Though it is said that paternalism is inconsistent with liberalism, Rawls is one liberal who holds that some paternalistic actions are permissible. Although he does not define this term, he uses it in discussing coercive actions that are justified as benefitting those who are coerced against their present wishes (TJ 249). According to Rawls, parties in the original position will agree to permit some actions of this kind because they are motivated to choose principles that guarantee each person the primary social goods necessary to develop and exercise their moral powers fully, and because, due to immaturity, mental disability, or “irrational inclinations” (TJ 249), a person might act so as to lose these goods or to undermine in some other way the conditions necessary for the full development and exercise of their moral powers. Parties in the original position will therefore agree to principles that authorize others in some cases “to act in their behalf and to override their present wishes if necessary” (TJ 249). Paternalistic decisions, however, must be guided by a person’s own settled preferences or, when this is unknown, by the theory of primary goods. Furthermore, “we must be able to argue that with the development or recovery of his rational powers the individual in question will accept our decision on his behalf and agree with us that we did the best thing for him” (TJ 249). So although some paternalistic actions are permissible – those that prevent a person from acting on a temporary lapse in judgment in a way that will result in the permanent loss of some important good –paternalistic actions are not permissible that prevent a mature, mentally sound person from acting on his settled convictions.