Political elites sometimes seek to delegitimize election results using unsubstantiated claims of fraud. Most recently, Donald Trump sought to overturn his loss in the 2020 US presidential election by falsely alleging widespread fraud. Our study provides new evidence demonstrating the corrosive effect of fraud claims like these on trust in the election system. Using a nationwide survey experiment conducted after the 2018 midterm elections – a time when many prominent Republicans also made unsubstantiated fraud claims – we show that exposure to claims of voter fraud reduces confidence in electoral integrity, though not support for democracy itself. The effects are concentrated among Republicans and Trump approvers. Worryingly, corrective messages from mainstream sources do not measurably reduce the damage these accusations inflict. These results suggest that unsubstantiated voter-fraud claims undermine confidence in elections, particularly when the claims are politically congenial, and that their effects cannot easily be mitigated by fact-checking.

This article responds to King and Persily’s (2019) proposal for a new model of industry–academic partnership using an independent third party to mediate between firms and academics. We believe this is a reasonable proposal for highly sensitive individual-level data, but it may not be appropriate for all types of data. We explore alternative options to their proposal, including Administrative Data Research Facilities, Data Collaboratives at GovLab, and Tech Data for Social Good Initiative at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences. We believe social scientists should continue to explore, evaluate, and scale a variety of industry–academic data-sharing models.

Douglass C. North, co-winner of the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics in 1993, became a major leader in historical and comparative political science and in the study of institutions more generally. His work proved particularly relevant for those interested in questions of state building, state variation, development, and long-term secular change.

Motivated by the local theory of Banach spaces, we introduce a notion of finite representability for metric spaces. This allows us to develop a new technique for comparing the generalised roundness of metric spaces. We illustrate this technique by applying it to Banach spaces and metric trees. In the realm of Banach spaces we obtain results such as the following: (1) if ${\mathcal{U}}$ is any ultrafilter and $X$ is any Banach space, then the second dual $X^{\ast \ast }$ and the ultrapower $(X)_{{\mathcal{U}}}$ have the same generalised roundness as $X$, and (2) no Banach space of positive generalised roundness is uniformly homeomorphic to $c_{0}$ or $\ell _{p}$, $2<p<\infty$. For metric trees, we give the first examples of metric trees of generalised roundness one that have finite diameter. In addition, we show that metric trees of generalised roundness one possess special Euclidean embedding properties that distinguish them from all other metric trees.

If any group of American blue-collar workers has benefited from the growth of trade it is the unionized dockworkers along the US West Coast. Nevertheless, the International Longshore and Warehouse Union (ILWU) representing these workers is vocally opposed to trade liberalization. We examine several competing explanations for this puzzle and evaluate them by tracing the union's stance on trade over several decades. We also use an original survey to compare ILWU affiliates' attitudes on trade with those of nonmembers with otherwise similar characteristics. Consistent with a model of organizational socialization, the data support the hypothesis that ILWU membership affects the members' revealed political opinions; the data are difficult to reconcile with standard theories of international trade. Our findings indicate that the political support for trade depends not just on voters' structural positions in the economy but also on the organizations and networks in which they are embedded.

We are in an era of Big Books, books with a magisterial sweep of the history of the world. All share the desire to explain why some countries flourish, why some start and stall on the path to development, and why others seem never to find the path at all. In sociology, Big Books date back at least to Karl Marx and Max Weber. Their publication has been more or less regular ever since, and their authors tend to elaborate the sort of grand and general theories that have come under increasing attack in recent decades, given methodological advances that have transformed analytic tastes.

It has been suggested that twinning may influence handedness through the effects of birth order, intra-uterine crowding and mirror imaging. The influence of these effects on handedness (for writing and throwing) was examined in 3657 Monozygotic (MZ) and 3762 Dizygotic (DZ) twin pairs (born 1893–1992). Maximum likelihood analyses revealed no effects of birth order on the incidence of left-handedness. Twins were no more likely to be left-handed than their singleton siblings (n = 1757), and there were no differences between the DZ co-twin and siblingtwin covariances, suggesting that neither intra-uterine crowding nor the experience of being a twin affects handedness. There was no evidence of mirror imaging; the co-twin correlations of monochorionic and dichorionic MZ twins did not differ. Univariate genetic analyses revealed common environmental factors to be the most parsimonious explanation of familial aggregation for the writing-hand measure, while additive genetic influences provided a better interpretation of the throwing hand data.

My subject is the way Peter Bachrach addressed the question of poverty. But given that I was his student and research assistant and that I am a political scientist largely because of him, it is impossible to resist a few words about the experience of being in his classrooms. Peter was an inspiring teacher of politics. The substantive content of his courses was legendary, and he possessed an extraordinary capacity to elicit participation from classes of pre-feminists at our well-bred women's college. I know this cost him. Peter had an extra shirt in his Bryn Mawr office so that he could change out of the one he had sweated through during the considerable exertions of getting us to talk, let alone think.

Sociologists have traditionally tended to overstate the role of norms in explaining human behavior. Economists, on the other hand, have tended to downplay the role of norms. Increasingly, rational choice theorists have begun to explore the interaction between normative and instrumentally rational motivations. There are at least two major points at issue in these discussions. First, how does one conceptualize norms, especially in relation to rational action? Second, how does one go about studying the variation in the reliance on norms? Jon Elster's paper offers a controversial answer to the first question. Ralph Turner's paper offers some guidance for answering the second (1). Building on both Elster and Turner, I shall bring a somewhat different perspective to bear on both these issues.

In the 1970s I was among a group of scholars endlessly debating theories of the state. Others in the discussion were my recent predecessor as APSA President, Theda Skocpol, and my immediate successor, Ira Katznelson. What intrigued us was a vast literature, grounded in neo-Marxism and covering huge swaths of history and geography. Nearly all the important books and articles were by sociologists and historians, but with Structure and Change in Economic History, my then-colleague, economist Douglass North, transformed the debate by using economic models of transaction costs and property rights to model the state's role in economic prosperity over time. Most political scientists now acknowledge the importance of this perspective, but it nonetheless helped precipitate twenty years of divergence between historical and new economic institutionalists.Margaret Levi is Jere L. Bacharach Professor of International Studies in the Department of Political Science, University of Washington, Seattle (mlevi@u.washington.edu). Among her books are the single-authored Consent, Dissent and Patriotism (1997) and Of Rule and Revenue (1988) and the co-authored Cooperation Without Trust? (2005) and Analytic Narratives (1998). Many people offered me comments. I did not always take their advice, but I am grateful to Amit Ahuja, Paloma Aquilar, Marcelo Bergman, Maureen Eger, Ann Gryzmala-Busse, Bea Kelleigh, Bob Kaplan, Edgar Kiser, Victor Lapuente-Giné, Michael Lipsky, Kenneth Kollman, José-Maria Maravall, Peter May, Leonardo Morlino, Steve Pfaff, Kate Pflaumer, Frances Fox Piven, Christoph Pohlmann, Nancy Rosenblum, Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, Bo Rothstein, Susan Stokes, Katherine Stovel, Joan Tronto, and Ashutosh Varshney. My greatest debt is to the two graduate students who read and commented on several drafts as well as located the materials I needed to write this presentation: John Ahlquist and Audrey Sacks.