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The Prisoner's Dilemma
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    Di Salvo, Rosa Gorgone, Matteo and Oliveri, Francesco 2017. Political Dynamics Affected by Turncoats. International Journal of Theoretical Physics, Vol. 56, Issue. 11, p. 3604.


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The Prisoner's Dilemma is one of the most fiercely debated thought experiments in philosophy and the social sciences, presenting the simple insight that when two or more agents interact, the actions that most benefit each individual may not benefit the group. The fact that when you do what is best for you, and I do what is best for me, we end up in a situation that is worse for both of us makes the Prisoner's Dilemma relevant to a broad range of everyday phenomena. This volume of new essays from leading philosophers, game theorists, and economists examines the ramifications of the Prisoner's Dilemma, the directions in which it continues to lead us, and its links to a variety of topics in philosophy, political science, social science, economics, and evolutionary biology. The volume will be a vital and accessible resource for upper-level students as well as for academic researchers.


‘… the book provides a good overview of the variety of perspectives on the rational solutions to the Prisoner’s dilemma, as well as of the increasing doubts regarding its descriptive and explanatory scope.’

Cédric Paternotte Source: Metascience

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