Introduction

Evidence from the history of electoral and party competition in post-independence India leads us to nuance some of the arguments that Hicken and Kuhonta (2009) advance about the determinants of the institutionalization of Asian party systems. Among others, they claim that the Asian experience teaches us that (1) “to get highly institutionalized party systems it may be necessary to have some form of authoritarian party in power at an earlier point in time”; (2) that “more elections [do not] necessarily lead to greater institutionalization”; and (3) that there is “no relationship between electoral institutions and government type with institutionalization.” The Indian case study helps us understand some of the limitations of these claims. First, drawing on conventional wisdom in the literature of the Indian party system, we point out that authoritarianism, marked by Indira Gandhi’s ascent to political leadership, actually led to a deinstitutionalization of the dominant party, the Congress, as well as the party system. As such, the Indian case shows that the type of authoritarianism and specifically the type of authoritarian party that is in power make an important difference for the future institutionalization of the party system. Similarly to what we find in the Philippines under the Marcos regime, the Indira Gandhi episode highlights that authoritarian interruption may not promote future party system institutionalization unless it is defined by the incumbency of an institutionally strong authoritarian party. Conversely, an authoritarian leader, such as Marcos and Indira Gandhi, who is bent on undermining the institutional foundations of political institutions that might become alternative loci of opposition will be equally capable of undermining the future institutionalization of the party system.