Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-76fb5796d-22dnz Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-04-29T16:59:27.403Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

12 - Are There Insolvable Moral Conflicts?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 December 2009

Peter Schaber
Affiliation:
Associate Professor of Practical Philosophy, University of Zürich, Switzerland
Peter Baumann
Affiliation:
University of Aberdeen
Monika Betzler
Affiliation:
Georg-August-Universität, Göttingen, Germany
Get access

Summary

Is there a solution to Bernard Williams's famous Jim/Pedro example? Jim is on a tour through South America and finds himself one day confronted with Pedro, an Army officer, who is about to kill twenty rebellious Indians. Jim cannot prevent Pedro from doing so. But Pedro offers Jim the “privilege” of killing one of the Indians, in return letting the others off. Should Jim accept Pedro's offer? Is there an answer to this question? Is Jim faced with a conflict, but one that can be resolved? Or is this a situation in which we are faced with an insolvable moral conflict, in which different moral demands draw us in different and incompatible directions without an ought being available, that is, a situation where it is even in principle impossible to say what Jim ought to do, all things considered? It is not that we are not able to determine what we ought to do; it is rather that there is nothing that could be discovered as something that ought to be done.

According to what Alan Donagan calls moral rationalism, this cannot be the case. Moral theories cannot allow for moral dilemmas. A moral theory that would do so would have to be revised. As Donagan puts it: “The generation of moral dilemmas is to moral rationalism what the generation of self-contradictions is to theories generally: an indispensable sign that a particular theory is defective.

Type
Chapter
Information
Practical Conflicts
New Philosophical Essays
, pp. 279 - 294
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2004

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Brink, David O. 1996. Moral Conflict and Its Structure. In Homer E. Mason (ed.), Moral Dilemmas and Moral Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 102–26
Broome, John. 1999. Incommensurable Values. In John Broome, Ethics Out of Economics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 145–61
Broome, John. 2000. Normative Requirements. In Jonathan Dancy (ed.), Normativity, Oxford: Blackwell, 78–99
Chang, Ruth. 1997. Introduction. In Ruth Chang (ed.), Incommensurability, Incomparability, and Practical Reason. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1–34
Chang, Ruth. 1998. Comparison and the Justification of Choice. University of Pennsylvania Law Review 146: 1569–98CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Conee, Earl. 1987. Against Moral Dilemmas. In Christopher W. Gowans (ed.), Moral Dilemmas. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 239–49
Dancy, Jonathan. 1993. Moral Reasons. Oxford: Blackwell
Donagan, Alan. 1987. Consistency in Rationalist Moral Systems. In Christopher W. Gowans, Moral Dilemmas. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 271–90
Donagan, Alan. 1996. Moral Dilemmas, Genuine and Spurious: A Comparative Anatomy. In Homer E. Mason (ed.), Moral Dilemmas and Moral Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 11–22
Gowans, Christopher W. 1994. Innocence Lost: An Examination of Inescapable Moral Wrongdoing. Oxford: Oxford University Press
Nagel, Thomas. 1979. The Fragmentation of Value. In Thomas Nagel, Mortal Questions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 128–41
Nagel, Thomas. 1986. The View from Nowhere. Oxford: Oxford University Press
Raz, Joseph. 1986. The Morality of Freedom. Oxford: Clarendon
Williams, Bernard. 1973. A Critique of Utilitarianism. In J. J. C. Smart and Bernard Williams, Utilitarianism: For and Against. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 73–150

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×