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Narratives, environments, and decision-making: A fascinating narrative, but one to be completed

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  08 May 2023

Julian N. Marewski Open the ORCID record for Julian N. Marewski [Opens in a new window]
Julian N. Marewski*
Affiliation:
Faculty of Business and Economics, Department of Organizational Behavior, University of Lausanne, 1015 Lausanne, Switzerland. Julian.marewski@unil.ch https://hecnet.unil.ch/hec/recherche/fiche?pnom=jmarewski&dyn_lang=en
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Abstract

I encourage Johnson et al. to ground Conviction Narrative Theory in more detail in foundational, earlier decision-making research – first and foremost in Herbert Simon's work. Moreover, I wonder if and how further reflections about narratives could aid tackling two interrelated grand challenges of the decision sciences: To describe decision-making environments; to understand how people select among decision-strategies in environments.

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Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 46 , 2023 , e102
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press

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