Conflicting Values and Conflicting Virtues

doi:10.1017/CBO9780511616402.010

9 - Conflicting Values and Conflicting Virtues

Published online by Cambridge University Press: 02 December 2009

Nicholas White

Edited by

Peter Baumann and

Monika Betzler

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Nicholas White: Affiliation:
Chair and Professor of Philosophy, University of California at Irvine
Peter Baumann: Affiliation:
University of Aberdeen
Monika Betzler: Affiliation:
Georg-August-Universität, Göttingen, Germany

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Summary

Some philosophers say that goods can “conflict.” Others deny this. What are they disagreeing about? The issue might appear simple, but it turns out to be complex. Among various conflicts generated by our thoughts about what is good, one conflict arises concerning whether to call conflicting things good or to avoid doing so.

Isaiah Berlin cites “freedom and equality” as an example of a conflict between goods. He also says that happiness can conflict with knowledge, mercy with justice, and liberty with fraternity. We may start by making a few remarks about such cases.

It seems utterly implausible to deny that sometimes particular things that we are strongly inclined to insist are good come into conflict, in the sense that gaining more of one can lead to having less of the other. At first sight it seems obvious that both freedom and equality can be called good, and that at least sometimes an increase in one leads to less of the other. True, there might be a case for saying that in the long run, an increase in equality might lead to greater freedom for all. That might happen, for instance, to the extent that restrictions on freedom are generated by resentments caused by inequalities. It seems flatly unbelievable, however, that all conflicts of things that we actually call goods can be so neatly explained.

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Type: Chapter
Information: Practical Conflicts
New Philosophical Essays
, pp. 223 - 243

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511616402.010 [Opens in a new window]

Publisher: Cambridge University Press

Print publication year: 2004

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