21 results
Terrorism and Extremism in Indonesia and the Southeast Asian Region
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- By Sidney Jones
- Edited by Daljit Singh, ISEAS - Yusof Ishak Institute, Thi Ha Hoang, ISEAS - Yusof Ishak Institute
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- Book:
- Southeast Asian Affairs 2022
- Published by:
- ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
- Published online:
- 01 September 2023, pp 162-174
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Summary
COVID-19, combined with intensive security operations and changing international dynamics, kept most local terrorist organizations off balance in 2021. In Indonesia, arrests were high and fatalities low, with terrorists responsible for five deaths, all in Poso, Central Sulawesi. Several attempts at attacks elsewhere, including the March 2021 bombing of Makassar cathedral, resulted in injuries to bystanders, but no deaths, other than the suicide bombers themselves. Almost no one tried to go overseas to join a jihad, and no one came back from Syria or was deported from Turkey.
Malaysia continued to patrol the coast of Sabah, occasionally deporting or killing Abu Sayyaf Group suspects, but no arrests of Malysians on terrorism charges took place during the year, either in Sabah or the rest of the country. In the Philippines, the military continued to try and “neutralize” top leaders, with top pro-ISIS leaders among those killed. Singapore arrested a few citizens with violent extremist sympathies. A Singaporean teenager arrested in December 2020 remains the only Southeast Asian detained for far-right sympathies. He reportedly wanted to attack two mosques in Singapore on the anniversary of the Christchurch, New Zealand shootings.
The return to power of the Taliban in Afghanistan raised concerns of possible renewed activity of al-Qaeda in the region or of a blowback to Southeast Asia of heightened activity from ISIS–Khorasan, the so-called province of Islamic State in Afghanistan. At least in the short term, these were probably overdrawn. While many Muslims celebrated the victory of a Muslim army over the United States, there were no immediate candidates for a partnership with al-Qaeda, even if the Taliban return gave the latter state protection. Its old partner, Jemaah Islamiyah, had no interest in resuming an affiliation and in any case since 2019 had become the target of a major crackdown by police. Its immediate aim was organizational survival, not global jihad. Pro-ISIS groups in Indonesia, as elsewhere, saw al-Qaeda as the enemy. Indeed, if Indonesian authorities were worried about outside influence serving as inspiration for violence at home, the source was more likely to be ISIS–Khorasan attacks on the Taliban rather than anything al-Qaeda was doing.
14 - Manipulating Minorities and Majorities: Reflections on ‘Contentious Belonging’
- from PART 5 - REFLECTIONS
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- By Sidney Jones, Director, Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC), Jakarta
- Edited by Greg Fealy, Ronit Ricci
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- Book:
- Contentious Belonging
- Published by:
- ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
- Published online:
- 06 September 2019
- Print publication:
- 27 May 2019, pp 255-266
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Summary
The theme of this volume, ‘contentious belonging’, posits two possibilities: the inclusiveness that is expressed in the official national motto, Bhinneka Tunggal Ika, or ‘Unity in Diversity’, and the exclusiveness in the form of Muslim majoritarianism that generates pressure to conform to an increasingly conservative set of norms and values. The spectre of the latter as it affects religious and sexual minorities has been an important theme of the chapters in this book, but if we shift the focus away from the national to the local level, and we look at islands other than Java, then several other dimensions of minority status, also contentious, emerge. One is the tension between indigenous and migrant communities. Another is the transformation of ethnic minorities into majorities through pemekaran—a byproduct of decentralisation that has allowed the partitioning of administrative regions to create new provinces, districts and subdistricts. A third is racial identity, especially along Melanesian versus Malay lines.
MIGRATION
Any discussion of minorities and contentiousness cannot ignore migration. In many areas of Indonesia outside Java, the tensions are not primarily between Muslim and non-Muslim but between indigenous and migrant, and the line between the two is constantly changing. One can be from an ethnic majority at home (Javanese, Balinese, Madurese, Bugis), become part of a minority community as a migrant and then, through family networks, see one's ethnic group grow to the point of demographically and often economically displacing the indigenous population.
One example is the Butonese in West Ceram, Maluku province, who now constitute a majority in at least three subdistricts but who have no right to own land in those subdistricts owing to discriminatory local regulations. In one village, they actually constitute 90 per cent of the population but the indigenous lobby has had the village declared a customary village (desa adat) and the Butonese have been excluded from representation on the village council. At the same time, the redrawing of electoral districts in 2014 produced two out of five districts in which Butonese were the majority, enabling them to win seats in the regional parliament (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah, DPRD) (Brauchler 2017).
ISIS in Indonesia (2015)
- from INDONESIA
- Edited by Daljit Singh, Malcolm Cook
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- Book:
- Turning Points and Transitions
- Published by:
- ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
- Published online:
- 29 May 2019
- Print publication:
- 21 November 2018, pp 353-360
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Summary
A steep decline in terrorist acts in Indonesia in 2014 should have been good news, especially because it underscored that police vigilance was high and extremist capacity was weak. But a third factor was also involved that was not such good news: more extremists were focused on getting to Syria and joining what they believed was a more important jihad than any they could wage at home. By late 2014, about 100 Indonesians, possibly more, were believed to have left to fight in Syria, some with their wives and children, and most to join the Islamic State.
Violent Extremists in Indonesia in 2014
By early 2014, Indonesia's jihadist community was divided between those who supported violence inside Indonesia, with the police as the primary target, and those who believed that at least for the moment, violence at home was counter-productive. The former generally supported the Islamic State and its predecessor, the Islamic State in Greater Syria and Iraq (ISIS). The latter were more likely to support IS's main rival in Syria, the al-Nusra Front, and its allies.
Prominent in the first group was Mujahidin Indonesia Timur (MIT), a group of some thirty armed men led by Santoso alias Abu Wardah in the hills outside Poso, Central Sulawesi. Santoso had run a series of military-style training camps in Poso beginning in 2011, and graduates and supporters are now scattered across Java, Sumatra, Sulawesi and Nusa Tenggara Barat (NTB). Despite being effectively under police siege during the year in his jungle camp, Santoso managed to smuggle out videos periodically to YouTube and radical websites. While neither he nor any other group managed any bombings in 2014, the few attacks on police during the year were all linked to MIT. Santoso was the first Indonesian to publicly pledge loyalty to the Islamic State after its leader, Abubakar al-Baghdadi, announced the establishment of the new caliphate on 29 June 2014 (1 Ramadan).
The pro-violence group also included remnants of Mujahidin Indonesia Barat (MIB), many members of which had previous ties to an old Darul Islam network led by the now-imprisoned Abdullah Umar. It included some but not all members of Abu Bakar Ba'asyir's organization, Jamaah Anshorul Tauhid (JAT), and many followers of the imprisoned cleric Aman Abdurrahman who had no specific organizational affiliation.
Organizations and the Democratic Representation of Interests: What Does It Mean When Those Organizations Have No Members?
- Kay Lehman Schlozman, Philip Edward Jones, Hye Young You, Traci Burch, Sidney Verba, Henry E. Brady
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- Journal:
- Perspectives on Politics / Volume 13 / Issue 4 / December 2015
- Published online by Cambridge University Press:
- 15 December 2015, pp. 1017-1029
- Print publication:
- December 2015
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This article documents the prevalence in organized interest politics in the United States of organizations—for example, corporations, think tanks, universities, or hospitals—that have no members in the ordinary sense and analyzes the consequences of that dominance for the democratic representation of citizen interests. We use data from the Washington Representatives Study, a longitudinal data base containing more than 33,000 organizations active in national politics in 1981, 1991, 2001, 2006, and 2011. The share of membership associations active in Washington has eroded over time until, in 2011, barely a quarter of the more than 14,000 organizations active in Washington in 2011 were membership associations, and less than half of those were membership association with individuals as members. In contrast, a majority of the politically involved organizations were memberless organizations, of which nearly two-thirds were corporations. The dominance of memberless organizations in pressure politics raises important questions about democratic representation. Studies of political representation by interest groups raise several concerns about democratic inequalities: the extent to which representation of interests by groups is unequal, the extent to which groups fail to represent their members equally, and the extent to which group members are unable to control their leaders. All of the dilemmas that arise when membership associations advocate in politics become even more intractable when organizations do not have members.
ISIS in Indonesia
- from INDONESIA
-
- By Sidney Jones, Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC), Jakarta, Indonesia, Solahudin
- Edited by Daljit Singh
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- Book:
- Southeast Asian Affairs 2015
- Published by:
- ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
- Published online:
- 19 May 2017
- Print publication:
- 19 May 2015, pp 154-164
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Summary
A steep decline in terrorist acts in Indonesia in 2014 should have been good news, especially because it underscored that police vigilance was high and extremist capacity was weak. But a third factor was also involved that was not such good news: more extremists were focused on getting to Syria and joining what they believed was a more important jihad than any they could wage at home. By late 2014, about 100 Indonesians, possibly more, were believed to have left to fight in Syria, some with their wives and children, and most to join the Islamic State.
Violent Extremists in Indonesia in 2014
By early 2014, Indonesia's jihadist community was divided between those who supported violence inside Indonesia, with the police as the primary target, and those who believed that at least for the moment, violence at home was counterproductive. The former generally supported the Islamic State and its predecessor, the Islamic State in Greater Syria and Iraq (ISIS). The latter were more likely to support IS's main rival in Syria, the al-Nusra Front, and its allies.
Prominent in the first group was Mujahidin Indonesia Timur (MIT), a group of some thirty armed men led by Santoso alias Abu Wardah in the hills outside Poso, Central Sulawesi. Santoso had run a series of military-style training camps in Poso beginning in 2011, and graduates and supporters are now scattered across Java, Sumatra, Sulawesi and Nusa Tenggara Barat (NTB). Despite being effectively under police siege during the year in his jungle camp, Santoso managed to smuggle out videos periodically to YouTube and radical websites. While neither he nor any other group managed any bombings in 2014, the few attacks on police during the year were all linked to MIT. Santoso was the first Indonesian to publicly pledge loyalty to the Islamic State after its leader, Abubakar al-Baghdadi, announced the establishment of the new caliphate on 29 June 2014 (1 Ramadan).
The pro-violence group also included remnants of Mujahidin Indonesia Barat (MIB), many members of which had previous ties to an old Darul Islam network led by the now-imprisoned Abdullah Umar. It included some but not all members of Abu Bakar Ba'asyir's organization, Jamaah Anshorul Tauhid (JAT), and many followers of the imprisoned cleric Aman Abdurrahman who had no specific organizational affiliation.
8 - Yudhoyono's legacy on internal security: achievements and missed opportunities
- from PART 2 INSTITUTIONS, POLITICS AND SECURITY
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- By Sidney Jones, Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, Jakarta
- Edited by Edward Aspinall, Marcus Mietzner, Dirk Tomsa
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- Book:
- The Yudhoyono Presidency
- Published by:
- ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
- Published online:
- 19 May 2017
- Print publication:
- 13 May 2015, pp 136-154
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Summary
Managing internal security affairs is one of the most vital policy portfolios for any president, especially in countries with a long history of communal, political and separatist violence. For Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, this area should have been his primary area of expertise, given his military background and his many years as the key government minister in charge of security affairs. Nevertheless, his commitment to find solutions was not always accompanied by direct personal involvement or the necessary expenditure of political capital. Three of the biggest internal security problems confronting Yudhoyono when he took office in 2004 were the insurgency in Aceh, violence in Papua and terrorism. Generally, he has been given high marks on the first and the third, and credit for at least trying on the second (MacIntyre and Ramage 2008). On all three, however, he could have done much more. He was generally reactive rather than proactive, letting external events force policy changes rather than providing clear strategic direction. He liked setting intellectual guidelines, but rarely did any of the heavy lifting himself. The opposite of a micromanager, he was happy to leave implementation to subordinates. He was often more interested in form than in substance, using the creation of new institutions as proof of commitment without the necessary follow-up to ensure they actually worked. At no point during his two terms was there any attempt to step back and look at security policy in a way that assessed overall needs and developed capabilities accordingly.
Yudhoyono has received the most praise on Aceh, not only for the 2005 peace agreement but for also ensuring that the peace was main tained. Indeed, his first vice-president, Jusuf Kalla, had for some time been actively seeking contact with the leadership of the Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, GAM). Yudhoyono, as president, was open to pursuing international mediation, and it could be argued that he was proactive during his first few months in office. But without the 26 December 2004 tsunami to give peace-making a new impetus and urgency, Yudhoyono's habitual dithering would almost certainly have led to endless discussions without a clear resolution. Instead, with Kalla in charge of the government negotiating team, an agreement was signed in Helsinki in August 2005 after just five formal meetings.
Terrorism in Indonesia: A Fading Threat?
- from INDONESIA
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- By Sidney Jones, Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC), Jakarta, Indonesia, Solahudin, Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC), Jakarta, Indonesia
- Edited by Daljit Singh
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- Book:
- Southeast Asian Affairs 2014
- Published by:
- ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
- Published online:
- 19 May 2017
- Print publication:
- 03 June 2014, pp 139-148
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Summary
Violent extremism in Indonesia continued to be low-tech and low-casualty, but groups continued to proliferate from Sumatra to Sumbawa, and there seemed to be an inexhaustible supply of recruits. The typical terrorist suspect was not a mass killer with global ambitions; he was more likely to be one step up from a petty criminal whose efforts to make simple pipe bombs almost always failed. There were no women among the 66 arrested and 21 suspects killed during 2013. One attempted suicide bombing killed only the bomber. Guns were in high demand, used for fund-raising robberies and revenge attacks on police — terrorists managed to kill three officers, down from eight in 2012. While police continued to be the primary target, several plots were hatched, all unsuccessful, to avenge attacks on Muslims in Myanmar. Despite the generally low capacity of wouldbe terrorists, however, concerns were mounting that three factors could lead to new enthusiasm for jihad at home: anger over deaths of suspects in police operations; releases from prison of convicted extremists; and the return of Indonesian fighters from Syria.
Most of the Islamist violence during the year was attributable to two networks, the Mujahidin of Eastern Indonesia (Mujahidin Indonesia Timur, MIT), based in Poso, Central Sulawesi, and the Mujahidin of Western Indonesia (Mujahidin Indonesia Barat, MIB), based in greater Jakarta and West Java. Both were alliances that included splinter groups of Darul Islam, the venerable sixty-five-year-old Islamic insurgency, and defectors from JAT, but the two were not formally linked. At year's end, MIT was still alive, if besieged; MIB had been largely crushed. The once-feared Jemaah Islamiyah, which since 2007 had disengaged from violence in Indonesia, was reburnishing its reputation as a jihadi organization through its channels to Syrian Islamist rebels.
In addition to Islamist groups, a tiny but growing anarchist movement with international links launched a number of arson attacks across the country from Jakarta to Aceh to South Kalimantan. The media paid no attention, much to the chagrin of those involved.
Mujahidin of Eastern Indonesia
MIT, led by Santoso alias Abu Wardah, a former member of JI's affiliate in Poso, grew out of a JAT military cell in Central Sulawesi that was formed in 2010 in the aftermath of the break-up by police of a militant training camp in Aceh.
17 - The political impact of carving up Papua
- from PART 5 - CHALLENGES FOR INDONESIA'S PERIPHERY
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- By Cillian Nolan, Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, Jakarta, Sidney Jones, Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, Jakarta, Solahudin, Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, Jakarta
- Edited by Hal Hill
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- Book:
- Regional Dynamics in a Decentralized Indonesia
- Published by:
- ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
- Published online:
- 21 October 2015
- Print publication:
- 20 May 2014, pp 409-432
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Summary
INTRODUCTION
Administrative fragmentation, through the process known as pemekaran, is transforming political dynamics in Papua, strengthening clan identities, generating a new assertiveness among elected Papuan officials and nurturing new conflicts. Papua has undergone greater administrative division than any other area of Indonesia. What in 1999 was a single province with 10 subprovincial districts or municipalities (kabupaten/ kota) has become two provinces, Papua and West Papua, with 42 districts and municipalities, and further new units in process – all of this taking place in one of the poorest and most violence-wracked regions of Indonesia.
Papua is historically and culturally different from the rest of Indonesia. Whereas the rest of the former Dutch East Indies secured independence in 1949, the western half of the island of New Guinea was incorporated into Indonesia only in 1969 following a controversial United Nations-supervised referendum. It has been home to an active independence movement ever since. It is culturally Melanesian, not Malay, and it has over 200 indigenous ethnic groups. In addition, a large migrant population from the rest of Indonesia has grown up over the last several decades, including migrants from both Java and elsewhere as part of an official resettlement program during the 1970s and 1980s, as well as many others who came on their own to trade or to take jobs in the civil service. In 2001, the Indonesian government granted Papua ‘special autonomy’ in the hope that this would weaken the independence movement, but whatever good will might have emerged from this initiative was destroyed two years later when, without consultation, the government divided the province first into three, then back into two, provinces. In the decade since special autonomy came into force, there has been limited progress on devolving political powers that would be significantly greater than those enjoyed by other Indonesian provinces; the main impact has been to flood Papua and West Papua with cash, much of which has disappeared through corruption. Both provinces remain at or near the bottom of the country's Human Development Index (HDI), despite huge wealth from various extractive industries and, increasingly, palm oil.
It is in this context that the ‘blossoming’ (pemekaran) of administrative units is taking place today, without any clear strategy or development logic, other than the tired refrain of ‘bringing government closer to the people’.
5 - Judicial Commentary on Thomas More's Trial
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- By Michael Tugendhat, The Law of Privacy and the Media, Edith Jones, Sidney Fitzwater, Chair of the Advisory Committee, Jennie Latta, Michael Tugendhat, The Law of Privacy and the Media
- Edited by Henry Ansgar Kelly, UCLA, Louis W. Karlin, University of Dallas, Gerard B. Wegemer, University of Dallas
-
- Book:
- Thomas More's Trial by Jury
- Published by:
- Boydell & Brewer
- Published online:
- 05 February 2013
- Print publication:
- 15 September 2011, pp 111-136
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Summary
The term “maliciously”
What did the word “maliciously” mean in a criminal statute in the sixteenth century?
The noun “malice,” and its adverb, “maliciously,” have long been used as terms of art in legal English (as in “malice aforethought”). According to the OED, these words are derived from Latin and French. The example given for Latin is the word malitia (as in malitia praecogitata”), and for French is the word malice (as in “malice prepensé”). Examples given in the dictionary from English sources show that, in English by the fourteenth century, the word malice had acquired the meaning “ill will,” which it bears to this day. That is a secondary meaning that the word bore in Latin.
In legal English the adverb “maliciously,” and Law Latin maliciose, are used to mean the same as “with malice.” Examples are in the indictment of Thomas More.
In legal English the words “malice” and “malicious” each have two distinct meanings. They are commonly referred to as “malice in law” (or “legal malice”) and “malice in fact” (or “actual malice”).
J. H. Baker discusses murder in the period 1483–1558. He states that what premeditation was required for murder was not precisely defined. None of the cases Baker cites suggests that ill will (or any other motive) was ever required as a constituent of the offense of murder, in addition to intent to do the act in question (actus reus).
The Ongoing Extremist Threat in Indonesia
- from INDONESIA
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- By Sidney Jones, International Crisis Group, Jakarta
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- Book:
- Southeast Asian Affairs 2011
- Published by:
- ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
- Published online:
- 21 October 2015
- Print publication:
- 03 June 2011, pp 91-104
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Summary
Despite the steady weakening of major jihadi groups, the potential for low-tech, low-casualty terrorist violence in Indonesia remains high, facilitated by corruption and other shortcomings in key state institutions. Every arrest of a terrorist suspect — and there were more than a hundred in 2010 — produces new information showing that extremist networks are more extensive than previously thought and that groups are constantly evolving and mutating, with older organizations like Jemaah Islamiyah losing ground to new alliances.
The fact that the only deaths at terrorist hands in 2010 were ten Indonesian police officers highlights an ideological shift among extremists that has been taking place for the last several years: Indonesian officials are now seen as at least as much the enemy as the United States and its allies. That shift has come about partly in recognition of the lack of public support for attacks on foreign civilians, partly through the influence on Indonesian radicals of the Jordanian writer Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, and partly out of determination to avenge the deaths of mujahidin killed in police raids.
It has produced a concomitant shift in Indonesian Government thinking. Particularly after a plot was discovered in mid-2009 against President Yudhoyono by the same team that bombed two luxury hotels in Jakarta, the government began to see terrorism as an issue of state security, not just an extraordinary crime. This in turn helped fast-track the establishment in July 2010 of the National Anti-Terrorism Agency (Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme, BNPT) and has led to a push by the Indonesian military for a greater role in counter-terrorism efforts. The government made little headway during the year in terrorism prevention efforts, but it did acknowlege the need for better prison oversight after some twenty former prisoners were captured or killed in police operations during the year. The recidivists included several common criminals who had been recruited in prison. While plans remain under discussion for constructing a separate facility for terrorists, some steps were taken towards better monitoring of detainees. Several particularly high-profile suspects arrested during the year were isolated from their friends and held in separate police lock-ups while awaiting trial.
Contributors
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- By Jane E. Adcock, Yahya Aghakhani, A. Anand, Eva Andermann, Frederick Andermann, Alexis Arzimanoglou, Sandrine Aubert, Nadia Bahi-Buisson, Carman Barba, Agatino Battaglia, Geneviève Bernard, Nadir E. Bharucha, Laurence A. Bindoff, William Bingaman, Francesca Bisulli, Thomas P. Bleck, Stewart G. Boyd, Andreas Brunklaus, Harry Bulstrode, Jorge G. Burneo, Laura Canafoglia, Laura Cantonetti, Roberto H. Caraballo, Fernando Cendes, Kevin E. Chapman, Patrick Chauvel, Richard F. M. Chin, H. T. Chong, Fahmida A. Chowdhury, Catherine J. Chu-Shore, Rolando Cimaz, Andrew J. Cole, Bernard Dan, Geoffrey Dean, Alessio De Ciantis, Fernando De Paolis, Rolando F. Del Maestro, Irissa M. Devine, Carlo Di Bonaventura, Concezio Di Rocco, Henry B. Dinsdale, Maria Alice Donati, François Dubeau, Michael Duchowny, Olivier Dulac, Monika Eisermann, Brent Elliott, Bernt A. Engelsen, Kevin Farrell, Natalio Fejerman, Rosalie E. Ferner, Silvana Franceschetti, Robert Friedlander, Antonio Gambardella, Hector H. Garcia, Serena Gasperini, Lorenzo Genitori, Gioia Gioi, Flavio Giordano, Leif Gjerstad, Daniel G. Glaze, Howard P. Goodkin, Sidney M. Gospe, Andrea Grassi, William P. Gray, Renzo Guerrini, Marie-Christine Guiot, William Harkness, Andrew G. Herzog, Linda Huh, Margaret J. Jackson, Thomas S. Jacques, Anna C. Jansen, Sigmund Jenssen, Michael R. Johnson, Dorothy Jones-Davis, Reetta Kälviäinen, Peter W. Kaplan, John F. Kerrigan, Autumn Marie Klein, Matthias Koepp, Edwin H. Kolodny, Kandan Kulandaivel, Ruben I. Kuzniecky, Ahmed Lary, Yolanda Lau, Anna-Elina Lehesjoki, Maria K. Lehtinen, Holger Lerche, Michael P. T. Lunn, Snezana Maljevic, Mark R. Manford, Carla Marini, Bindu Menon, Giulia Milioli, Eli M. Mizrahi, Manish Modi, Márcia Elisabete Morita, Manuel Murie-Fernandez, Vivek Nambiar, Lina Nashef, Vincent Navarro, Aidan Neligan, Ruth E. Nemire, Charles R. J. C. Newton, John O'Donavan, Hirokazu Oguni, Teiichi Onuma, Andre Palmini, Eleni Panagiotakaki, Pasquale Parisi, Elena Parrini, Liborio Parrino, Ignacio Pascual-Castroviejo, M. Scott Perry, Perrine Plouin, Charles E. Polkey, Suresh S. Pujar, Karthik Rajasekaran, R. Eugene Ramsey, Rahul Rathakrishnan, Roberta H. Raven, Guy M. Rémillard, David Rosenblatt, M. Elizabeth Ross, Abdulrahman Sabbagh, P. Satishchandra, Swati Sathe, Ingrid E. Scheffer, Philip A. Schwartzkroin, Rod C. Scott, Frédéric Sedel, Michelle J. Shapiro, Elliott H. Sherr, Michael Shevell, Simon D. Shorvon, Adrian M. Siegel, Gagandeep Singh, S. Sinha, Barbara Spacca, Waney Squier, Carl E. Stafstrom, Bernhard J. Steinhoff, Andrea Taddio, Gianpiero Tamburrini, C. T. Tan, Raymond Y. L. Tan, Erik Taubøll, Robert W. Teasell, Mario Giovanni Terzano, Federica Teutonico, Suzanne A. Tharin, Elizabeth A. Thiele, Pierre Thomas, Paolo Tinuper, Dorothée Kasteleijn-Nolst Trenité, Sumeet Vadera, Pierangelo Veggiotti, Jean-Pierre Vignal, J. M. Walshe, Elizabeth J. Waterhouse, David Watkins, Ruth E. Williams, Yue-Hua Zhang, Benjamin Zifkin, Sameer M. Zuberi
- Edited by Simon D. Shorvon, Frederick Andermann, Renzo Guerrini
-
- Book:
- The Causes of Epilepsy
- Published online:
- 05 March 2012
- Print publication:
- 14 April 2011, pp ix-xvi
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Contributors
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- By Rose Teteki Abbey, K. C. Abraham, David Tuesday Adamo, LeRoy H. Aden, Efrain Agosto, Victor Aguilan, Gillian T. W. Ahlgren, Charanjit Kaur AjitSingh, Dorothy B E A Akoto, Giuseppe Alberigo, Daniel E. Albrecht, Ruth Albrecht, Daniel O. Aleshire, Urs Altermatt, Anand Amaladass, Michael Amaladoss, James N. Amanze, Lesley G. Anderson, Thomas C. Anderson, Victor Anderson, Hope S. Antone, María Pilar Aquino, Paula Arai, Victorio Araya Guillén, S. Wesley Ariarajah, Ellen T. Armour, Brett Gregory Armstrong, Atsuhiro Asano, Naim Stifan Ateek, Mahmoud Ayoub, John Alembillah Azumah, Mercedes L. García Bachmann, Irena Backus, J. Wayne Baker, Mieke Bal, Lewis V. Baldwin, William Barbieri, António Barbosa da Silva, David Basinger, Bolaji Olukemi Bateye, Oswald Bayer, Daniel H. Bays, Rosalie Beck, Nancy Elizabeth Bedford, Guy-Thomas Bedouelle, Chorbishop Seely Beggiani, Wolfgang Behringer, Christopher M. Bellitto, Byard Bennett, Harold V. Bennett, Teresa Berger, Miguel A. Bernad, Henley Bernard, Alan E. Bernstein, Jon L. Berquist, Johannes Beutler, Ana María Bidegain, Matthew P. Binkewicz, Jennifer Bird, Joseph Blenkinsopp, Dmytro Bondarenko, Paulo Bonfatti, Riet en Pim Bons-Storm, Jessica A. Boon, Marcus J. Borg, Mark Bosco, Peter C. Bouteneff, François Bovon, William D. Bowman, Paul S. Boyer, David Brakke, Richard E. Brantley, Marcus Braybrooke, Ian Breward, Ênio José da Costa Brito, Jewel Spears Brooker, Johannes Brosseder, Nicholas Canfield Read Brown, Robert F. Brown, Pamela K. Brubaker, Walter Brueggemann, Bishop Colin O. Buchanan, Stanley M. Burgess, Amy Nelson Burnett, J. Patout Burns, David B. Burrell, David Buttrick, James P. Byrd, Lavinia Byrne, Gerado Caetano, Marcos Caldas, Alkiviadis Calivas, William J. Callahan, Salvatore Calomino, Euan K. Cameron, William S. Campbell, Marcelo Ayres Camurça, Daniel F. Caner, Paul E. Capetz, Carlos F. Cardoza-Orlandi, Patrick W. Carey, Barbara Carvill, Hal Cauthron, Subhadra Mitra Channa, Mark D. Chapman, James H. Charlesworth, Kenneth R. Chase, Chen Zemin, Luciano Chianeque, Philip Chia Phin Yin, Francisca H. Chimhanda, Daniel Chiquete, John T. Chirban, Soobin Choi, Robert Choquette, Mita Choudhury, Gerald Christianson, John Chryssavgis, Sejong Chun, Esther Chung-Kim, Charles M. A. Clark, Elizabeth A. Clark, Sathianathan Clarke, Fred Cloud, John B. Cobb, W. Owen Cole, John A Coleman, John J. Collins, Sylvia Collins-Mayo, Paul K. Conkin, Beth A. Conklin, Sean Connolly, Demetrios J. Constantelos, Michael A. Conway, Paula M. Cooey, Austin Cooper, Michael L. Cooper-White, Pamela Cooper-White, L. William Countryman, Sérgio Coutinho, Pamela Couture, Shannon Craigo-Snell, James L. Crenshaw, David Crowner, Humberto Horacio Cucchetti, Lawrence S. Cunningham, Elizabeth Mason Currier, Emmanuel Cutrone, Mary L. Daniel, David D. Daniels, Robert Darden, Rolf Darge, Isaiah Dau, Jeffry C. Davis, Jane Dawson, Valentin Dedji, John W. de Gruchy, Paul DeHart, Wendy J. Deichmann Edwards, Miguel A. De La Torre, George E. Demacopoulos, Thomas de Mayo, Leah DeVun, Beatriz de Vasconcellos Dias, Dennis C. Dickerson, John M. Dillon, Luis Miguel Donatello, Igor Dorfmann-Lazarev, Susanna Drake, Jonathan A. Draper, N. Dreher Martin, Otto Dreydoppel, Angelyn Dries, A. J. Droge, Francis X. D'Sa, Marilyn Dunn, Nicole Wilkinson Duran, Rifaat Ebied, Mark J. Edwards, William H. Edwards, Leonard H. Ehrlich, Nancy L. Eiesland, Martin Elbel, J. Harold Ellens, Stephen Ellingson, Marvin M. Ellison, Robert Ellsberg, Jean Bethke Elshtain, Eldon Jay Epp, Peter C. Erb, Tassilo Erhardt, Maria Erling, Noel Leo Erskine, Gillian R. Evans, Virginia Fabella, Michael A. Fahey, Edward Farley, Margaret A. Farley, Wendy Farley, Robert Fastiggi, Seena Fazel, Duncan S. Ferguson, Helwar Figueroa, Paul Corby Finney, Kyriaki Karidoyanes FitzGerald, Thomas E. FitzGerald, John R. Fitzmier, Marie Therese Flanagan, Sabina Flanagan, Claude Flipo, Ronald B. Flowers, Carole Fontaine, David Ford, Mary Ford, Stephanie A. Ford, Jim Forest, William Franke, Robert M. Franklin, Ruth Franzén, Edward H. Friedman, Samuel Frouisou, Lorelei F. Fuchs, Jojo M. Fung, Inger Furseth, Richard R. Gaillardetz, Brandon Gallaher, China Galland, Mark Galli, Ismael García, Tharscisse Gatwa, Jean-Marie Gaudeul, Luis María Gavilanes del Castillo, Pavel L. Gavrilyuk, Volney P. Gay, Metropolitan Athanasios Geevargis, Kondothra M. George, Mary Gerhart, Simon Gikandi, Maurice Gilbert, Michael J. Gillgannon, Verónica Giménez Beliveau, Terryl Givens, Beth Glazier-McDonald, Philip Gleason, Menghun Goh, Brian Golding, Bishop Hilario M. Gomez, Michelle A. Gonzalez, Donald K. Gorrell, Roy Gottfried, Tamara Grdzelidze, Joel B. Green, Niels Henrik Gregersen, Cristina Grenholm, Herbert Griffiths, Eric W. Gritsch, Erich S. Gruen, Christoffer H. Grundmann, Paul H. Gundani, Jon P. Gunnemann, Petre Guran, Vidar L. Haanes, Jeremiah M. Hackett, Getatchew Haile, Douglas John Hall, Nicholas Hammond, Daphne Hampson, Jehu J. Hanciles, Barry Hankins, Jennifer Haraguchi, Stanley S. Harakas, Anthony John Harding, Conrad L. Harkins, J. William Harmless, Marjory Harper, Amir Harrak, Joel F. Harrington, Mark W. Harris, Susan Ashbrook Harvey, Van A. Harvey, R. Chris Hassel, Jione Havea, Daniel Hawk, Diana L. Hayes, Leslie Hayes, Priscilla Hayner, S. Mark Heim, Simo Heininen, Richard P. Heitzenrater, Eila Helander, David Hempton, Scott H. Hendrix, Jan-Olav Henriksen, Gina Hens-Piazza, Carter Heyward, Nicholas J. Higham, David Hilliard, Norman A. Hjelm, Peter C. Hodgson, Arthur Holder, M. Jan Holton, Dwight N. Hopkins, Ronnie Po-chia Hsia, Po-Ho Huang, James Hudnut-Beumler, Jennifer S. Hughes, Leonard M. Hummel, Mary E. Hunt, Laennec Hurbon, Mark Hutchinson, Susan E. Hylen, Mary Beth Ingham, H. Larry Ingle, Dale T. Irvin, Jon Isaak, Paul John Isaak, Ada María Isasi-Díaz, Hans Raun Iversen, Margaret C. Jacob, Arthur James, Maria Jansdotter-Samuelsson, David Jasper, Werner G. Jeanrond, Renée Jeffery, David Lyle Jeffrey, Theodore W. Jennings, David H. Jensen, Robin Margaret Jensen, David Jobling, Dale A. Johnson, Elizabeth A. Johnson, Maxwell E. Johnson, Sarah Johnson, Mark D. Johnston, F. Stanley Jones, James William Jones, John R. Jones, Alissa Jones Nelson, Inge Jonsson, Jan Joosten, Elizabeth Judd, Mulambya Peggy Kabonde, Robert Kaggwa, Sylvester Kahakwa, Isaac Kalimi, Ogbu U. Kalu, Eunice Kamaara, Wayne C. Kannaday, Musimbi Kanyoro, Veli-Matti Kärkkäinen, Frank Kaufmann, Léon Nguapitshi Kayongo, Richard Kearney, Alice A. Keefe, Ralph Keen, Catherine Keller, Anthony J. Kelly, Karen Kennelly, Kathi Lynn Kern, Fergus Kerr, Edward Kessler, George Kilcourse, Heup Young Kim, Kim Sung-Hae, Kim Yong-Bock, Kim Yung Suk, Richard King, Thomas M. King, Robert M. Kingdon, Ross Kinsler, Hans G. Kippenberg, Cheryl A. Kirk-Duggan, Clifton Kirkpatrick, Leonid Kishkovsky, Nadieszda Kizenko, Jeffrey Klaiber, Hans-Josef Klauck, Sidney Knight, Samuel Kobia, Robert Kolb, Karla Ann Koll, Heikki Kotila, Donald Kraybill, Philip D. W. Krey, Yves Krumenacker, Jeffrey Kah-Jin Kuan, Simanga R. Kumalo, Peter Kuzmic, Simon Shui-Man Kwan, Kwok Pui-lan, André LaCocque, Stephen E. Lahey, John Tsz Pang Lai, Emiel Lamberts, Armando Lampe, Craig Lampe, Beverly J. Lanzetta, Eve LaPlante, Lizette Larson-Miller, Ariel Bybee Laughton, Leonard Lawlor, Bentley Layton, Robin A. Leaver, Karen Lebacqz, Archie Chi Chung Lee, Marilyn J. Legge, Hervé LeGrand, D. L. LeMahieu, Raymond Lemieux, Bill J. Leonard, Ellen M. Leonard, Outi Leppä, Jean Lesaulnier, Nantawan Boonprasat Lewis, Henrietta Leyser, Alexei Lidov, Bernard Lightman, Paul Chang-Ha Lim, Carter Lindberg, Mark R. Lindsay, James R. Linville, James C. Livingston, Ann Loades, David Loades, Jean-Claude Loba-Mkole, Lo Lung Kwong, Wati Longchar, Eleazar López, David W. Lotz, Andrew Louth, Robin W. Lovin, William Luis, Frank D. Macchia, Diarmaid N. J. MacCulloch, Kirk R. MacGregor, Marjory A. MacLean, Donald MacLeod, Tomas S. Maddela, Inge Mager, Laurenti Magesa, David G. Maillu, Fortunato Mallimaci, Philip Mamalakis, Kä Mana, Ukachukwu Chris Manus, Herbert Robinson Marbury, Reuel Norman Marigza, Jacqueline Mariña, Antti Marjanen, Luiz C. L. Marques, Madipoane Masenya (ngwan'a Mphahlele), Caleb J. D. Maskell, Steve Mason, Thomas Massaro, Fernando Matamoros Ponce, András Máté-Tóth, Odair Pedroso Mateus, Dinis Matsolo, Fumitaka Matsuoka, John D'Arcy May, Yelena Mazour-Matusevich, Theodore Mbazumutima, John S. McClure, Christian McConnell, Lee Martin McDonald, Gary B. McGee, Thomas McGowan, Alister E. McGrath, Richard J. McGregor, John A. McGuckin, Maud Burnett McInerney, Elsie Anne McKee, Mary B. McKinley, James F. McMillan, Ernan McMullin, Kathleen E. McVey, M. Douglas Meeks, Monica Jyotsna Melanchthon, Ilie Melniciuc-Puica, Everett Mendoza, Raymond A. Mentzer, William W. Menzies, Ina Merdjanova, Franziska Metzger, Constant J. Mews, Marvin Meyer, Carol Meyers, Vasile Mihoc, Gunner Bjerg Mikkelsen, Maria Inêz de Castro Millen, Clyde Lee Miller, Bonnie J. Miller-McLemore, Alexander Mirkovic, Paul Misner, Nozomu Miyahira, R. W. L. Moberly, Gerald Moede, Aloo Osotsi Mojola, Sunanda Mongia, Rebeca Montemayor, James Moore, Roger E. Moore, Craig E. Morrison O.Carm, Jeffry H. Morrison, Keith Morrison, Wilson J. Moses, Tefetso Henry Mothibe, Mokgethi Motlhabi, Fulata Moyo, Henry Mugabe, Jesse Ndwiga Kanyua Mugambi, Peggy Mulambya-Kabonde, Robert Bruce Mullin, Pamela Mullins Reaves, Saskia Murk Jansen, Heleen L. Murre-Van den Berg, Augustine Musopole, Isaac M. T. Mwase, Philomena Mwaura, Cecilia Nahnfeldt, Anne Nasimiyu Wasike, Carmiña Navia Velasco, Thulani Ndlazi, Alexander Negrov, James B. Nelson, David G. Newcombe, Carol Newsom, Helen J. Nicholson, George W. E. Nickelsburg, Tatyana Nikolskaya, Damayanthi M. A. Niles, Bertil Nilsson, Nyambura Njoroge, Fidelis Nkomazana, Mary Beth Norton, Christian Nottmeier, Sonene Nyawo, Anthère Nzabatsinda, Edward T. Oakes, Gerald O'Collins, Daniel O'Connell, David W. Odell-Scott, Mercy Amba Oduyoye, Kathleen O'Grady, Oyeronke Olajubu, Thomas O'Loughlin, Dennis T. Olson, J. Steven O'Malley, Cephas N. Omenyo, Muriel Orevillo-Montenegro, César Augusto Ornellas Ramos, Agbonkhianmeghe E. Orobator, Kenan B. Osborne, Carolyn Osiek, Javier Otaola Montagne, Douglas F. Ottati, Anna May Say Pa, Irina Paert, Jerry G. Pankhurst, Aristotle Papanikolaou, Samuele F. Pardini, Stefano Parenti, Peter Paris, Sung Bae Park, Cristián G. Parker, Raquel Pastor, Joseph Pathrapankal, Daniel Patte, W. Brown Patterson, Clive Pearson, Keith F. Pecklers, Nancy Cardoso Pereira, David Horace Perkins, Pheme Perkins, Edward N. Peters, Rebecca Todd Peters, Bishop Yeznik Petrossian, Raymond Pfister, Peter C. Phan, Isabel Apawo Phiri, William S. F. Pickering, Derrick G. Pitard, William Elvis Plata, Zlatko Plese, John Plummer, James Newton Poling, Ronald Popivchak, Andrew Porter, Ute Possekel, James M. Powell, Enos Das Pradhan, Devadasan Premnath, Jaime Adrían Prieto Valladares, Anne Primavesi, Randall Prior, María Alicia Puente Lutteroth, Eduardo Guzmão Quadros, Albert Rabil, Laurent William Ramambason, Apolonio M. Ranche, Vololona Randriamanantena Andriamitandrina, Lawrence R. Rast, Paul L. Redditt, Adele Reinhartz, Rolf Rendtorff, Pål Repstad, James N. Rhodes, John K. Riches, Joerg Rieger, Sharon H. Ringe, Sandra Rios, Tyler Roberts, David M. Robinson, James M. Robinson, Joanne Maguire Robinson, Richard A. H. Robinson, Roy R. Robson, Jack B. Rogers, Maria Roginska, Sidney Rooy, Rev. Garnett Roper, Maria José Fontelas Rosado-Nunes, Andrew C. Ross, Stefan Rossbach, François Rossier, John D. Roth, John K. Roth, Phillip Rothwell, Richard E. Rubenstein, Rosemary Radford Ruether, Markku Ruotsila, John E. Rybolt, Risto Saarinen, John Saillant, Juan Sanchez, Wagner Lopes Sanchez, Hugo N. Santos, Gerhard Sauter, Gloria L. Schaab, Sandra M. Schneiders, Quentin J. Schultze, Fernando F. Segovia, Turid Karlsen Seim, Carsten Selch Jensen, Alan P. F. Sell, Frank C. Senn, Kent Davis Sensenig, Damían Setton, Bal Krishna Sharma, Carolyn J. Sharp, Thomas Sheehan, N. Gerald Shenk, Christian Sheppard, Charles Sherlock, Tabona Shoko, Walter B. Shurden, Marguerite Shuster, B. Mark Sietsema, Batara Sihombing, Neil Silberman, Clodomiro Siller, Samuel Silva-Gotay, Heikki Silvet, John K. Simmons, Hagith Sivan, James C. Skedros, Abraham Smith, Ashley A. Smith, Ted A. Smith, Daud Soesilo, Pia Søltoft, Choan-Seng (C. S.) Song, Kathryn Spink, Bryan Spinks, Eric O. Springsted, Nicolas Standaert, Brian Stanley, Glen H. Stassen, Karel Steenbrink, Stephen J. Stein, Andrea Sterk, Gregory E. Sterling, Columba Stewart, Jacques Stewart, Robert B. Stewart, Cynthia Stokes Brown, Ken Stone, Anne Stott, Elizabeth Stuart, Monya Stubbs, Marjorie Hewitt Suchocki, David Kwang-sun Suh, Scott W. Sunquist, Keith Suter, Douglas Sweeney, Charles H. Talbert, Shawqi N. Talia, Elsa Tamez, Joseph B. Tamney, Jonathan Y. Tan, Yak-Hwee Tan, Kathryn Tanner, Feiya Tao, Elizabeth S. Tapia, Aquiline Tarimo, Claire Taylor, Mark Lewis Taylor, Bishop Abba Samuel Wolde Tekestebirhan, Eugene TeSelle, M. Thomas Thangaraj, David R. Thomas, Andrew Thornley, Scott Thumma, Marcelo Timotheo da Costa, George E. “Tink” Tinker, Ola Tjørhom, Karen Jo Torjesen, Iain R. Torrance, Fernando Torres-Londoño, Archbishop Demetrios [Trakatellis], Marit Trelstad, Christine Trevett, Phyllis Trible, Johannes Tromp, Paul Turner, Robert G. Tuttle, Archbishop Desmond Tutu, Peter Tyler, Anders Tyrberg, Justin Ukpong, Javier Ulloa, Camillus Umoh, Kristi Upson-Saia, Martina Urban, Monica Uribe, Elochukwu Eugene Uzukwu, Richard Vaggione, Gabriel Vahanian, Paul Valliere, T. J. Van Bavel, Steven Vanderputten, Peter Van der Veer, Huub Van de Sandt, Louis Van Tongeren, Luke A. Veronis, Noel Villalba, Ramón Vinke, Tim Vivian, David Voas, Elena Volkova, Katharina von Kellenbach, Elina Vuola, Timothy Wadkins, Elaine M. Wainwright, Randi Jones Walker, Dewey D. Wallace, Jerry Walls, Michael J. Walsh, Philip Walters, Janet Walton, Jonathan L. Walton, Wang Xiaochao, Patricia A. Ward, David Harrington Watt, Herold D. Weiss, Laurence L. Welborn, Sharon D. Welch, Timothy Wengert, Traci C. West, Merold Westphal, David Wetherell, Barbara Wheeler, Carolinne White, Jean-Paul Wiest, Frans Wijsen, Terry L. Wilder, Felix Wilfred, Rebecca Wilkin, Daniel H. Williams, D. Newell Williams, Michael A. Williams, Vincent L. Wimbush, Gabriele Winkler, Anders Winroth, Lauri Emílio Wirth, James A. Wiseman, Ebba Witt-Brattström, Teofil Wojciechowski, John Wolffe, Kenman L. Wong, Wong Wai Ching, Linda Woodhead, Wendy M. Wright, Rose Wu, Keith E. Yandell, Gale A. Yee, Viktor Yelensky, Yeo Khiok-Khng, Gustav K. K. Yeung, Angela Yiu, Amos Yong, Yong Ting Jin, You Bin, Youhanna Nessim Youssef, Eliana Yunes, Robert Michael Zaller, Valarie H. Ziegler, Barbara Brown Zikmund, Joyce Ann Zimmerman, Aurora Zlotnik, Zhuo Xinping
- Edited by Daniel Patte, Vanderbilt University, Tennessee
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- Book:
- The Cambridge Dictionary of Christianity
- Published online:
- 05 August 2012
- Print publication:
- 20 September 2010, pp xi-xliv
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16 - The Normalisation of Local Politics? Watching the Presidential Elections in Morotai, North Maluku
- from Part III - Local Democracy
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- By Sidney Jones, Southeast Asia Office, Jakarta
- Edited by Edward Aspinall, Marcus Mietzner
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- Book:
- Problems of Democratisation in Indonesia
- Published by:
- ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
- Published online:
- 21 October 2015
- Print publication:
- 06 April 2010, pp 330-348
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Summary
obj-d>Ever since the introduction of democratic elections in 1999, observers have engaged in intense debate about the factors that motivate Indonesian voters when going to the ballot box. Some analysts believe that Indonesians are still primarily driven by their ethnic, religious, social or regional affiliations, as in the country' first democratic polls in 1955 (King 2003; Baswedan 2007). Others have emphasised the importance of ‘money politics’ in electoral behaviour. According to this view, Indonesians mostly vote for political patrons who offer them cash or other forms of material inducements, including jobs (Sulistyo 2002). But an increasing number of scholars contend that Indonesian voters are becoming more rational, critically evaluating politicians’ leadership qualities, the performance of the incumbent government and the media advertisements presented during the campaign (see, for example, Mietzner 2009 and Mujani and Liddle in this volume). Obviously these highly divergent views on electoral behaviour have led to equally differing assessments of the state of Indonesia' democracy: while those who stress the significance of primordial attachments and material inducements generally see Indonesia as being at a very early stage of democratisation, the proponents of the view that the electorate is becoming more rational maintain that the country has made considerable progress.
Many of the studies mentioned above are based on national survey data or analyses of Jakarta-based newspapers and magazines. While this is a useful (and perhaps inevitable) approach to the regionally frag mented landscape of post-Suharto politics, it often misses nuances and details that only grassroots research can capture. Therefore, this chapter offers a local perspective on the 2009 presidential elections, evaluating from a close distance the key drivers of voting behaviour in one of Indonesia' most remote islands. The observations presented here on the elections in Morotai, an island off the north coast of Halmahera in North Maluku province (see Map 16.1), are not meant to establish more generalised claims about electoral patterns in other parts of Indonesia' vast archipelago. They do, however, present important insights into the workings of Indonesia' democracy in an area far off the journalistic and scholarly track.
The presidential elections in the district of Morotai were a quiet, orderly exercise in civic duty, marked more by a quiet cynicism that nothing would change than excitement over the candidates.
Influence of Rings on the Efficacy of Hand Sanitization and Residual Bacterial Contamination
- Montri D. Wongworawat, Sidney G. Jones
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- Journal:
- Infection Control & Hospital Epidemiology / Volume 28 / Issue 3 / March 2007
- Published online by Cambridge University Press:
- 02 January 2015, pp. 351-353
- Print publication:
- March 2007
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Background.
Previous studies, conducted before widespread use of scrubless, alcohol-based hand sanitizers, demonstrated increased residual bacterial counts after hand hygiene on hands with jewelry.
Objective.To compare the impact of finger rings on the effectiveness of scrubless and water-aided alcohol-based hand sanitization methods with that of povidone-iodine scrub.
Design.Randomized, controlled study.
Setting.University hospital.
Participants.Sixty volunteer subjects from a pool of perioperative staff and medical students.
Intervention.After recruitment, participants wore a ring on one hand and no ring on the other hand. They were randomly assigned to perform hand hygiene with a povidone-iodine scrub, an alcohol wash, or a waterless alcohol-chlorhexidine lotion (n = 20 subjects per method). After subjects completed hand hygiene, gloves were placed on their hands by means of sterile methods, and a “glove juice” technique was used to obtain samples for culture. The number of colony-forming units in each culture was counted, and the data were compared.
Results.There was no significant difference in the number of bacteria between hands with and hands without rings for the groups that used alcohol wash or alcohol-chlorhexidine lotion. However, for the povidone-iodine group, the number of bacteria on hands with rings was greater than the number on hands without rings (P < .05). The hands of participants who used waterless alcohol-chlorhexidine had the lowest bacterial count, regardless of the presence of rings (P < .01).
Conclusions.The presence of rings does not negatively impact the effectiveness of alcohol-based hand sanitizers. Use of waterless alcohol-chlorhexidine lotion resulted in the lowest bacterial count.
5 - Terrorism in Southeast Asia
- from Part III - Security Issues in Southeast Asia
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- By Sidney Jones, Southeast Asia Project Director of the International Crisis Group
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- Book:
- ASEAN-Russia Relations
- Published by:
- ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
- Published online:
- 09 November 2017
- Print publication:
- 27 February 2006, pp 41-42
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Summary
Ms Sidney Jones, Southeast Director of the International Crisis Group and a Visiting Fellow at ISEAS, discussed security threats in the region, notably Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). She noted that terrorism was not viewed as the biggest threat within the region. It was not regime-threatening, although terrorist organizations such as the JI had some capability for violence. The JI was based in Indonesia. Other groups also had broad connections. As the JI weakened, other groups would rise. In the Philippines, there were the MILF, Abu Sayaf and Balek Islam; such groups were mainly used as foot- soldiers. There was no hard evidence of external connections/JI involvement in the terrorism in Southern Thailand. Local issues were usually the prime drivers behind terrorist attacks. But the persecution of Muslims in Chechnya, as well as in Palestine, Iraq and elsewhere, were always cited as grievances in JI documents. In Afghanistan, the recruits from Southeast Asia had trained separately, by themselves. JI leaders had met Khatab in Afghanistan, and Chenchnya was viewed in “romantic terms” by Indonesian mujaheedin, who always had an article about Chechen resistance in their bulletins. There were also video cassettes circulating in Indonesia with titles such as “Hell in Russia”. It was known that three JI members had visited Chechnya. Afghanistan formed the bond between the mujaheedin, and Afghan alumni were the most important core members of “special operations” or suicide bombings. They had carried out the Marriott Hotel attack in Jakarta. From 1984 to 1995, most training had been done in camps in Saada (Pakistan) and Khost and Torkham in Afghanistan, where Indonesians had trained, together with some Filipinos and Tajiks. An academy with a three-year training programme had been set up by the JI in Afghanistan. In 1994, the JI decided to move their training camp to Mindanao. It was in operation from 1996 to 2000. One hundred and seventy-five Indonesians and thirty Malaysians had attended courses there. Small groups went to assist the MILF after 2000.
2 - Political Update 2003: Terrorism, Nationalism and Disillusionment with Reform
- from PART I - Political and Economic Developments
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- By Sidney Jones, Director, South East Asia Project, International Crisis Group, Jakarta
- Edited by M. Chatib Basri, Pierre van van der Eng
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- Book:
- Business in Indonesia
- Published by:
- ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
- Published online:
- 21 October 2015
- Print publication:
- 12 May 2004, pp 23-38
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Summary
If the international community, especially Australia and the United States, saw terrorism as dominating developments in Indonesia during the year, most Indonesians did not. For the political elite, there were far more important issues: rising corruption; stalled democratic reform; how to maintain the country's territorial integrity; the battle between the army and police for control of internal security; the impact of political Islam; the consequences of decentralisation; and manoeuvring for the 2004 elections.
For those outside the elite, all politics was local. People were concerned about personal security, but less because of the Bali bombings than because of vigilantism in their neighbourhoods. In Lombok, the question of whether a ban on gambling would lead to increased tensions between ethnic Balinese and Sasaks was far more important than what happened to Amrozi.
And yet there were issues that touched both the elite and non-elite across the country. One was the dismal performance of civilian leaders. As respect for President Megawati Sukarnoputri plummeted, nostalgia for Soeharto-style leadership grew and promised to be a factor in the 2004 elections.
Nationalism, combined with suspicion of foreigners, was on the upsurge, and helped account for the strong public support for military operations in Aceh. The government managed to transform the name of the government from ‘RI’ – Republik Indonesia – to ‘NKRI’ – Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia’ – and struck a responsive chord by promising to defend the nation from separatists, their foreign supporters and international institutions like the United Nations and the International Court of Justice.
Anti-Western, and particularly anti-American, sentiment was high, fuelled by the war on Iraq. While the Indonesian reaction was muted and street demonstrations few, perceptions of the United States and its allies turned strongly negative across the board. This not only elped to reinforce the notion that the war on terror was a war on Islam, but also meant that, in relation to issues such as Aceh, military accountability for human rights abuses and security sector reform, international donors had even less leverage than they did under normal circumstances.
Finally, Indonesians remained worried about communal tensions. The war in Ambon may have died down, but it flared again in Poso, Central Sulawesi, and mutual suspicions between Muslims and non-Muslims continued, as evidenced in particular by the reactions of both communities to a national education bill with a controversial provision on religious instruction.
Regional Institutions for Protecting Human Rights in Asia
- Sidney Jones
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- Journal:
- Proceedings of the ASIL Annual Meeting / Volume 89 / 1995
- Published online by Cambridge University Press:
- 28 February 2017, pp. 475-480
- Print publication:
- 1995
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Asian Perspectives on Human Rights. Edited by Claude E. WelchJr., and Virginia A. Leary. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1990. 310 pp. $39.50.
- Sidney Jones
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- Journal:
- The Journal of Asian Studies / Volume 50 / Issue 3 / August 1991
- Published online by Cambridge University Press:
- 23 March 2011, pp. 658-659
- Print publication:
- August 1991
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The Elders: A New Generation
- Sidney Jones
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- Journal:
- Ageing & Society / Volume 6 / Issue 3 / September 1986
- Published online by Cambridge University Press:
- 14 November 2008, pp. 313-331
- Print publication:
- September 1986
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Drawing upon evidence from Britain, this paper advances the proposition that new generations of older people are experiencing a healthier, materially better off and more satisfying old age. It is argued that both popular and scientific images of later life are out-dated and unduly negative. In advancing this analysis, attention is given to key areas of personal experience and social life: education, leisure and holidays, retirement, voluntary activity, spirituality, economic status, health and political involvement. A re-construction of the societal position of older people is indicated.
Social Support and Long-Term Lithium Outcome
- Ralph A. O'Connell, Julia A. Mayo, Leonard K. Eng, J. Sidney Jones, Richard H. Gabel
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- Journal:
- The British Journal of Psychiatry / Volume 147 / Issue 3 / September 1985
- Published online by Cambridge University Press:
- 29 January 2018, pp. 272-275
- Print publication:
- September 1985
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The failure rate in long-term lithium treatment of bipolar affective disorder is in the range of 20 to 30%, even with rigorous diagnostic criteria and adequate serum lithium levels. This may be due to a variety of biologic and psychosocial factors. Psychosocial factors affecting treatment outcome were studied in 60 RDC diagnosed bipolar patients treated with lithium for one year. Outcome was measured using an affective episode score, a social adjustment scale and a global assessment scale. Social support was the factor most strongly correlated with a good outcome on all three measures.