Women legislators face a variety of gendered barriers both outside and inside the legislature. Yet, little previous scholarship has quantitatively examined whether legislative insiders are biased against women and their accomplishments. We explore a new potential explanation for gender inequity in legislatures: that women in office may get less credit than men for similar achievements. If legislative insiders systematically undervalue women’s work, women will have a harder time gaining influence within the chamber; alternatively, those working in and with the legislature may be uniquely aware of the effort that goes into representational activities and can observe the work that women perform firsthand. To examine this question, we combine elite evaluations of legislators from the North Carolina General Assembly with data on committee assignments, legislative effectiveness, electoral performance, and more. We find little systematic evidence that women legislators’ accomplishments are valued less than those of the men with whom they serve.

Research quality assessment is a cornerstone of academic practice, yet the criteria that inform such judgments are often assumed rather than critically examined through empirical research. This article draws on a global survey of international relations (IR) scholars (N = 820) to analyze the cognitive dimensions underlying research quality evaluation and their variation across sociological and epistemological factors. We identify seven distinct quality factors: theoretical significance, logical style and structure, practical significance, methodological rigor, contribution and value for future research, interest and topicality, and challenge to existing knowledge. Our results suggest that, while personal preferences, disciplinary norms, and professional practices—shaped by variables such as gender, nationality, and political orientation—influence evaluations, research quality judgments are ultimately grounded in shared cognitive frameworks. Our study offers robust evidence that quality assessments, though subject to sociological variation, reflect deeper, common cognitive structures across scholarly communities.

In 1939 and 1940, the renowned political scientist Harold Lasswell wrote and hosted over 40 episodes of a radio show, Human Nature in Action, for the National Broadcasting Corporation. The program was meant to adjust listeners to the experience of psychological insecurities generated by American life—insecurities Lasswell believed would engender political unrest if not properly managed. In uncovering the archives of the show, which have gone almost entirely unexamined to date, this article not only explains why one of the most famous political scientists of the mid-twentieth century believed the American public needed to be subjected to such a program of mass psychotherapy and why the nation’s largest broadcaster agreed to support it. It also invites reconsideration of the ways in which popular political commentary today—even when it represents otherwise diverse ideological perspectives—remains attached to Lasswellian narratives of anxiety as dangerous to a “healthy” democratic polity.

Social media platforms have an increasingly central influence on global politics. Media of unprecedented reach, they have the power to sway elections, exacerbate societal polarization, promote or provoke conflict at all levels, and jeopardize relations between states. But what of the people who govern and oversee these platforms? For although algorithms and automation may underpin how social media content influences politics, the policies, approaches, and international relations of social media companies are directed or conducted by corporate executives and their representatives, actors who receive limited critical attention in International Relations (IR) scholarship. Combining multiple data sources, including field interviews with Meta and Twitter staff on three continents, this reflection suggests an approach to studying social media companies and their relationships to global politics that moves beyond abstraction and aggregation. Examining these actors and their internal dynamics through an organizational lens can shed fresh light on the contingent spatial, temporal, and normative drivers and enactments of their influence across the international system.

Under what conditions are user-generated digital content platforms responsive to pressures from users, businesses, and states? I propose that digital platforms show different levels of responsiveness to users, businesses, and states over time. Early in a platform’s life, the platform is highly sensitive to the demands of users, who have an opportunity to directly shape the institutional characteristics of the platform through the threat of user revolt. The unique power of its users stems from the network logic that underpins the value of the platform. As a platform grows and the size and centrality of its network increase, it becomes more sensitive to pressures by businesses (through boycotts) and the state (through regulation). At the same time, the power of users lessens as collective action problems become more severe and exit threats become less credible. The threat of user revolts has a temporal significance: Unless users alter the institutional architecture of the platform and lock in pro-user institutional characteristics early, the threat of user revolts becomes less consequential as the platform grows. Comparative case studies of Facebook, Wikipedia, Digg, and Reddit provide support for the theory.

Citizens’ resentment at losing out to the rest of society is commonly regarded as the foundation of the demand for the populist radical right (PRR). Yet whether this motive has an objective economic basis remains disputed. Relying on European Social Survey individual-level data from 23 elections across Western Europe, combined with Eurostat data, I demonstrate that the PRR polls better among social classes facing economic status loss. To do so, I leverage a novel positional measure of income. This approach allows me to gauge economic status loss as a distinct experience from worsening financial circumstances, which has been the initial focus of empirical research. Evidence that economic status loss is the economic engine of PRR support is corroborated by data on cultural stances and redistributive preferences. My study confirms the complementarity of cultural- and economic-based explanations of PRR voting and reveals one electoral consequence of rising economic inequalities.

Which autocratic elites are more likely to return to cabinet in a democracy? Elites’ incentives are at the core of the explanations of why, how, and when democratization happens, yet existing studies on elites’ post-democratization trajectory are mostly anecdotal, case-study–based, region-specific, or based on aggregate, slow-moving structural variables. This article offers a novel theory and systematic empirical evidence of autocratic revolving doors that explain which former autocratic elites are more likely to return to cabinet positions under democracy. Using a demand-and-supply logic of cabinet formation, I propose that the return of former autocratic elites to cabinet is explained both by the need for cabinet leaders with policy-making experience and to appease old autocratic elites and their interests. More specifically, the political experience and the characteristics of the position that political elites held under autocracy explains which of them are more likely to meet these objectives and return to cabinet in a democracy. These theoretical propositions receive support in a quantitative analysis using a novel measure of returning elites for 12,949 former autocratic elites from 68 new democracies between 1966 and 2020.

How does ideology affect relations between armed groups within a state? While existing research has underscored how ideological proximity can foster alliances among armed groups, this article posits that ideological proximity can also breed hostility among them. When organizations share foundational narratives, they gain access to each other’s ideational resources, which can, in turn, pose challenges to these groups’ cohesion and leadership status. These challenges manifest in the form of questioning the sincerity and authenticity of each other’s beliefs, thereby threatening the group’s survival, sometimes overshadowing the risks posed by their shared ideologically distant adversaries. Focusing on Iran’s Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization (MKO), this article highlights its evolution as one of the first armed groups to transform Islam into a potent ideology before transitioning to Marxism and later reverting to Islamism. It examines how the organization’s ideological proximity with other Islamist and Marxist actors led to conflict and outbidding violence instead of cooperation. Drawing upon a trove of the MKO’s secret documents, this article reveals how a significant portion of the rhetoric and actions of armed groups is directed at outperforming their ideologically similar rivals, rather than confronting ideologically distant adversaries.