Under what conditions do states die? Survival is often assumed to be
the primary goal of states. Yet international relations scholars have
not previously examined the rate or the causes of state death in a
systematic way. I argue that buffer states—states caught between
two rivals—are particularly vulnerable to being coerced out of
existence. Each rival is afraid that its opponent will conquer the
buffer that lies between them, gaining strength and strategic
advantage. The rivals' inability to credibly commit to preserving
the buffer state's sovereignty means that buffer states are
extremely vulnerable to conquest. Using event history analysis, I test
this argument while controlling for traditional realist variables such
as power and alliances, as well as for changes in the post–World
War II era. The analysis generates three major findings: buffer states
are significantly more likely to die than are nonbuffer states; violent
state death (conquest and occupation) virtually ceases after 1945; and
the relationship between power and state survival is tenuous.For their valuable comments and suggestions,
I thank James Fearon, Page Fortna, Erik Gartzke, Hein Goemans, Simon
Jackman, Stephen Krasner, David Lewis, Scott Sagan, Erik Voeten, the
editor of IO, two anonymous reviewers, as well as seminar participants
at Stanford University, Harvard University, the University of Chicago,
and the University of Virginia Law School. Earlier versions of this
article were presented at the 2000 Annual Meetings of the International
Studies Association and the American Political Science Association.
Jessica Stanton provided valuable research assistance. I gratefully
acknowledge the support of the Center for International Security and
Cooperation and the John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies. Any
errors are my own.