Introduction

The regime transition literature has found that apart from exogenous shocks, internal splits and leadership succession are the two most likely causes of single-party breakdown. Unlike hegemonic party systems in Mexico and Taiwan that experienced party alternation, Singapore has been governed by one party uninterruptedly for more than five decades. Under the People’s Action Party’s (PAP) rule, export-oriented Singapore has weathered a series of global financial crises. Even when the country posted a negative growth rate in 2001, the PAP government was able to garner an exceptional 75 percent vote share in the general election (GE) the same year. Now, apart from tackling rising inflation and income inequality, what appears to concern most people is the imminent death of the country’s strongman, Lee Kuan Yew. Will the PAP continue to rule and maintain order after the passing of its founding leader?

This chapter focuses on the PAP’s leadership succession to highlight the key intraparty processes and mechanisms that have kept one of the world’s longest-serving political parties together. It argues that the PAP’s long-term survival will depend more on institutions than coercion, charisma, or ideological commitment. Indeed, the PAP’s incumbency advantage, coupled with an institutionalized leadership succession system, has facilitated self-renewal and kept the party together. Specifically, the elitist leadership selection model, based nominally on meritocracy, is well institutionalized and serves as an incentive distribution system that builds party loyalty and elite cohesion.