According to John Rawls, publicity considerations constrain a theory of distributive justice in multiple ways. The most fundamental way follows immediately from his understanding of society as a “cooperative venture for mutual advantage” (TJ 4; JF 5–8). Since Rawls has in mind a relatively robust form of cooperation – mere coordination of action among mutually disinterested parties does not suffice – this conception of social justice brings with it a need for mutual understanding among persons about the terms on which they are cooperating. This mutual understanding is possible only if everyone understands the conception of justice governing their joint activity, as well as what justifies this conception. This in turn requires that this conception be publicly known and articulated. It is in this sense that Rawls claims that publicity is a “formal condition” on a conception of right. By this expression Rawls does not mean that the concept of rightness or of justice entails that a conception of rightness or of justice is publicly known. He means rather that the problem to which a conception of distributive justice is addressed – namely, constituting societal cooperation – can be solved by that conception only on the supposition that it is publicly known (TJ 112–115).