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10 - Involvement and Detachment: A Paradox of Practical Reason

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 December 2009

Peter Baumann
Affiliation:
Lecturer of Philosophy, University of Aberdeen, UK
Peter Baumann
Affiliation:
University of Aberdeen
Monika Betzler
Affiliation:
Georg-August-Universität, Göttingen, Germany
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Summary

If the world were perfect, it wouldn't be.

Yogi Berra

I am going to present what I think is an interesting paradox. I will first give an exposition of the paradox (which could be called a “preface paradox for goals” – for reasons that will become obvious soon). I will then deal with some objections and finally discuss a proposed solution to the paradox.

THE PARADOX

A good starting point is, as always, a triviality: Agents want their goals to be realized. More precisely:

  1. (1) If an agent A has a goal G, then A wants that G will be realized (by A or somebody or something else).

This has to be taken in the de dicto-sense – hence not in the de re-sense of “something would constitute the goal's realization, and A wants it.” I use “A wants that p” in the strong sense of “All things considered, A prefers the truth of ‘p’ to the truth of ‘not-p.’”

Having a particular desire is, of course, compatible with not wanting its realization. Goals, however, are different: They imply the desiredness of their realization. It is simply incoherent to say something like, “I have this goal but I do not want to realize it.”

The following thing seems trivial also:

  1. (2) Agents have many goals (at any particular time as well as throughout their lives).

As does this:

  1. (3) If an agent A has a finite number of goals G1, G2, …, Gn, then A wants that G1 will be realized, A wants that G2 will be realized, …, A wants that Gn will be realized.

  2. […]

Type
Chapter
Information
Practical Conflicts
New Philosophical Essays
, pp. 244 - 261
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2004

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References

Baumann, Peter. 1996. Mephistos Problem: Über den Zusammenhang von Absichten und Handlungserfolgen. In Christoph Hubig and Hans Poser (eds.), Cognitio Humana – Dynamik des Wissens und der Werte. XVII Deutscher Kongress für Philosophie (Leipzig 1996). Leipzig: Institut für Philosophie, vol. 1, 50–7
Bratman, Michael. 1987. Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press
Chang, Ruth. 1997a. Introduction. In Ruth Chang (ed.), Incommensurability, Incomparability, and Practical Reason. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1–34
Chang, Ruth (ed.). 1997b Incommensurability, Incomparability, and Practical Reason. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press
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Parfit, Derek. 1984. Reasons and Persons. Oxford: Clarendon
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