Research questions in the human sciences often seek to answer if and when a process changes across time. In functional MRI studies, for instance, researchers may seek to assess the onset of a shift in brain state. For daily diary studies, the researcher may seek to identify when a person’s psychological process shifts following treatment. The timing and presence of such a change may be meaningful in terms of understanding state changes. Currently, dynamic processes are typically quantified as static networks where edges indicate temporal relations among nodes, which may be variables reflecting emotions, behaviors, or brain activity. Here we describe three methods for detecting changes in such correlation networks from a data-driven perspective. Networks here are quantified using the lag-0 pair-wise correlation (or covariance) estimates as the representation of the dynamic relations among variables. We present three methods for change point detection: dynamic connectivity regression, max-type method, and a PCA-based method. The change point detection methods each include different ways to test if two given correlation network patterns from different segments in time are significantly different. These tests can also be used outside of the change point detection approaches to test any two given blocks of data. We compare the three methods for change point detection as well as the complementary significance testing approaches on simulated and empirical functional connectivity fMRI data examples.

Gervais & Fessler argue that contempt is a natural kind and that its experience cannot be explained by a constructionist account of emotion. We dispute these claims and offer a positive constructionist model of contempt that accounts for the existing evidence and unifies conflicting findings in the literature on contempt.

Researchers have wondered how the brain creates emotions since the early days of psychological science. With a surge of studies in affective neuroscience in recent decades, scientists are poised to answer this question. In this target article, we present a meta-analytic summary of the neuroimaging literature on human emotion. We compare the locationist approach (i.e., the hypothesis that discrete emotion categories consistently and specifically correspond to distinct brain regions) with the psychological constructionist approach (i.e., the hypothesis that discrete emotion categories are constructed of more general brain networks not specific to those categories) to better understand the brain basis of emotion. We review both locationist and psychological constructionist hypotheses of brain–emotion correspondence and report meta-analytic findings bearing on these hypotheses. Overall, we found little evidence that discrete emotion categories can be consistently and specifically localized to distinct brain regions. Instead, we found evidence that is consistent with a psychological constructionist approach to the mind: A set of interacting brain regions commonly involved in basic psychological operations of both an emotional and non-emotional nature are active during emotion experience and perception across a range of discrete emotion categories.

In our response, we clarify important theoretical differences between basic emotion and psychological construction approaches. We evaluate the empirical status of the basic emotion approach, addressing whether it requires brain localization, whether localization can be observed with better analytic tools, and whether evidence for basic emotions exists in other types of measures. We then revisit the issue of whether the key hypotheses of psychological construction are supported by our meta-analytic findings. We close by elaborating on commentator suggestions for future research.