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6 - The Second Worst in Practical Conflict

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 December 2009

Isaac Levi
Affiliation:
Emeritus Professor of Philosophy, Columbia University, New York
Peter Baumann
Affiliation:
University of Aberdeen
Monika Betzler
Affiliation:
Georg-August-Universität, Göttingen, Germany
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Summary

TIES FOR OPTIMALITY

Rational agents do the best they can. That is to say, they choose an option from those available to them that is the best, all things considered, among those available options. This maximizing recipe creates no difficulty in case there is exactly one option that is best among the options available to agent X. agent X should choose the optimal option.

Suppose, however, that like Buridan's Ass, X faces a predicament where two or more options are optimal. Which option should X choose? It does no good to say that all optimal options are equally optimal. X knows that. But X may still want guidance as to what to do.

To insist that rational agents never face decision problems where more than one available option is optimal is to disallow the possibility that decision makers can judge distinct options to be equally valuable. If A and B are equally valuable, all things considered, and belong to set of feasible options S, then the subset of S consisting of the pair {A, B} could coherently be a set of available options. Both A and B are equally optimal relative to that set of available options.

Buridan's Ass X need not be frozen in indecision, leading to doom. X will choose for the best no matter which optimal option X chooses. X may not feel the need for guidance between equally optimal options.

Type
Chapter
Information
Practical Conflicts
New Philosophical Essays
, pp. 159 - 171
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2004

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References

Herzberger, H. 1973. Ordinal Preference and Rational Choice. Econometrica 41: 187–237CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Levi, Isaac. 1986. Hard Choices: Decision Making under Unresolved Conflict. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Levi, Isaac. 1989. Possibility and Probability. Erkenntnis 31: 365–86CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Little, I. M. D. 1957. A Critique of Welfare Economics. Oxford: Clarendon
Sen, Amartya K. 1970. Collective Choice and Social Welfare. San Francisco, Calif.: Holden Day
Walley, Peter. 1991. Statistical Reasoning with Imprecise Probabilities. London and New York: Chapman and Hall

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