Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Tables
- Preface
- 1 Policy-Making Accountability and Democratic Consolidation
- 2 Alternative Routes to Policy-Making Accountability
- 3 Legacy of the Past
- 4 External Accountability and the European Union
- 5 Oversight
- 6 Decentralized Political Accountability
- 7 Public Participation in Policy Making: Government Procedures
- 8 Civil Society Groups: Overview
- 9 Environmental Advocacy Organizations in Hungary
- 10 Student and Youth Organizations in Poland
- 11 Democratic Consolidation and Policy-Making Accountability
- Appendix 1
- Appendix 2
- References
- Index
5 - Oversight
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 23 July 2009
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Tables
- Preface
- 1 Policy-Making Accountability and Democratic Consolidation
- 2 Alternative Routes to Policy-Making Accountability
- 3 Legacy of the Past
- 4 External Accountability and the European Union
- 5 Oversight
- 6 Decentralized Political Accountability
- 7 Public Participation in Policy Making: Government Procedures
- 8 Civil Society Groups: Overview
- 9 Environmental Advocacy Organizations in Hungary
- 10 Student and Youth Organizations in Poland
- 11 Democratic Consolidation and Policy-Making Accountability
- Appendix 1
- Appendix 2
- References
- Index
Summary
Hungary and Poland have a full complement of public institutions that oversee government behavior. None of these is unique to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), and the offices are frequently part of regional and global associations that set standards of behavior. Some are playing distinctive roles in the transition process and have had a pivotal impact on democratic consolidation. This chapter reviews Hungarian and Polish experience with these institutions. It argues that, valuable as these institutions are in upholding the rule of law, they are not sufficient to ensure policy-making accountability. Their role is mostly to enhance performance accountability. In other words, they help keep the government operating within the law – both statutes and the constitution – but they are not well designed to monitor policy making.
I consider six key institutions: the presidency, the constitutional court, administrative and ordinary courts, the ombudsman, the procuracy, and the supreme audit office. They are interconnected so that the clout of one may be weakened because it needs to work through another. These offices have a range of direct and indirect links to the general public. In some cases, citizens can petition them directly; in other cases, popular control is indirect through parliamentary oversight. They vary in their independence from the legislature and the government and in their authority to make decisions that bind the government.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- From Elections to DemocracyBuilding Accountable Government in Hungary and Poland, pp. 55 - 99Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2005