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Not as distinct as you think: Reasons to doubt that morality comprises a unified and objective conceptual category

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 May 2018

Jordan Theriault
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Northeastern University, Boston, MA 02115. jordan_theriault@northeastern.eduhttp://www.jordan-theriault.com/
Liane Young
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Boston College, Chestnut Hill, MA 02467. liane.young@bc.eduhttp://moralitylab.bc.edu/

Abstract

That morality comprises a distinct and objective conceptual category is a critical claim for Stanford's target article. We dispute this claim. Statistical conclusions about a distinct moral domain were not justified in prior work, on account of the “stimuli-as-fixed-effects” fallacy. Furthermore, we have found that, behaviorally and neurally, morals share more in common with preferences than facts.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2018 

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