While political scientists regularly engage in spirited theoretical debates about elections and voting behavior, few have noticed that elected politicians also have theories of elections and voting. Here, we investigate politicians’ positions on eight central theoretical debates in the area of elections and voting behavior and compare politicians’ theories to those held by ordinary citizens. Using data from face-to-face interviews with nearly one thousand politicians in 11 countries, together with corresponding surveys of more than twelve thousand citizens, we show that politicians overwhelmingly hold thin, minimalist, “democratic realist” theories of voting, while citizens’ theories are more optimistic and policy oriented. Politicians’ theoretical tendencies—along with their theoretical misalignment from citizens—are remarkably consistent across countries. These theories are likely to have important consequences for how politicians campaign, communicate with the public, think about public policy, and represent their constituents.

The “gender gap” in voting is one of the most well-documented findings in survey research across democracies. However, gender gap research has traditionally assumed that everyone is either a man or a woman, which does not account for the growing number of people who identify as nonbinary. How do nonbinary people differ from men and women in their party identification and voting behavior? We answer this question using data from the 2021 Canadian Election Study online panel, which has a large enough subsample of nonbinary respondents to identify gaps in party identification and voting behavior. Nonbinary people are much less likely to identify with and vote for the Liberal Party or Conservative Party and much more likely to identify with and vote for the social democratic New Democratic Party (NDP) than both men and women. Many of these gaps persist even when restricting the analysis to LGBTQ respondents, adjusting for demographic variables that predict nonbinary identity, and adjusting for issue attitudes. Nonbinary people’s distinctiveness from men and women suggests that researchers need to add nonbinary response options to gender questions and, wherever possible, incorporate nonbinary people into analyses of gender and politics.

As governments increasingly adopt algorithms and artificial intelligence (AAI), we still know comparatively little about citizens’ support for algorithmic government. In this paper, we analyze how many and what kind of reasons for government use of AAI citizens support. We use a sample of 17,000 respondents from 16 OECD countries and find that opinions on algorithmic government are divided. A narrow majority of people (55.6%) support a majority of reasons for using algorithmic government, and this is relatively consistent across countries. Results from multilevel models suggest that most of the cross-country variation is explained by individual-level characteristics, including age, education, gender, and income. Older and more educated respondents are more accepting of algorithmic government, while female and low-income respondents are less supportive. Finally, we classify the reasons for using algorithmic government into two types, “fairness” and “efficiency,” and find that support for them varies based on individuals’ political attitudes.

Politicians regularly bargain with colleagues and other actors. Bargaining dynamics are central to theories of legislative politics and representative democracy, bearing directly on the substance and success of legislation, policy, and on politicians’ careers. Yet, controlled evidence on how legislators bargain is scarce. Do they apply different strategies when engaging different actors? If so, what are they, and why? To study these questions, we field an ultimatum game bargaining experiment to 1,100 sitting politicians in Belgium, Canada, Germany, Switzerland, and the United States. We find that politicians exhibit a strong partisan bias when bargaining, a pattern that we document across all of our cases. The size of the partisan bias in bargaining is about double the size when politicians engage citizens than when they face colleagues. We discuss implications for existing models of bargaining and outline future research directions.

War comes with terrible costs both in terms of money and lives. Do voters punish incumbents for these costs? Much of the existing literature on the effects of war deaths on public opinion toward incumbents and their war efforts suggests that the answer is yes. We test this proposition on data from a non-US case: Canada's war in Afghanistan. We estimate models of the effect of local war deaths on incumbent support using individual-level panel data from the 2006, 2008 and 2011 Canadian Election Studies and aggregate district-level data from the 2008 and 2011 general elections. In none of our models do we find support for the conclusion that war deaths decrease support for candidates of the governing party. Instead, we find evidence at both the individual and district levels that support for Conservative party candidates is higher in districts that experienced war deaths.

The COVID-19 pandemic has placed unprecedented pressure on governments to engage in widespread cash transfers directly to citizens to help mitigate economic losses. Major and near-universal redistribution efforts have been deployed, but there is remarkably little understanding of where the mass public believes financial support is warranted. Using experimental evidence, we evaluate whether considerations related to deservingness, similarity, and prejudicial attitudes structure support for these transfers. A preregistered experiment found broad, generous, and nondiscriminatory support for direct cash transfers related to COVID-19 in Canada. The second study, accepted as a preregistered report, further probes these dynamics by comparing COVID-19-related outlays with nonemergency ones. We find that COVID-19-related spending was more universal as compared to a more generic cash allocation program. Given that the results were driven by the income of hypothetical recipients, we find broad support for disaster relief that is not means-tested or otherwise constrained by pre-disaster income.

The 2019 Canadian Election Study (CES) consists of two separate surveys with campaign-period rolling cross-sections and post-election follow-ups. The parallel studies were conducted online and through a random-digit-dial (RDD) telephone survey. Both continue the long tradition of gathering information about the attitudes, opinions, preferences and behaviours of the Canadian public. The online survey, in particular, introduces some important innovations that open up the potential for exciting new research on subgroups in the electorate.

We conducted a field experiment with 334 Canadian Members of Parliament exploring whether politicians seek out more information about an issue when they are farther offside the average opinion in their constituency on that issue. In the midst of a contentious national debate on the oil industry, we invited MPs and their staff to watch a webinar or read a written summary of the webinar created by experts and containing a variety of viewpoints on the issue. For politicians on either side, the information could prove useful in future debate and conversation. Some politicians were randomly assigned to information about the distribution of opinion in their constituency on the issue. We find no evidence that politicians are more likely to pursue policy information when they are offside their average constituency opinion, and none that this effect is enhanced when they learn about their relative position vis-a-vis constituency preferences.

The COVID-19 pandemic requires an effort to coordinate the actions of government and society in a way unmatched in recent history. Individual citizens need to voluntarily sacrifice economic and social activity for an indefinite period of time to protect others. At the same time, we know that public opinion tends to become polarized on highly salient issues, except when political elites are in consensus (Berinsky, 2009; Zaller, 1992). Avoiding elite and public polarization is thus essential for an effective societal response to the pandemic. In the United States, there appears to be elite and public polarization on the severity of the pandemic (Gadarian et al., 2020). Other evidence suggests that polarization is undermining compliance with social distancing (Cornelson and Miloucheva, 2020). Using a multimethod approach, we show that Canadian political elites and the public are in a unique period of cross-partisan consensus on important questions related to the COVID-19 pandemic, such as its seriousness and the necessity of social distancing.

The SARS-CoV-2 virus was first identified in Wuhan, China, in late December 2019, and it quickly spread to many countries. By March 2020, the virus had triggered a global pandemic (World Health Organization, 2020). In response to this crisis, governments have implemented unprecedented public health measures. The success of these policies will largely depend on the public's willingness to comply with new rules. A key factor in citizens’ willingness to comply is their understanding of the data that motivate government action. In this study, we examine how different ways of presenting these data visually can affect citizen's perceptions, attitudes and support for public policy.

Federal systems can also provide citizens with multiple avenues to obtain service representation. In shared issue areas, citizens are officially represented by two sets of politicians. When politicians are willing to cross jurisdictional boundaries, citizens might also obtain help or information from more than one set of politicians, even in areas of exclusive jurisdiction. We report an experiment designed to examine responses to requests for assistance in different issue areas. Our sample includes 202 Canadian politicians, each of whom received two requests for assistance from fictional constituents. We show that federal arrangements can enhance service representation. On average, politicians are as helpful on issues of shared jurisdiction as issues of exclusive jurisdiction. They are less helpful for issues outside of their jurisdiction. These results suggest that federal arrangements can work to provide citizens with multiple access points to their representative, even in areas that fall outside their representatives’ jurisdictional purviews.

What impact do local candidates have on elections in single member district plurality electoral systems? We provide new evidence using data from a large election study carried out during the 2015 Canadian federal election. We improve on the measurement of local candidate effects by asking over 20,000 survey respondents to rate the candidates in their constituency directly. We present three estimates. We find that when all voters are considered together, local candidate evaluations are decisive for approximately 4 per cent of voters. Second, these evaluations are decisive for the outcome of 10 per cent of constituency contests. Third, when models are estimated for each constituency, we find significant evaluation effects for 14 per cent of candidates.

A considerable body of work in political science is built upon the assumption that politicians are more purposive, strategic decision makers than the citizens who elect them. At the same time, other work suggests that the personality profiles of office seekers and the environment they operate in systematically amplifies certain choice anomalies. These contrasting perspectives persist absent direct evidence on the reasoning characteristics of representatives. We address this gap by administering experimental decision tasks to incumbents in Belgium, Canada, and Israel. We demonstrate that politicians are as or more subject to common choice anomalies when compared to nonpoliticians: they exhibit a stronger tendency to escalate commitment when facing sunk costs, they adhere more to policy choices that are presented as the status-quo, their risk calculus is strongly subject to framing effects, and they exhibit distinct future time discounting preferences. This has obvious implications for our understanding of decision making by elected politicians.

Abstract. Is there a conflict between the principles of representation by population and the representation of communities of interest? In Canada, the legal requirement to design electoral districts based on pre-existing regions and communities of interest has produced large discrepancies in district populations. Several authors claim that this situation has a deleterious effect on the representational experiences of those citizens living in more populous districts. This paper examines whether the population of an electoral district affects the quality of political representation in that district. We first present survey data characterizing the relationship between constituency population and citizens' reported satisfaction with democracy and contact with politicians and parties. We then present audit experimental evidence from Canada demonstrating that the helpfulness of politicians towards citizens is not conditioned on constituency population. Our data indicate that constituency population has no clear impact on the quality of representational experiences in Canada, suggesting that it is possible to ensure the effective representation of communities of interest without harming the overall quality of Canadian democracy.

Résumé. Y a-t-il un conflit entre les principes de représentation par personne et de représentation de communautés d'intérêts? Au Canada, des écarts importants entre la population de certaines circonscriptions électorales résultent de l'obligation légale de les délimiter en tenant compte des régions et des communautés d'intérêts préexistantes. Plusieurs auteurs soutiennent que cette situation entraîne des effets néfastes sur la représentation vécue par les citoyens qui habitent les circonscriptions les plus populeuses. Dans cet article, nous vérifions si la taille de la population influence la qualité de la représentation politique dans une circonscription électorale. Nous présentons d'abord des données d'enquête sur la relation entre la taille de la population d'une circonscription et (i) la satisfaction des citoyens à l'égard de la démocratie, (ii) leurs contacts avec les politiciens et (iii) les communications qu'ils reçoivent des politiciens et des partis. Puis, nous présentons des données d'une expérience menée au Canada qui indiquent que la propension des politiciens à aider les citoyens n'est pas influencée par la taille de la population de leur circonscription. Nos résultats indiquent que la taille de la population d'une circonscription n'a pas d'effet clair sur la qualité de la représentation au Canada, suggérant ainsi qu'il est possible d'assurer la représentation efficace des communautés d'intérêts sans nécessairement nuire à la qualité globale de la démocratie canadienne.

Abstract. Some citizens differ in their levels of concern for the supporters of various parties. I demonstrate how such concerns can motivate citizens to vote. I first present a simple formal model that incorporates concern for others and election benefits to explain the decision to vote. By predicting substantial turnout, this model overcomes the “paradox of participation.” I then verify the model empirically. I utilize a series dictator games in an online survey of more than 2000 Canadians to measure the concern of individuals for other partisans. I show how the preferences revealed in these games can predict the decision to vote in the face of several conventional controls. Taken together, the formal model and empirical results generate a more fulsome and satisfactory account of the decision to vote than an explanation which relies solely on duty.

Résumé. Les citoyens ne se préoccupent pas tous des partisans des divers partis politiques. Je démontre comment de telles préoccupations peuvent motiver les citoyens à participer aux élections. Je présente d'abord un modèle formel qui explique la décision de voter en intégrant les préoccupations à l'égard des autres électeurs et les bénéfices associés à une élection. En prédisant une part substantielle de la participation, ce modèle surmonte le paradoxe de la participation électorale. Ensuite, le modèle est vérifié empiriquement. J'emploie à cette fin une série de jeux du dictateur insérés dans une enquête menée en ligne auprès de 2000 Canadiens afin de mesurer leur degré de préoccupation à l'égard des autres partisans. Je montre comment les préférences révélées dans ces jeux peuvent prédire la décision de voter. Ensemble, le modèle formel et les résultats empiriques produisent une explication plus éloquente et plus satisfaisante de la décision de voter lors d'une élection que les explications qui s'appuient seulement sur le sens du devoir.

Abstract. Despite the development of electoral studies in Canada, by-elections have received little attention from researchers. We believe that these are important political events. This research note examines the 121 federal by-elections held between general elections from 1963 to 2008. Our analysis indicates that turnout in by-elections is driven by the larger societal determinants of turnout and not the characteristics of each race. We also find that the support of the government party in a by-election is affected by changes in national opinion towards the government, but only in the third-party system. We find that minor parties and independent candidates perform better in by-elections than in general elections. And we find no difference in the re-election rates of by-election winners and those who enter parliament through general elections.

Résumé. Malgré le développement des études électorales au Canada, les élections partielles ont reçu très peu d'attention de la part des chercheurs. Nous croyons qu'il s'agit pourtant d'événements importants dans la vie politique canadienne. Cette note de recherche examine les 121 élections partielles fédérales survenues entre les élections générales de 1963 à 2008. Notre analyse indique que le taux de participation aux élections partielles est davantage influencé par des déterminants sociétaux que par des caractéristiques propres à chacune. Nous constatons aussi que les fluctuations de l'opinion publique canadienne à l'égard du gouvernement influençaient la performance du parti gouvernemental lors des élections partielles avant le réalignement partisan de 1993, mais que ce n'est plus le cas dans le système partisan actuel. Nous observons également que les petits partis et les candidats indépendants enregistrent de meilleures performances lors des élections partielles et qu'il n'y a pas, aux élections générales qui suivent, de différence notable entre le taux de réélection des gagnants aux élections partielles et celui des autres députés sortants.