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The impact of egg consumption on indices of gastrointestinal health: a systematic literature review
- N. Sultan, E. Cheng, N. Kellow, C. Tuck, J. Biesiekierski
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- Journal:
- Proceedings of the Nutrition Society / Volume 83 / Issue OCE1 / April 2024
- Published online by Cambridge University Press:
- 07 May 2024, E71
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Eggs are highly digestible, nutrient-rich and are a valuable source of protein and choline, thereby promoting a range of health benefits. Several studies have found an association between protein intake and gastrointestinal microbial diversity(1), while bacterial fermentation of undigested protein in the large bowel can produce short-chain fatty acids, such as butyrate, positively influencing host metabolic health, gut integrity and immune function(2). On the other hand, dietary choline stimulates gastrointestinal bacterial production of trimethylamine and the prothrombotic compound trimethylamine-N-oxide (TMAO)(3). Despite these established links, limited studies have explored the effects of whole egg intake on indices of gastrointestinal health. This systematic literature review aimed to synthesise research that has investigated the impact of egg-supplemented diets or egg consumption on markers of gastrointestinal health including microbiome, function and symptoms. This review was conducted in accordance with PRISMA guidelines. Five databases (Ovid Medline, Embase, CINAHL Plus, SCOPUS, and PsychInfo), and reference lists of relevant papers, were searched from inception until April 2023. Studies were included if they examined the link between whole chicken egg consumption and gastrointestinal health in healthy adults (aged>16). Indices of gastrointestinal health were defined as any outcomes related to gastrointestinal factors, including symptoms, microbiome, inflammation, colonic fermentation and TMAO. Reviews and case studies were excluded. All studies underwent risk of bias assessment. Overall, 548 studies were identified and 19 studies were included after screening. Eight of these were randomised controlled trials (RCTs), 8 cross-sectional and 3 prospective cohort studies. Participants ranged in number between 20-32,166 and in age between 18–84 years. Study periods varied between 3–14 weeks for RCTs and 6 months–12.5 years for prospective cohort studies. RCTs examined intakes between 1–4 eggs/day, with the majority examining 3 eggs/day (n = 6). The primary outcome across 15 articles was TMAO levels, with most reporting no significant associations (n = 13). Five studies examined inflammation with inconsistent findings ranging from no alterations (in TNF-α, IL-8, CRP), increases (in anti-inflammatory marker LTB5, TNF-α), and decreases (in IL-6, CRP). Lastly, 7 studies explored alterations in microbiome. Two RCTs and 2 cross-sectional trials reported no alterations in microbial diversity in response to eggs. Meanwhile, 2 cross-sectional and 1 prospective study linked specific bacteria to consistent egg intake. Eggs were associated with species that produce butyrate (E.rectale, F.prausnitzii, M.smithii, and R.bromii), and protect against metabolic syndrome (A.muciniphila). This systematic review found that egg consumption did not increase levels of the undesirable biomarker TMAO and were associated with butyrate-producing bacteria. Evidence regarding the effect of egg intake on inflammation was inconsistent. This review revealed the general lack of available research investigating whole eggs and gastrointestinal health. Future carefully designed RCTs are required to improve understanding of how eggs may influence the gastrointestinal microbiome and colonic fermentation.
The impact of egg consumption on cognitive function: a systematic literature review
- N. Sultan, E. Cheng, C. McMahon, N. Kellow, C. Tuck, J. Biesiekierski
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- Journal:
- Proceedings of the Nutrition Society / Volume 83 / Issue OCE1 / April 2024
- Published online by Cambridge University Press:
- 07 May 2024, E181
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Eggs provide several nutrients that have been linked to neurological function. Phospholipids, which comprise 30% of lipids in egg yolk, modulate neurotransmitter receptors and have been shown to lower reaction time in healthy adults(1). Eggs are also high in choline (340mg per egg), a building block for acetylcholine, a neurotransmitter involved in memory, learning and attention(2). Finally, eggs contain the omega-3 fatty acid docosahexaenoic acid (DHA) (25mg per egg), which has roles in neurological function including neurogenesis, synaptic plasticity and myelination(3). The impact of whole egg consumption on cognition has not been widely explored. This systematic review aimed to consolidate studies that investigated frequency of egg consumption or egg-supplemented diets on cognitive function. This review followed PRISMA guidelines and involved a search of five databases (Ovid Medline, Embase, CINAHL Plus, SCOPUS, and PsychInfo) from inception until April 2023. Included studies examined the link between whole chicken egg consumption and brain function, including cognitive decline, memory, risk-taking, reaction-time, decision-making, and executive function, in healthy adults (aged>16 y). All studies underwent risk of bias assessment. Twelve studies were included in the review. Four were prospective cohort studies, 4 were retrospective, 3 cross-sectional and 1 was a randomised controlled trial (RCT). Participant numbers, with the exception of the RCT, ranged between 178-9028 and were aged between 42-97 years. Duration of prospective studies varied from 2-5 years. Egg intake was measured via food frequency questionnaires (n = 8), 24-hr diet recalls (n = 2), a 4-day food record (n = 1) and a 7-day food record (n = 1). The RCT provided 2 DHA-fortified eggs/day compared to 2 whole eggs/day for 8 weeks. The primary outcome across 9 studies was cognitive decline, followed by memory (n = 7), reaction-time (n = 2), attention (n = 2), and executive function (n = 1). For outcome measures, studies used 9 different validated task-oriented tools (including the Montreal Cognitive Assessment n = 3, and California Verbal Learning Test n = 2), or 4 self-completed questionnaires. Several studies found no significant associations between egg consumption and cognitive decline (n = 4) or memory (n = 2). Conversely, 5 studies reported significant inverse associations between egg consumption and rates of cognitive decline. The RCT found that reaction-times were faster on both whole eggs and DHA-eggs after 8 weeks (p>0.05 between groups). Although conflicting results were found, more studies showed a greater frequency of habitual egg consumption to be associated with reduced cognitive decline. However, the variety of outcome measures across studies make direct comparisons challenging, preventing definitive conclusions about the impact of eggs on cognitive health. This review highlights the need for future RCTs.
The relationship between the low food chemical diet and symptoms in irritable bowel syndrome: a cross-sectional survey
- K. Lynam, G. Trakman, J. Biesiekierski, Z. Cooke, J. Barrett, C. Tuck
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- Journal:
- Proceedings of the Nutrition Society / Volume 83 / Issue OCE1 / April 2024
- Published online by Cambridge University Press:
- 07 May 2024, E70
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Dietary therapies have revolutionised treatment for irritable bowel syndrome (IBS). However, response rates to the diet with the highest evidence of efficacy (the low FODMAP diet) remain at 50-75%, suggesting other potential drivers of symptom onset. A low food chemical elimination-rechallenge diet targeting bioactive food chemicals (including salicylates, amines, glutamate and other additives), is commonly applied in Australia in patients exhibiting both gastrointestinal and extra-intestinal symptoms. One key food chemical, salicylate, has been shown to elicit symptoms in IBS patients with aspirin-sensitivity(1), and 77% of IBS patients have reported amine-rich foods trigger symptoms(2). However, data supporting the full low chemical diet is scant, and safety concerns exist due to its restrictive nature potentially causing nutritional deficiencies and disordered eating. This cross-sectional survey aimed to evaluate the frequency of co-existing extra-intestinal symptoms, as well as explore patient perceptions and use of the low chemical diet in those with IBS and healthy controls. Participants with IBS (IBS-Severity Scoring System (IBS-SSS) >75), and healthy controls (not meeting Rome IV and IBS-SSS ≤75) were recruited via online advertisement. Validated questionnaires were used to assess gastrointestinal symptoms (IBS-SSS), extraintestinal symptoms (extended PHQ-12), nutrient (Comprehensive Nutritional Assessment Tool) and food additive intake (IBD-Food additive questionnaire). Additional questionnaires assessed use of dietary therapies with specific focus on food chemicals. Data was analysed using independent samples t-test and chi-square test. 204 IBS (Total IBS-SSS, 277 ± 79) and 22 healthy controls (36 ± 28, p<0.01) completed the study. IBS participants were more likely to report extra-intestinal symptoms including headaches (p<0.01), migraines (p = 0.03), fatigue (p<0.01), difficulty sleeping (p = 0.03), rhinitis (p = 0.02), urticaria (p = 0.04) and mood disturbance (p<0.01). IBS participants were more likely to report at least one food chemical as a trigger for gastrointestinal (38% vs 13%, p = 0.03) and/or extra-intestinal (30% vs 9%, p = 0.04) symptoms. In the IBS group, the most common suspected dietary triggers for gastrointestinal symptoms were salicylates (19%) followed by MSG (17%) and artificial colours (14%); while for extra-intestinal symptoms, MSG (15%) was most common, followed by amines (14%), and sulphites (12%). There was no significant difference in consumption of ultra-processed, additive containing foods. Twenty-one (10%) IBS participants were following a low chemical diet, with dietary advice provided by a dietitian (n = 13), general practitioner (n = 6), gastroenterologist (n = 6), naturopath (n = 3), family/friend (n = 4) and/or the diet was self-initiated (n = 7). Fourteen of the 21 (67%) reported following both a low food chemical and low FODMAP diet. Patients with IBS are more likely to report extra-intestinal symptoms compared to healthy controls. Despite limited evidence, a low food chemical diet is utilised to manage both gastrointestinal and extra-intestinal symptoms. Of concern, many respondents following a low food chemical diet reported also following a low FODMAP diet, which may have implications for nutritional adequacy.
Initiation of nutrition in the intensive care unit and the reasons for its delay: a prospective audit
- R. D. Abeles, R. Pearse, J. Powell-Tuck
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- Proceedings of the Nutrition Society / Volume 67 / Issue OCE3 / May 2008
- Published online by Cambridge University Press:
- 30 June 2021, E151
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False-green kyllinga (Kyllinga gracillima) control in cool-season turfgrass
- Matthew T. Elmore, Aaron J. Patton, Daniel P. Tuck, James A. Murphy, Jenny Carleo
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- Weed Technology / Volume 33 / Issue 2 / April 2019
- Published online by Cambridge University Press:
- 23 April 2019, pp. 329-334
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We conducted research to evaluate various herbicides for POST false-green kyllinga control in cool-season turfgrass (primarily creeping bentgrass). In a preliminary evaluation, single and sequential applications of halosulfuron-methyl (70 g ai ha−1), mesotrione (175 g ai ha−1), and sulfentrazone (140 g ai ha−1), as well as a single application of imazosulfuron (740 g ai ha−1), were evaluated in New Jersey. Imazosulfuron and sequential applications of halosulfuron-methyl controlled false-green kyllinga >93% at 9 and 18 wk after initial treatment (WAIT). Sulfentrazone and mesotrione controlled false-green kyllinga <50%. Additional experiments were conducted to evaluate single and sequential applications of halosulfuron-methyl (70 g ha−1), imazosulfuron (420 and 740 g ha−1), and sulfentrazone (140 g ha−1) in New Jersey and Indiana at two locations in each state. At 12 WAIT, imazosulfuron generally controlled false-green kyllinga more effectively than other treatments at all locations. Sequential applications of imazosulfuron controlled false-green kyllinga 100% at 12 WAIT. Halosulfuron-methyl was less effective in Indiana than in New Jersey. Sulfentrazone controlled false-green kyllinga <40% at 12 WAIT. This research demonstrates that imazosulfuron is more effective than halosulfuron-methyl and sulfentrazone for POST false-green kyllinga control in cool-season turf.
Smectite-polymer interactions in aqueous systems
- S. Burchill, P. L. Hall, R. Harrison, M. H. B. Hayes, J. I. Langford, W. R. Livingston, R. J. Smedley, D. K. Ross, J. J. Tuck
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- Clay Minerals / Volume 18 / Issue 4 / December 1983
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- 09 July 2018, pp. 373-397
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Neutron scattering studies have indicated that the non-coordinated water at smectite surfaces has a similar mobility to that of bulk water, but that the water coordinated to the cations is immobile on the time scale of the neutron measurements. Thus hydrophylic polymers can readily displace the non-coordinated water and bind to the silicate surface, and to the exchangeable cations through a water-bridge mechanism. Poly(ethylene oxide) molecules with molecular weights up to 4000 appear to be bound to Na-montmorillonite in flattened conformations at the clay surface. Poly(vinyl alcohol) is extensively bound by Na-montmorillonite and by Na-Laponite (a synthetic hectorite-like clay); as binding progresses fewer molecule segments can contact the surface and so at the higher levels of adsorption extensive loops of polymer extend away from the silicate surface. Some polyanions provide good protection for smectites against flocculation with salt. The abilities of such polymers to protect the clays is dependent both on the extents of the charges and on the solution conformations which these polymers can assume.
3 - The practice of strategy
- from Part I - Strategy
- David Jordan, King's College London, James D. Kiras, David J. Lonsdale, University of Hull, Ian Speller, National University of Ireland, Maynooth, Christopher Tuck, King's College London, C. Dale Walton, Lindenwood University, Missouri
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- Understanding Modern Warfare
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- 09 August 2018
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- 14 July 2016, pp 61-80
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Summary
Key themes
• Military force is a flexible instrument of policy.
• The contemporary strategic environment is complex and requires astute strategy.
• Certain trends, such as cyberwar and military ethics, interact in complex and often unpredictable ways.
Introduction
Strategy may be complex and difficult. And yet, perhaps with the aid of theory, experience and ideally military genius, the strategist can, indeed must, utilise the military instrument in the service of policy. This can be done in a number of ways. Highlighting the fact that military power is a far more flexible instrument than many assume, this chapter explores the various uses of force in the modern world. These will be divided into six categories: defence, deterrence, compellence, posturing, offence and miscellaneous. It should of course be noted that the actual use of force will often simultaneously cover a number of these categories. It is important to remember that the categorisation of anything rarely reflects the complexities of reality in an absolute sense.
Often, discussion is limited to the first four categories. The exclusion of the fifth and sixth categories may reflect a philosophical and/or ethical shift away from regarding military force as a useful, flexible or legitimate instrument of policy. However, the conflict-ridden international security environment suggests that this is clearly a naive philosophical approach. Take, for example, the recent history of Afghanistan and Iraq. Regardless of the subsequent challenges encountered by the counterinsurgency campaigns in these two wars, it is undeniable that the offensive use of military power removed the Taliban and Ba'athist regimes.
Having discussed the use of force in general conceptual terms, the chapter will conclude by analysing the current and future state of strategy. In particular, the work will explore the interplay amongst various developments in the strategic landscape: military transformation, irregular warfare, nuclear strategy, cyberwar, targeted killing and military ethics.
The use of force
Defence
Generally speaking, defending the state/community is the primary function of military force. The defensive use of force has two functions: to repel an attack and to limit the damage caused should an attack occur. What actually constitutes an act of self-defence has become something of a debate since the terrorist attacks of 9/11, and the Bush administration's response to it.
12 - Air and space power in the contemporary era: 1990–2030
- from Part IV - Air and space warfare
- David Jordan, King's College London, James D. Kiras, David J. Lonsdale, University of Hull, Ian Speller, National University of Ireland, Maynooth, Christopher Tuck, King's College London, C. Dale Walton, Lindenwood University, Missouri
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- Understanding Modern Warfare
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- 09 August 2018
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- 14 July 2016, pp 273-298
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Summary
Key themes
• The contested concept of air power as a revolution in military affairs.
• Technology as a key enabler for air power to achieve effect.
• Air power's role in the post-Cold War world.
• The importance of maintaining access to space and the growing threat to space platforms.
As the preceding chapters have shown, the development of air and space power has been swift. In little more than a century of heavier-than-air flight, aircraft have moved from being capable of spending little more than five minutes in the air to possessing the ability to spend more than a day aloft; the speeds which military aircraft can attain have gone from under 100 miles per hour (160 kilometres per hour) to over 2,000 mph (3,218 kph) and the loads they are capable of carrying have increased dramatically. By the end of the Vietnam War, it was possible for fighter aircraft to routinely engage enemy aircraft with missiles (although the success rate of such weapons in Vietnam was low), while attack aircraft with precision-guided munitions (PGMs) could use one weapon to destroy a target when it might have previously taken several aircraft using over a dozen bombs to achieve the same result. Between the early 1900s and 1989, air and space power had a clear role, directed against potentially hostile nation states or alliances, with regular diversions into ‘small wars’. It became something of a mantra, particularly after Vietnam, to note that high-speed fighter-bombers and attack aircraft, designed to fight a possible Third World War, were not best-suited for this sort of ‘brushfire’ war, not least since their speed and relative lack endurance over a target area meant that it was difficult for aircrew to locate targets. Although a prominent and repeated charge – and not without reason, particularly in the 1950s and 1960s, prior to the development of targeting pods and PGMs, as well as technology which allowed ground troops to accurately direct aircrews’ attention to the target which needed to be struck – the fact that air transport and reconnaissance were critical contributions to such campaigns often went unremarked. The constant fear of a major state-on-state war, notably between NATO and the USSR, meant that the development of high-technology fighter aircraft largely went unquestioned.
4 - Concepts of land warfare
- from Part II - Land warfare
- David Jordan, King's College London, James D. Kiras, David J. Lonsdale, University of Hull, Ian Speller, National University of Ireland, Maynooth, Christopher Tuck, King's College London, C. Dale Walton, Lindenwood University, Missouri
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- Understanding Modern Warfare
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- 09 August 2018
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- 14 July 2016, pp 83-100
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Summary
Key themes
• Land, in the form of the ground that warfare is fought on, gives land warfare certain unique characteristics.
• These characteristics in turn shape the nature of the forces that fight upon land.
• Land warfare is complex: its prosecution requires navigating a wide array of competing trade-offs.
Introduction
Warfare on land has been pivotal to military outcomes throughout history. This is because human beings live on land; therefore, the capacity to seize and control territory often carries with it decisive political consequences. As the strategist Colin Gray has noted, ‘the inherent strength of land warfare is that it carries the promise of achieving decision’.
The next three chapters explore the key ideas, concepts, principles and debates associated with conventional, high-intensity land warfare in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. At the heart of these chapters lies the idea of the so-called ‘modern system’ of land warfare. During the twentieth century, armies faced a range of problems resulting from the interaction between various forces for change, including the effects of increasing firepower and the problem of moving, feeding and supplying larger armies. Incrementally, armies found potential solutions for these problems by manipulating some of the core areas of continuity in land warfare, not least the nature of the land environment itself and the basic characteristics of armies. These solutions created a dominant set of themes in the conduct of land warfare: dispersal, combined arms, fire-and-manoeuvre, depth and close co-operation with air and maritime forces (joint operations). Collectively, these themes constitute modern-system land warfare.
As with the later parts of this book on maritime and air warfare, our discussion of land warfare begins with an exploration of some of the key concepts that lie at the heart of the subject. This provides an essential background to the development of the modern system of land warfare both in terms of explaining the problems facing armies at the beginning of the twentieth century but also how important continuities, such as the effect of terrain and the flexibility of armies, have shaped potential solutions. Building on the concepts explored in this chapter, chapter 5 then explores how and why the modern system evolved during the twentieth century. Whereas the modern system is essentially an evolutionary and adaptive development, more recent debates have often focused on the potential for revolutionary changes in the conduct of land warfare.
15 - Current irregular warfare
- from Part V - Irregular warfare
- David Jordan, King's College London, James D. Kiras, David J. Lonsdale, University of Hull, Ian Speller, National University of Ireland, Maynooth, Christopher Tuck, King's College London, C. Dale Walton, Lindenwood University, Missouri
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- Understanding Modern Warfare
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- 09 August 2018
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- 14 July 2016, pp 344-376
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Summary
Key themes
• Given their resource constraints and the character of irregular warfare, insurgents and terrorists have relatively few choices regarding the organisation or strategies they pursue. There is more continuity in insurgent strategy and organisation than there is change.
• Doctrine for countering insurgency, whether historical or contemporary, agrees in kind but differs only in preferred terminology, degree or specific approach. The principles of countering irregular warfare, therefore, are largely immutable. What matters regarding doctrine, however, is the ability of organisations and their leaders to adapt to the environment, learn faster than their opponent and connect their actions to the overall strategic effort, and not become the strategy itself.
• Irregular warfare is a complex phenomenon that is difficult to understand as different types of violence can be used individually or simultaneously. This can lead to confusing the method or tactics of irregular warfare for its strategy or its purpose. Fixating on the tactics of violence, or improving one's own performance, as opposed to tackling your opponent's organisation and rationale, leads to operational frustration and strategic failure.
• Special operations forces are the preferred instrument of policy-makers now and in the future but they are best suited to tackle immediate irregular threats and only establish the conditions for the future success of others to exploit, but are not a solution to irregular warfare in and of themselves.
The current era of irregular warfare begins with the end of the Second World War and decolonisation or, rather, had its genesis during the Second World War. American President Franklin Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill could not possibly have known how truly strong and problematic the future whirlwind would be when they issued the Atlantic Charter in August 1940. Although most of its points appeared innocuous, the third point – the right of all peoples to self-determination – would cause the greatest difficulties. In particular, the leaders of socialist or nationalist movements in colonial territories interpreted the Atlantic Charter as the basis for declarations of independence once the war was over. The most famous example occurred in French Indochina in September 1945, where Ho Chi Minh declared Vietnam independent using language borrowed from the US Declaration of Independence.
Glossary
- David Jordan, King's College London, James D. Kiras, David J. Lonsdale, University of Hull, Ian Speller, National University of Ireland, Maynooth, Christopher Tuck, King's College London, C. Dale Walton, Lindenwood University, Missouri
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- Understanding Modern Warfare
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- 09 August 2018
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- 14 July 2016, pp 461-471
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8 - The evolution of naval warfare
- from Part III - Naval warfare
- David Jordan, King's College London, James D. Kiras, David J. Lonsdale, University of Hull, Ian Speller, National University of Ireland, Maynooth, Christopher Tuck, King's College London, C. Dale Walton, Lindenwood University, Missouri
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- Understanding Modern Warfare
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- 09 August 2018
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- 14 July 2016, pp 180-201
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Summary
Key themes
• The techniques of naval warfare have been subject to many changes over the past two centuries.
• Technology has also changed and this has had an impact on all forms of naval activity. However, to understand technology one must place it within an appropriate context. It is not an independent variable.
• Despite such changes there have also been some notable continuities and these suggest that the concepts articulated in the previous chapter retain some relevance.
The previous chapter suggested that there has been a considerable degree of continuity in thinking about naval warfare; concepts and principles articulated in the nineteenth century continue to be employed in the twenty-first. Over the same period there have been many obvious changes in the conduct of naval warfare, particularly in the tactics adopted and in the technology used. No navy today maintains a fleet of wooden sailing ships similar to those employed by Admiral Nelson in 1805 nor do any possess pre-dreadnought battleships akin to those used to good effect by Admiral Togo a century later. No modern commander would deploy their fleet in battle in the same way as did either Nelson or Togo and to do so would be to invite disaster. It is legitimate therefore to question whether principles articulated in Togo's era, which were often derived from an examination of Nelson's, are still useful today when platforms, weapons and sensors have changed so much and where the general strategic context has been transformed. This chapter will address that question.
Unfortunately there is not the space here to provide a detailed history of the evolution of naval warfare over the past century, still less can we examine the very rich history before this period. The reader is fortunate that there are numerous good books that already do precisely this and some of these are introduced in the ‘Further reading’ guide at the end of this chapter. The aim here is not to present a comprehensive history but rather to illustrate some of the ways in which naval warfare has changed over time, and also some of the continuities. There will be a particular focus on the past 150 years, roughly the time at which steam, steel and shellfire replaced the ‘wooden ships and iron men’ of Nelson's era.
Index
- David Jordan, King's College London, James D. Kiras, David J. Lonsdale, University of Hull, Ian Speller, National University of Ireland, Maynooth, Christopher Tuck, King's College London, C. Dale Walton, Lindenwood University, Missouri
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- Understanding Modern Warfare
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- 09 August 2018
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- 14 July 2016, pp 472-482
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List of illustrations
- David Jordan, King's College London, James D. Kiras, David J. Lonsdale, University of Hull, Ian Speller, National University of Ireland, Maynooth, Christopher Tuck, King's College London, C. Dale Walton, Lindenwood University, Missouri
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- Understanding Modern Warfare
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- 09 August 2018
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- 14 July 2016, pp ix-xi
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6 - Future land warfare
- from Part II - Land warfare
- David Jordan, King's College London, James D. Kiras, David J. Lonsdale, University of Hull, Ian Speller, National University of Ireland, Maynooth, Christopher Tuck, King's College London, C. Dale Walton, Lindenwood University, Missouri
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- Understanding Modern Warfare
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- 09 August 2018
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- 14 July 2016, pp 128-156
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Summary
Key themes
• The future form of land warfare is far from certain.
• For some, the future is a technologically focused Revolution in Military Affairs; for others it is a future of new wars, brutal, local and low-tech; still others see a future marked by hybrid warfare threats that mix conventional and unconventional techniques.
• History suggests that, in the future, many different forms of land warfare are likely to co-exist because land warfare is shaped by different political, economic, social and cultural contexts.
Introduction
In this final chapter on land warfare, we turn our attention to the future. The two preceding chapters have highlighted the evolutionary underpinnings of the ‘modern system’ approach to land warfare. Can we assume similarly that future land warfare will look much like that of the past? This is clearly a crucial question for land forces around the world. Governments do not have the luxury of perpetual analysis: given the time taken to generate effective military power, choices have to be made now about the sorts of land forces that will be required for the future – their size, structure, equipment, training and doctrine. But these choices carry risks: while we need to know that we are preparing for the right future, history suggests, as the previous chapter has illustrated, that we often do not get the sorts of wars that we expect.
Sadly, for those tasked with generating future land power there is no consensus on what the future of land warfare holds. This chapter looks at the issue of future land warfare through the lens of three of the key contending schools of thought on the issue: the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA); new wars; and hybrid warfare. Each takes the view that the character of warfare is changing; each has implications for the kind of land forces required to fight it; but each is also the subject of important critiques.
The Revolution in Military Affairs
The Gulf War of 1991 cast a long shadow over subsequent debates on the character and future of land warfare. The then US secretary of defense, Richard (‘Dick’) Cheney, argued that the Gulf War ‘demonstrated dramatically the new possibilities of what has been called the “military–technical revolution in warfare”’.
Frontmatter
- David Jordan, King's College London, James D. Kiras, David J. Lonsdale, University of Hull, Ian Speller, National University of Ireland, Maynooth, Christopher Tuck, King's College London, C. Dale Walton, Lindenwood University, Missouri
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- Understanding Modern Warfare
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- 09 August 2018
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- 14 July 2016, pp i-iv
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List of boxes and tables
- David Jordan, King's College London, James D. Kiras, David J. Lonsdale, University of Hull, Ian Speller, National University of Ireland, Maynooth, Christopher Tuck, King's College London, C. Dale Walton, Lindenwood University, Missouri
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- Understanding Modern Warfare
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- 09 August 2018
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- 14 July 2016, pp xii-xiv
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9 - Naval warfare in the twenty-first century
- from Part III - Naval warfare
- David Jordan, King's College London, James D. Kiras, David J. Lonsdale, University of Hull, Ian Speller, National University of Ireland, Maynooth, Christopher Tuck, King's College London, C. Dale Walton, Lindenwood University, Missouri
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- Understanding Modern Warfare
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- 09 August 2018
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- 14 July 2016, pp 202-224
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Summary
Key themes
• The political, military and economic importance of the sea appears to be enhanced rather than diminished by recent developments. The emergence of a globalised world economy, in particular, has prompted a growing appreciation that states have a shared interest in the security of the global commons.
• This has been reflected in heightened awareness of the importance of maritime security operations and of the value of multinational co-operation required to deal with transnational threats. This has encouraged collaboration between navies.
• On the other hand competitive tendencies remain. It seems likely that new technology and new techniques, often employed in conjunction with some distinctly old capabilities, will challenge the kind of access and freedom of manoeuvre than many navies had previously taken for granted. This will present challenges to some navies and opportunities to others.
• It may be that new navies gain in power and capability and old navies decline. There is nothing new or unusual in this. What does appear likely is that the ability to use the sea will remain important in both war and peace, that there will be many ways for adversaries to challenge such usage and that navies, in close co-operation with other joint forces, will need to adapt in an appropriate and timely fashion in order to meet such challenges.
Chapters 7 and 8 argued that despite continuing change at the tactical level of naval warfare there has been a considerable degree of continuity in the roles that navies fulfil. It is not necessarily true that this will always remain the case. It is possible that naval roles might change to reflect political, economic or technological developments. Even if existing roles do remain, navies might be forced to change their forms in order to meet future challenges. Thus, new roles may evolve (and old ones disappear) in the face of new challenges while alternative means may be needed in order to sustain those roles that endure. This chapter will examine these issues and will discuss the nature of naval warfare today and into the future.
Naval warfare: changing roles?
Traditional interpretations suggest that naval warfare revolves around the use or denial of the use of the sea for military or economic purposes.
14 - The historical practice of irregular warfare
- from Part V - Irregular warfare
- David Jordan, King's College London, James D. Kiras, David J. Lonsdale, University of Hull, Ian Speller, National University of Ireland, Maynooth, Christopher Tuck, King's College London, C. Dale Walton, Lindenwood University, Missouri
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- Book:
- Understanding Modern Warfare
- Published online:
- 09 August 2018
- Print publication:
- 14 July 2016, pp 319-343
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Summary
Key themes
• Understanding the continuity and differences between historical rationale and practice, and not just the most recent era of lessons learned, is the key to success in current and future irregular wars.
• Striking a balance between gaining the willing and demonstrated support of the population, versus simply controlling and coercing it, is a consistent theme historically. Brute force has been effective in the short term, but its use creates more problems than it solves.
• Traumatic events for those conducting or countering it, particularly failure, are often the catalyst for reflection and an upsurge in interest in and writing on irregular warfare.
• The most effective practitioners of irregular warfare historically accurately assess the subjective and objective conditions for success within its specific context, or provide a comprehensive roadmap that links tactical action to strategic purpose.
Understanding modern irregular warfare through the lens of the past
The study of irregular warfare historically presents a number of unique challenges. Although the history of irregular warfare, in the form of bandit raids or other unconventional tactics, arguably existed long before more organised, conventional warfare by fielded armies, there are relatively few memoirs, much less theories of violence, by those conducting irregular warfare against militarily superior opponents prior to the nineteenth century. Classic texts on ancient warfare from across the globe, including Maurice's Strategikon (Byzantium), Sun Tzu's The Art of War (China) and Kautilya's Arthasastra (India), addressed unconventional methods of fighting such as raids, ambushes, stratagems and ruses as a method of gaining an advantage over an opponent prior to or during battle. Other ancient texts, including epic poems, theological texts and historical narratives, suggest that irregular tactics were used to overcome formidable defences. The most famous example remains the Trojan Horse in Homer's Iliad, but far more accounts describe a common subterfuge: taking walled cities by using traitors inside to open gates for armies waiting outside. In addition, some texts discuss the specific fighting qualities, or what scholars now call ‘stra-tegic culture’ or ‘way of war’, of irregular or barbarian opponents. Indeed, some scholars have gone so far as to suggest that civilisations have distinct styles of fighting, either as a result of geography or as an explanation for their political and economic success.
2 - Strategy defined
- from Part I - Strategy
- David Jordan, King's College London, James D. Kiras, David J. Lonsdale, University of Hull, Ian Speller, National University of Ireland, Maynooth, Christopher Tuck, King's College London, C. Dale Walton, Lindenwood University, Missouri
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- Book:
- Understanding Modern Warfare
- Published online:
- 09 August 2018
- Print publication:
- 14 July 2016, pp 39-60
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Summary
Key themes
• Strategy is a process that connects military power with policy effect.
• Strategy has various levels that must be in harmony.
• Strategy is a complex, challenging activity.
Introduction
Now that we have identified the need to develop an analytical approach to the subject, we must begin our exploration with some key definitions of strategy and its various levels. Having illuminated the essence of strategy, this chapter will analyse the various factors that make it difficult. In particular, the chapter will explore strategy's multidimensional nature; disharmony amongst the levels; the paradoxical logic; nature of war; friction; human participation; and war's polymorphous character. It is hoped that by the end of this chapter the reader will have a better understanding of the challenges involved in strategy, and how these can be dealt with so that the use of military force can best serve policy objectives.
Strategy
The process that converts military power into policy effect
Strategy defined
Extant strategic literature contains various definitions of strategy. For Clausewitz, it can be understood as ‘the use of engagements for the object of the war.’ Similarly, Gray defines strategy as ‘the use that is made of force and the threat of force for the ends of policy’, whereas Andre Beaufre highlights the dynamic interaction between belligerents: ‘the art of the dialectic of two opposing wills using force to resolve their dispute’. This work defines strategy as the process that converts military power into policy effect (see Box 2.1). Importantly, this definition identifies the key relationship in strategy: that between policy and the military instrument. Furthermore, it acknowledges strategy as process. The latter is recognition of that fact that strategy is not tangible, but is dynamic and does have manifest effect.</p
As noted, the core relationship within strategy is that between military force and the policy objective. Gray describes this relationship as a bridge that links the military and political worlds. Alternatively, Eliot Cohen described this relationship as an ‘unequal dialogue’ (see Figure 2.1). In this sense, we can regard strategy as a process by which military force creates political effect. Although the supremacy of policy is established and well understood, and thereby military force must serve policy, it is not simply a case of the political leadership demanding what it requires from the military instrument.