This paper argues in favour of a desire-based account of normativity. In addition, it demonstrates that the view is particularly well-placed to answer ‘bootstrapping’ objections. Such objections have previously been taken to be a problem not just for desire-based accounts, but for a variety of other subjective accounts of practical normativity.

I will begin by explaining desire-based accounts of normativity, and then by explicating two different kinds of bootstrapping objection: one about normative conflicts, and one about normativity coming from the wrong kind of source. Both objections, I will show, can be answered with a clear explanation of what makes desire-based accounts of normativity so attractive: their ability to explain practical normative force. As such, this paper aims to go further than simply being a new response to a popular objection, or a new argument in support of a controversial view. It will also contribute to a better understanding of practical normativity itself, and how the nature of the normativity depends on and changes with the corresponding desire.