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The small world's problem is everyone's problem, not a reason to favor CNT over probabilistic decision theory

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  08 May 2023

Daniel Greco Open the ORCID record for Daniel Greco [Opens in a new window]
Daniel Greco*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Yale University, New Haven, CT 06511-6629, USA. daniel.greco@yale.edu https://sites.google.com/site/dlgreco/
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Abstract

The case for the superiority of Conviction Narrative Theory (CNT) over probabilistic approaches rests on selective employment of a double standard. The authors judge probabilistic approaches inadequate for failing to apply to “grand-world” decision problems, while they praise CNT for its treatment of “small-world” decision problems. When both approaches are held to the same standard, the comparative question is murkier.

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Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 46 , 2023 , e95
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press

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