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For several decades, scholars of Plato's dialogues have focussed their efforts on understanding Socrates’ philosophy by unravelling the arguments used to establish it. On this view, Socrates’ philosophy is presented in his arguments, and, as Gregory Vlastos says, ‘Almost everything Socrates says is wiry argument; that is the beauty of his talk for a philosopher.’ In this paper I raise questions about what can be learned about Socrates’ philosophy through analysis of his arguments. One critic of what he views as traditional interpretations of Plato—‘the sole frame of reference used by most interpreters of Plato from antiquity to the present’—describes this approach as follows:
(i) reading the dialogues to discover Platonic or Socratic doctrines, and
(ii) the logic of the arguments on which these doctrines are based.
While I subscribe to the first point, I have questions about (ii), the ready contention that Plato's dogmas are based on the arguments through which they are defended in dialogues.
Though consequentialist theories of political obligation have been widely criticized in recent years, a series of arguments presented by Derek Parfit, in Reasons and Persons, are now believed to have given this position new life.
Questions of political obligation concern people’s duties to obey the law. Rawls’s first sustained discussion of this subject was in his1964 article, “Legal Obligation and the Duty of Fair Play.” In this piece, Rawls assumes that in acceptably just modern societies, there is a moral obligation to obey the law, which rests on some general moral principle (CP 117). The principle to which Rawls appeals is the principle of fair play.
This principle was first clearly formulated by H. L. A. Hart in 1955 (Hart 1955, 185–186). Rawls’s formulation is as follows:
Suppose there is a mutually beneficial and just scheme of social cooperation,and that the advantages it yields can only be obtained if everyone, or nearly everyone, cooperates. Suppose further that cooperation requires a certain sacrifice from each person […] Suppose finally that the benefits produced by cooperation are, up to a certain point, free […] Under these conditions a person who has accepted the benefits of the scheme is bound by a duty of fair play to do his part and not to take advantage of the free benefit by not cooperating. (CP 122)
The moral basis of the principle is mutuality of restrictions. Under specified conditions, if members of a cooperative scheme make sacrifices in order to produce benefits that are also received by non-cooperators, the latter may have obligations to make similar sacrifices. As Rawls later says, “We are not to gain from the cooperative labors of others without doing our fair share” (TJ 96).
The idea of a constitutional consensus was developed in a 1989 article by Kurt Baier, “Justice and the Aims of Political Philosophy” (Baier 1989). The focus of Rawls’s “political liberalism” is an “overlapping consensus,” a conception of justice that is able to contribute to the stability of liberal society, in spite of inhabitants’ fundamental disagreements over moral, religious, and political views. In Rawls’s terms, the necessary “political” conception should be worked up from “fundamental intuitive ideas” in the public culture, and so independent of society’s comprehensive views. It should also be rooted in moral principles, as opposed to a modus vivendi, which is conceived on the model of a truce, the outcome of political bargaining. While Rawls believes these conditions can be satisied by justice as fairness, Baier presents an alternative. Contending that there is no consensus on Rawls’s principles of justice in the US’s deeply pluralistic culture, Baier argues that “there is a consensus on something else, namely, on the procedures for making law” and on the outlines of a judicial process for settling disagreements. Unlike a modus vivendi, this “constitutional consensus,” as Baier calls it, “is valued for its own sake and for much the same reasons as a consensus on a principle of justice” (Baier 1989, 775). Although Baier recognizes that a constitutional consensus is mainly procedural, an agreement on means to adjudicate differences between adherents of different conceptions of the good, he also argues that political philosophy’s practical aim, “stable political unity,” can be achieved on the basis of something narrower and easier to obtain than the agreement on principles of justice that constitutes an overlapping consensus (Baier 1989, 775). Empirical evidence indicates that something like Baier’s constitutional consensus exists among the vast majority of Americans (Klosko 2000).
One reason the political theory of Plato's Republic is widely misunderstood is that its precise relationship to the political content of the early dialogues is not generally recognized. That the political views of the Republic are frequently misconstrued seems apparent. In recent years many scholars have argued that the ideal state put forward in the work is completely “utopian.” This word is used in different senses, but the sense I will concentrate on in this paper is its bearing upon questions of political reform. As I use the term, a “utopian” political theory contains proposals that are not intended to be taken seriously in terms of political reform. When I say that the ideal state discussed in the Republic is not “utopian” as these scholars maintain, I mean that Plato designed it with political reform in mind, and that he thought seriously about how to bring it into existence. This does not, however, imply that the ideal state is likely to be realized, or that Plato ever thought it was, but only that Plato wished to bring it into existence and thought this was possible, should extraordinary good fortune bring the necessary conditions into existence.
Athenian Legacies: Essays on the Politics of Going On
Together. By Josiah Ober. Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2005. 296p. $29.95.
In the Philosophy of History, Hegel says that the only thing
anyone ever learns from history is that no one ever learns anything from
history. Josiah Ober dissents. He believes that the study of ancient Greek
history provides valuable lessons for maintaining democratic polities in
today's world. Athenian Legacies is comprised of 10
essays—eight published previously, lightly revised. Ober is
primarily a cultural historian. He describes this field as
“concerned with functional explanation: how members of a society, or
subgroups within a community, negotiated a set of meanings that allowed
them to continue to live in an existing community” (p. 177). This
volume can be read as a follow-up (one of several) to his important 1989
work, Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens. That study explores
the role of discourse and ideology in alleviating conflict between richer
and poorer citizens in ancient Athens and so contributing to democratic
stability. In this new book as well, Ober's central concern is how
products of public culture contributed to the reconciling of differences
in Athenian identity, thus helping the Athenians “go on
together.” The essays were written for different audiences:
political theorists, classicists, moral philosophers. But the collection
is more unified than many such works, as most essays bear to some degree
on the central idea of “going on together.”
Though questions of political obligation have long been central to liberal political theory, discussion has generally focused on voluntaristic aspects of the individual's relationship to the state, as opposed to other factors through which the state is able to ground compliance with its laws. The individual has been conceptualized as naturally without political ties, whether or not formally in a state of nature, and questions of political obligation have centered on accounting for political bonds.
We inquire into reasons given by the United States Supreme Court to explain political obligations, in order to assess different theories of political obligation that are currently advanced. The justices have most often grounded moral requirements to obey the law on protection individuals receive from society. The most likely bases of these “reciprocal obligations” are an idea of reciprocity as itself a binding moral notion and, more specifically, the principle of fairness. Although the evidence is somewhat unclear, on balance, it supports the more specific fairness interpretation.
In Political Liberalism, John Rawls employs a distinctive method of “political constructivism” to establish his well-known principles of justice, arguing that his principles are suited to bridge the ineradicable pluralism of liberal societies and so to ground an “overlapping consensus.” Setting aside the question of whether Rawls's method supports his principles, I argue that he does not adequately defend reliance on this particular method rather than alternatives. If the goal of Rawls's “political” philosophy is to derive principles that are able to overcome liberal pluralism, then another and simpler method should be employed. The “method of convergence” would develop liberal principles directly from the convergence of comprehensive views in existing societies, and so give rise to quite different moral principles.