Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Figures
- List of Tables
- Acknowledgments
- 1 THE ELECTORAL INCENTIVES FOR ETHNIC VIOLENCE
- 2 EXPLAINING TOWN-LEVEL VARIATION IN HINDU-MUSLIM VIOLENCE
- 3 STATE CAPACITY EXPLANATIONS FOR HINDU-MUSLIM VIOLENCE
- 4 THE CONSOCIATIONAL EXPLANATION FOR HINDU-MUSLIM VIOLENCE
- 5 THE ELECTORAL INCENTIVES FOR HINDU-MUSLIM VIOLENCE
- 6 PARTY COMPETITION AND HINDU-MUSLIM VIOLENCE
- 7 THE ELECTORAL INCENTIVES FOR ETHNIC VIOLENCE IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
- 8 DEMOCRACY AND ETHNIC VIOLENCE
- Appendix A Data Sources for Hindu-Muslim Riots
- Appendix B Data-Entering Protocol for Riot Database
- Appendix C Additional Results from Statistical Tables
- References
- Index
- Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics
8 - DEMOCRACY AND ETHNIC VIOLENCE
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 28 July 2009
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Figures
- List of Tables
- Acknowledgments
- 1 THE ELECTORAL INCENTIVES FOR ETHNIC VIOLENCE
- 2 EXPLAINING TOWN-LEVEL VARIATION IN HINDU-MUSLIM VIOLENCE
- 3 STATE CAPACITY EXPLANATIONS FOR HINDU-MUSLIM VIOLENCE
- 4 THE CONSOCIATIONAL EXPLANATION FOR HINDU-MUSLIM VIOLENCE
- 5 THE ELECTORAL INCENTIVES FOR HINDU-MUSLIM VIOLENCE
- 6 PARTY COMPETITION AND HINDU-MUSLIM VIOLENCE
- 7 THE ELECTORAL INCENTIVES FOR ETHNIC VIOLENCE IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
- 8 DEMOCRACY AND ETHNIC VIOLENCE
- Appendix A Data Sources for Hindu-Muslim Riots
- Appendix B Data-Entering Protocol for Riot Database
- Appendix C Additional Results from Statistical Tables
- References
- Index
- Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics
Summary
Reading through the various accounts presented in this book of how local politicians in India and elsewhere foment ethnic riots in order to win elections, some readers might begin to feel pessimistic about the prospects for stability in multiethnic democracies. My findings about the relationship between political competition and communal violence in India might seem to lend empirical support to Rabushka and Shepsle's argument that “The plural society, constrained by the preferences of its citizens, does not provide fertile soil for democratic values or stability.” Much recent research in development economics and political science has indeed found that ethnic heterogeneity is generally associated with higher levels of political instability and violence, as well as lower levels of economic growth (which is in turn is linked to more instability and violence).
However what this book ultimately shows, I believe, is that violence is far from being an inevitable by-product of electoral competition in plural societies. My central finding is that high levels of electoral competition can reduce as well as precipitate ethnic violence. This is consistent with other research that has found the interparty competition for minority votes (what Horowitz terms “vote-pooling” is the best guarantor of ethnic peace. I have shown that in states with high levels of party fractionalization, such as Bulgaria, Malaysia, and the Indian states of Bihar and Kerala, governments will protect minorities in order to hold their existing coalitions together as well as preserve their coalition options for the future.
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- Votes and ViolenceElectoral Competition and Ethnic Riots in India, pp. 236 - 242Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2004
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