Rawls characterizes perfectionism as both a general teleological ethical theory and as a controversial conception of justice. As a general teleological ethical theory, it directs “society to arrange institutions and to define the duties and obligations of individuals so as to maximize the achievement of excellence in art, science and culture” (TJ 285–286). A theory of this kind is sometimes attributed to Nietzsche. As a controversial conception of justice, perfectionism is a comprehensive doctrine that directs the state to favor some conceptions of the good over others and holds that “some persons have special claims because their greater gifts enable them to engage in the higher activities that realize perfectionist values” (JF 152). Rawls rejects perfectionism under both descriptions. He advances a number of arguments for doing so. To appreciate these arguments, an initial difficulty must be confronted. Rawls’s characterizations of perfectionism are too narrow. They do not capture the full range of views that plausibly qualify as perfectionist. For example, construed as a general teleological ethical theory, perfectionism need not be identified with the promotion of specific goods, such as those realized in art and science. Many perfectionist writers have appealed to the value of self-development, or the development of human capacities and powers in general. This development can take place in many different spheres of human activity. Moreover, perfectionism, despite its name, need not take a maximizing form. Rather than aiming to maximize human achievements, a perfectionist theory could aim to secure an adequate level of achievement or self-development. Likewise, construed as a conception of justice, perfectionism need not hold that some are entitled to more because of their special gifts or talents. Instead, it might value the perfectionist achievements of each person equally. Egalitarian conceptions of perfectionist justice are available.