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Adaptive narratives and fantastical falsehoods?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  08 May 2023

Aaron D. Lightner Open the ORCID record for Aaron D. Lightner [Opens in a new window]
Aaron D. Lightner*
Affiliation:
Department of the Study of Religion, Aarhus University, Jens Chr. Skous Vej 3, 8000 Aarhus C, Denmark. adlightner@cas.au.dk
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Abstract

Johnson et al. make a strong case for Conviction Narrative Theory, but it remains unclear why so many adaptive narratives include supernatural causes and other falsehoods. Focusing on religions, I argue that an adaptive decision-making system might include supernatural falsehoods because they simplify complex problems, they are sensitive to long-term incentives, and they evoke strong emotions in a communicative context.

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Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 46 , 2023 , e100
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Copyright © The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press

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