In Part I of this discussion I considered the nature and validity of the principle of respect for persons as distinguished from its practical import and application. Before I proceed to that second topic let me draw together in summary fashion the main points of the view I have put forward.

Beliefs and desires are linked with one another by an obvious kind of duality. Everyone assumes that a person's beliefs may be, to some extent, ascertained by seeing how he acts: for we suppose that he will do the things which he believes will fulfil his wishes, and avoid doing what he thinks will frustrate them. Similarly, his desires may, to some extent, be ascertained by seeing how he acts; for if we know what he thinks about the results of his actions, we suppose that the expected results are desired or not disliked and those believed unlikely are disliked or undesired. We have three variables, conduct, desire, and belief; and we suppose that there is some equation by which the first in conjunction with one of the others implies a determinate value of the third. In principle, it should be equally possible to deduce conduct from belief and desire. But that seems of less metaphysical interest, because we think of actions as open to observation in a straightforward way, whereas we are more dubious about beliefs and desires.

The purpose of this article is to examine two major arguments in favour of the philosophical thesis that the meaning of an expression is its use, and not its referent or what it corresponds to. A second philosophical thesis which is closely related to the first is that the study of the ordinary, “actual” uses of certain expressions is not of purely linguistic interest but in fact is a way, probably the only proper way, of solving the problems of traditional philosophy; in the sequel to the present article, we shall examine one major argument in favour of this second thesis. Both theses occupy a place of central importance in the dominant movement in contemporary British philosophy, to which we shall refer as “the philosophy of ordinary language”. Together they seem to constitute the basis of the most characteristic claim of this movement: that traditional philosophic discourse is logically improper and that philosophy is a legitimate cognitive discipline only if it is concerned with “the spatial and temporal phenomenon of language” by describing “the actual use of language”. Both theses are necessary for the justifi cation of this more general claim.

Professor Karl Popper has had a great deal to endure: “expositions” of his ideas which were mere travesties, “refutations” which he had already answered, by anticipation, or which entirely missed the point at issue. One can easily understand why, when he came to publish an English translation of his Logik der Forschung, he decided to keep to the original text; it should at last be clear exactly what he had—and had not—said in 1934. Yet his thinking had by no means stood still since that time; quite naturally, too, he wished to emphasize as much.

The publication in English of Karl R. Popper's The Logic of Scientific Discovery (London, Hutchinson, 1959) twenty-five years after the appearance of the German original, is an important event. At the time when many philosophers questioned the cognitive value of scientific hypotheses (and even of the most down-to-earth empirical generalizations), Popper has shown how to reconcile the free use of bold explanatory hypotheses with an insistence on empirical testing. Many of Popper's views have now been accepted even by most of his earlier opponents, which is no small tribute to a philosopher who had challenged an important current of opinion. But, though the basic aspects of Popper's theory have attracted considerable attention in recent years, some of his finer points have received insufficient discussion. It is hoped that the publication of this important book in English translation will now help to remedy this situation.

The conceptual problems raised by the discovery of quantum effects have not been fully resolved after half a century. Part of the reason for this is undoubtedly to be found in the mutual ignorance which prevails between physicists and philosophers. In his book Heisenberg brings together a philosophically inclined temperament with an unrivalled knowledge of physics. The result is a book of very great interest, however much one might disagree with his conclusions. The collection of essays of which the other book is made up is intended to bring crucial conceptual problems in physics especially to the notice of philosophers. The design and intention of the collection is admirable for this is the proper way to overcome the departmentalization of interest that has left the deep conceptual problems still unresolved. Men like Heisenberg who combine philosophical temperament with scientic knowledge of great distinction are rare, and yet the difficulties can only be cleared up by the application of philosophical techniques of analysis to problems which are an intimate and difficult part of physics.

The purpose of this important series of Gifford lectures is to give an account of science; to show its method, its aims, its metaphysical presuppositions, and in what social context it may best flourish.

Die Atombombe und die Zukunft des Menschen (R. Piper, München) is the topical title of Karl Jaspers's latest book. His intention is excellent, he wants to arouse the conscience of man in face of the deadly danger of atomic warfare. It would be most interesting to compare this book of more than 500 pages with Bertrand Russell's corresponding short publications which concentrate on practical proposals. In order to do justice to Jaspers the English reader should, however, keep in mind that the author had to overcome formidable obstacles. His subtitle, Politisches Bewusstsein in unserer Zeit, indicates that he does not only wish to discuss the present dangerous situation and the means for mastering it, but also to lay the foundation of a Political Philosophy. But here he is faced with two brute facts. First, the Germans are almost by nature un political and falsify by their existence a famous Aristotelian dictum. Their political sense or instinct is, for complex psychological and historical reasons, underdeveloped; a fact which is, paradoxically, of great political importance. Secondly, a German Political Philosophy in the Anglo-American sense does not exist; it forms part of the Rechts-und Staatsphilosopie (cf. Hegel's Philosophie des Rechts, which should not be translated as Philosophy of Right) or of sociological studies. Consequently, Jaspers has to construct his Political Philosophy on the basis of his own Philosophy of Existence, an interesting experiment, beset with formidable difficulties. Here again he remains the gliding philosopher (der schwebende Philosoph), whose analysis of our political predicament moves in “possible perspectives” so that in the end everything remains in suspense (Es bleibt alles in der Schwebe). Indeed, Jaspers holds that rationally atomic warfare cannot be eliminated and that the total destruction of mankind is probable. He therefore appeals to every human being for a radical change of heart which alone could avert the disaster. This change of the “essence of man” remains a Utopian hope. Nevertheless, Jaspers is right in appealing to everybody's conscience. He confirms, moreover, that his existentialism cannot provide the basis for a Political Philosophy.

In his lucid paper “The Objectivity of History” (PHILOSOPHY, April 1958, pp. 97–111) Professor Pass more poses the problem of history's objectivity and seeks to find out in what the objectivity of history might consist. In this note I wish only to criticize his presentation of Popper's views (under his head Criterion Seven). I think Pass more's failure to report Popper's views correctly causes him to overlook the striking similarity between Popper's conclusion and his own.