Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of figures
- List of tables
- Acknowledgements
- 1 Introduction
- 2 A model of intra-party politics
- 3 Patterns of backbench dissent in four Westminster parliamentary systems, 1945–2005
- 4 Policy preferences and backbench dissent in Great Britain and Canada
- 5 Dissent, constituency service, and the personal vote in Great Britain and New Zealand
- 6 The cost of dissent to the party
- 7 Demotion and dissent in the Canadian Liberal Party, 1991–1997
- 8 Discipline and dissent in the Australian Coalition, 1996–1998
- 9 Career trajectories, socialization, and backbench dissent in the British House of Commons
- 10 Conclusion
- Appendix 1 Comparative statics and proofs
- Appendix 2 Content and construction of ideological scales
- Appendix 3 Sampling and coding of media dissent and discipline
- Appendix 4 Demotion and the parliamentary careers of Canadian MPs
- References
- Index
8 - Discipline and dissent in the Australian Coalition, 1996–1998
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 03 July 2009
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of figures
- List of tables
- Acknowledgements
- 1 Introduction
- 2 A model of intra-party politics
- 3 Patterns of backbench dissent in four Westminster parliamentary systems, 1945–2005
- 4 Policy preferences and backbench dissent in Great Britain and Canada
- 5 Dissent, constituency service, and the personal vote in Great Britain and New Zealand
- 6 The cost of dissent to the party
- 7 Demotion and dissent in the Canadian Liberal Party, 1991–1997
- 8 Discipline and dissent in the Australian Coalition, 1996–1998
- 9 Career trajectories, socialization, and backbench dissent in the British House of Commons
- 10 Conclusion
- Appendix 1 Comparative statics and proofs
- Appendix 2 Content and construction of ideological scales
- Appendix 3 Sampling and coding of media dissent and discipline
- Appendix 4 Demotion and the parliamentary careers of Canadian MPs
- References
- Index
Summary
We're a bit more tolerant now. Expulsion is very messy anyway, and as a result it's counter-productive.
ALP shadow minister commenting on party discipline, July 1999Party discipline never prevented anyone from rebelling.
British MP quoted in Jackson (1968, p. 187)Introduction
Advancement may be the immediate bulwark of party unity, but it is not the only means that party leaders have of compelling their MPs to toe the party line. In the LEADS model, for example, the leader shifts from advancement to discipline as the cost of distributing preferment increases. Imposing discipline is costly, however: publicly punishing or threatening dissidents advertises the party's internal discord, and leaders who discipline dissidents too harshly may be seen as dictatorial. In the model, these costs are offset by lower levels of dissent. This chapter examines the extent to which discipline is in fact effective at suppressing dissent. I assess the efficacy of party discipline by studying the relationship between media dissent, party discipline, and parliamentary dissent in the Australian Coalition during the 1996–8 term. I show that by publicly disciplining some of the MPs who were engaged in media dissent, the Coalition leadership slowed the rate at which these rebels engaged in parliamentary dissent. This is an important result, because Coalition media dissidents were overwhelmingly MPs who lacked ministerial futures. A similar test conducted on the Canadian Liberal Party shows parallel results.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Party Discipline and Parliamentary Politics , pp. 169 - 188Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2009