Any theory of international justice must include an account of the agents between whom duties of justice apply. In Rawls’s LP these agents are “peoples.” The term is somewhat obscure. While Rawls gives no general definition, certain key features are evident: a people is an independent, territorially based, political community united by “common sympathies” (LP 23) and a shared sense of justice. Though the emphasis on common sympathies, formed partly by cultural, historical, and linguistic ties, might suggest that peoples are akin to nations or ethnic groups, Rawls clearly construes peoples as essentially politically organized in a way that these other collectivities are not. However, at the same time, he carefully distinguishes peoples from states, to avoid implying two features traditionally associated with the latter in international law: the right to wage war for national gain and the right to unlimited discretion affairs (LP 25). Rawls also emphasizes that, unlike states as traditionally conceived, peoples are capable of having a moral character: ideally, they are concerned to cooperate on fair, mutually respectful terms with other peoples (LP 35).