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A cognitive, non-selectionist account of moral externalism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 May 2018

Jason Zinser
Jason Zinser*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Wisconsin–Stevens Point, Stevens Point, WI 54481-3897. jzinser@uwsp.edu https://www.uwsp.edu/philosophy/Pages/AboutUs/FacultyStaff/jZinser.aspx
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Abstract

A general feature of our moral psychology is that we feel that some moral demands are motivated externally. Stanford explains this feature with an evolutionary account, such that moral externalism was selected for its ability to facilitate prosocial interactions. Alternatively, I argue that a cognitive, non-selectionist account of moral externalism is a more parsimonious explanation.

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Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 41 , 2018 , e118
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2018 

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