is the best guarantor of ethnic peace. I have shown that in states with high levels of party fractionalization, such as Bulgaria, Malaysia, and the Indian states of Bihar and Kerala, governments will protect minorities in order to hold their existing coalitions together as well as preserve their coalition options for the future.