Max Scheler was born in 1874 in Munich, Germany and died at the early age of fifty-four in 1928. During the last fifteen years or so of his life, Scheler was widely regarded as “the most brilliant thinker of his day,” according to Bochenski (1961: 140). ‘His day’ is roughly from 1912 until his death in 1928.
Scheler focused on two main areas in his most influential publications, from 1912 to 1920. One was describing the essence of our emotional consciousness of values, such as a special sort of love: an act of loving the holy person, God; a loving act in which the value of holiness originally appears. The other is the study of the religious consciousness, or the religious act of ‘faith’, with faith viewed as a reactive response to the self-disclosure of the holy person (God).
Scheler's philosophical writings began with his 1899 doctoral degree under the neo-Kantian Rudolf Eucken, who believed that the nature of the philosopher's task is to discover the eternal realm of values. This view exercised a lifelong influence on Scheler.
The second most important influence on Scheler arose from his meeting ‘the father of phenomenology’, Edmund Husserl, in 1910. Scheler quickly became the most creative of the many followers of Husserl, and by 1918 or 1920 Scheler was considered by many German phenomenologists to have superseded him.
Cosmological arguments for God's existence have two parts. The first part aims to establish that there is a cause of the universe. The second part aims to establish that this cause is God or God's act of creation. My goal is to show that this second “theistic ” part is unsound and that there is a sound “atheistic ” second part that shows that the universe is self-caused.
The cosmological and teleological arguments are two types of arguments for the existence of God. They are different from other types in that they are about the entire universe; the cosmological argument seeks to find a causal explanation of why some universe exists, and the teleological argument seeks to find an explanation of the designed or apparently designed nature of the universe. In this way they differ from the ontological and conceptual arguments, which are a priori, and from the arguments from mystical experience, moral conscience, and human consciousness. The cosmological and teleological arguments are about the empirical facts of the universe, the mystical, moral, and consciousness arguments are about empirical facts concerning humans, and the ontological and conceptualist arguments endeavor to deduce God's existence from a priori concepts alone, without needing any observational evidence about the universe.
It seems intuitively obvious that what I am doing right now is more real than what I did just one second ago, and it seems intuitively obvious that what I did just one second ago is more real than what I did forty years ago. And yet, remarkably, every philosopher of time today, except for the author, denies this obvious fact about reality. What went wrong? How could philosophers get so far away from what is the most experientially evident fact about reality?
The concept of a degree of existence (of being more or less real) went out of fashion with the rise of analytic philosophy early in the 20th century, specifically, with Russell's 1905 article ‘On Denoting’, for in 1904 and earlier years he and G. E. Moore held a sort of Meinongian theory of degrees of existence (subsistence and existence are distinguished, with existence being a higher degree of being than subsistence). Early work by Frege also rejected the notion of degreed existence and implied that existence is an all or nothing affair; either something exists or it does not exist, and it makes no sense to talk about it existing to some degree.
Most (but not all) philosophers from Plato to Meinong have held doctrines of degrees of existence. Unfortunately, however, they also denied this obvious temporal fact about reality, for they explained degrees of reality in other ways than the way we know it (as being more or less distant from the present).
Amino acids serve critical roles in brain and are required for normal brain development and function. However, marked differences exist among amino acids, in the roles they serve and metabolic handling within the nervous system.
For example, glutamate, aspartate, glycine, and GABA operate as neurotransmitters in brain and may, in fact, be the predominant neurotransmitters at over 90% of central nervous system synapses (Smith and Cooper, 1992). As a result, they are synthesized locally in neurons and their release and re-uptake are regulated closely to maintain synaptic efficiency. In contrast, most large neutral and basic amino acids, including arginine, lysine, tryptophan, leucine, isoleucine, valine, methionine and phenylalanine, cannot be synthesized in brain, yet are required for brain protein synthesis and as precursors for serotonin (tryptophan), nitric oxide (arginine) and the catecholamines (tyrosine). These ‘essential’ amino acids must be delivered to the brain from the circulation to ensure normal cerebral growth and metabolism.
The handling of amino acids at the bloodbrain barrier reflects this dichotomy. Most dietary ‘nonessential’ small neutral and anionic (acidic) amino acids have very slow rates of uptake into brain, and, in fact, may be shuttled out of brain by active transport (Oldendorf, 1971; Pardridge, 1983; Al-Sarraf et al., 1995).
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