The symposium collection in this issue of TEL, consisting of four articles including this framing article, seeks to conceptualize and flesh out a new branch of law and legal research: global animal law. The starting hypothesis is that contemporary animal law must be global or transnational (that is, both transboundary and multilevel) in order to be effective. In times of globalization, all aspects of (commodified) human−animal interactions (from food production and distribution, working animals and uses in research, to breeding and keeping of pets) possess a transboundary dimension. Animal welfare has become a global concern, which requires global regulation. This foreword introduces the three symposium articles, sketches out the research programme of global animal law and links its emergence to the ongoing ‘animal turn’ in the social sciences, including political philosophy.

This article problematizes the discrepancy between the wealth of international law serving human needs and rights and the international regulatory deficit concerning animal welfare and animal rights. It suggests that, in the face of scientific evidence, the legal human–animal boundary (as manifest notably in the denial of rights to animals) needs to be properly justified. Unmasking the (to some extent) ‘imagined’ nature of the human–animal boundary, and shedding light on the persistence of human–animal comparisons for pernicious and beneficial purposes of the law, can offer inspirations for legal reform in the field of animal welfare and even animal rights.

Many animal and environmental activists think of international trade law as a block to the achievement of their goals and perceive the World Trade Organization (WTO) as a threat to animals. Yet, the first legal decision of an international tribunal to devote careful, sustained attention to animal welfare issues comes from the WTO, in the EC – Seal Products decision. This article argues that international trade law is currently an important, although under-acknowledged, locus for the development of global norms concerning the protection of animals, and that animal conservation and animal welfare can be seen as aspects of a single overarching principle of animal protection. International trade law contributes to animal protection in two ways. Firstly, WTO jurisprudence has recognized animal protection as a legitimate basis for invoking exceptions to trade rules (as in EC – Seal Products). Secondly, international trade negotiations enhance cooperation on the implementation and enforcement of existing conservation obligations (as in the new Trans-Pacific Partnership’s Environment Chapter).

Globalization now exerts an enormous impact on the human/animal relationship, which has momentous implications for both animal advocacy and the future of animal law. Animal abuse is being outsourced as animal experimentation heads east and agricultural animal production moves south. As a result of, among other things, outsourcing and other impacts of globalization on the industries of animal experimentation and animal agricultural production, parochialism and ‘one state’ strategies will not ultimately be effective in ending animal abuse. Animal advocates and lawyers must therefore construct theories, strategies, principles and campaigns that have resonance around the globe and traverse seemingly impenetrable cultural divides. To accomplish this crossing of cultural boundaries, it is paramount to fashion a common language – one which expresses cross-culturally accepted universal principles. This article proposes a methodology for generating these universal principles for animal advocacy and legal policy proposals, loosely based on Feminist Care Theory, positing that moral principles are based on feelings of compassion, sympathy and empathy. The specific basal notion proposed for grounding these universal principles for animal advocacy and legal policy proposals is the concept of ‘caring’, defined as ‘the suite of feelings and cognitions that an emotionally sound human experiences in response to focusing attention on the suffering of others’. Based on this foundational notion, several examples of uses of animals are analyzed and exemplar universal principles and legal policy proposals are derived.

This article argues that the involvement of technical experts in decision making promotes better environmental results while simultaneously recognizing the uncertainty in science. India’s record as a progressive jurisdiction in environmental matters through its proactive judiciary is internationally recognized. The neoteric National Green Tribunal of India (NGT) – officially described as a ‘specialised body equipped with necessary expertise to handle environmental disputes involving multi-disciplinary issues’ – is a forum which offers greater plurality for environmental justice. The NGT, in exercising wide powers, is staffed by judicial and technical expert members who decide cases in an open forum. The experts are ‘central’, rather than ‘marginal’, to the NGT’s decision-making process.

This article draws on theoretical insights developed by Lorna Schrefler and Peter Haas to analyze the role of scientific experts as decision makers within the NGT. Unprecedented interview access provides data that grants an insight into the internal decision-making processes of the five benches of the NGT. Reported cases, supported by additional comments of bench members, illustrate the wider policy impact of scientific knowledge and its contribution to the NGT’s decision-making process.

This article offers a socio-legal analysis of the role played by the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR) in the development, diffusion, and implementation of jurisdictional REDD+ activities throughout the developing world. It employs a qualitative research method known as process tracing to uncover whether and, if so, to what extent and how actors have used CBDR to support the emergence and effectiveness of the transnational legal process for REDD+. The article argues that the transnational legal process for REDD+ reflects a conception of CBDR in which developing country governments may take on voluntary commitments to reduce their carbon emissions, with the multilateral, bilateral, and private sources of financial support and technical assistance provided by developed countries, international organizations, non-governmental organizations, and corporations. This creative conception and application of CBDR has fostered the construction and diffusion of legal norms for REDD+ because it has influenced the interests, ideas, and identities of public and private actors in the North and South. However, the early challenges associated with the implementation of REDD+ reveal a worrying gap between the financial pledges made by developed countries and the costs associated with the full implementation of REDD+, as well as contradictions in the very way in which the responsibilities of various countries have been defined in the context of REDD+. The analysis has important implications for the transnational governance of REDD+, as well as for scholarship on the role of differentiation in the pursuit of effective and equitable climate change solutions.

The landmark 2015 decision by the Hague District Court in Urgenda v. The Netherlands represents the first time a national court has expressly used the international environmental law (IEL) principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and capabilities (CBDRs) of the climate regime as a complementary tool to interpret the scope of a state’s climate obligations under domestic law. This article highlights that despite the marked engagement of national courts with IEL in recent decades (including engaging with principles such as sustainable development, polluter pays, intergenerational equity, and precaution), until this decision CBDRs had remained outside the purview of environmental law jurisprudence at the national level. The article examines how the Hague Court used CBDRs to help address two common barriers to climate liability: causation and the ‘political question’ doctrine. The article argues that the Court was able to find normative content in a core element of the climate-related CBDRs: the ‘leadership’ role of developed countries in climate action. This core element has remained remarkably consensual throughout the contested history of CBDRs in the climate regime – a history that has gained a new chapter with the signature of the Paris Agreement in December 2015. The article concludes that Urgenda v. The Netherlands may serve as a starting point for a more productive and extensive use of CBDRs in climate litigation, provided litigants make more explicit use of the persuasive authority of the principle.

Transnational carbon major companies are responsible for over 30% of global industrial greenhouse gas emissions and exert tremendous influence over future global climate trajectories. Yet, they are not governed through top-down, stringent emissions limits, but are instead regulated largely by disclosure-only domestic requirements and market-based or voluntary corporate social responsibility mechanisms. Through an examination of the requirements of domestic laws such as the United Kingdom (UK) Climate Change Act 2008 and the UK Energy Act 2013, as well as the environmental and sustainability reports produced under the UK Companies Act 2006 (Strategic Report and Directors’ Report) Regulations 2013, this article analyzes the regulatory requirements placed on carbon majors, and the climate change pledges and emissions of five UK-based carbon majors: BP, Royal Dutch Shell, BG Group, National Grid, and Centrica. The article concludes that the efforts to curb emissions in these carbon major entities are being subverted by company law, company theory and commercial norms such as shareholder wealth maximization.

Many multilateral environmental agreements have adopted differentiated rules for different countries, based on the recognition of the ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ (CBDRs) of states. By establishing two rigid groups of countries with and without emissions reduction obligations, the intergovernmental climate regime represents the most extreme case of such differentiation. The regime has struggled to overcome this rigidity and the resulting political deadlock between developing and developed countries. Transnational climate governance (TCG) initiatives have emerged as an alternative to provide mitigation, adaptation or finance outside the multilateral process. By drawing on synergies between public and private actors, it is hoped that they overcome the paralysis of the intergovernmental process. Yet, they take place in the same world of unequal peers, with different levels of capacity and responsibility for climate change. This article investigates the extent to which such TCG initiatives reflect the CBDR principle. Do different types of initiative – involving different types of actor or with different climate-related goals – address differentiation in distinct ways? Does taking account of CBDRs affect the membership of transnational initiatives? This article explores these questions empirically by analyzing a sample of TCG initiatives in terms of how they include differential treatment of states and non-state members. It concludes that TCG initiatives address differentiation in a pragmatic way. Most frequently, they either offer participants flexibility in how to implement their commitments, or provide support to members from developing countries. Such support is, so far, still insufficient to address the limited involvement of developing country actors.

The Paris Agreement to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) signifies a shift in how the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR) manifests in the international climate change regime. Unlike the UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol, the Paris Agreement does not enshrine differentiated substantive mitigation obligations for developed and developing countries. However, an increasingly proceduralized variant of the CBDR principle, which facilitates regard for the interests of developing countries with respect to treaty implementation yet does not guarantee favourable substantive outcomes for these states, is evident in the emerging regime. The experience of the International Maritime Organization’s climate change regime provides a cautionary tale with respect to procedurally oriented differentiation that is not reinforced by effective processes to ensure that developed states honour their finance and technology transfer commitments. Accordingly, this article posits that strong accountability mechanisms are required to transform opportunities for procedural differentiation in the Paris Agreement into a robust framework for procedural regard for the interests of developing states.