Several of the prior chapters in this book allude to the work of Harold Garfinkel and his seminal Studies in Ethnomethodology (1967). One of the great lessons that one can take from that book is the idea that society is made up of people who “do” sociological theory or, rather, people who construct and deploy “lay-sociological theorizing” to both interpret and organize the world around them. Their everyday reasoning is a form of sociology Garfinkel would have us believe. Today, of course, the idea that people theorize in this sense, that they reason sociologically, has suffused itself throughout the discipline of sociology and its cognates. Take Michel De Certeau (1984), for example, or another sociologist of the quotidian, Henri Lefebrve (2004). Both argue that the social world is constructed, “enacted” through the deployment of interpretative skills and agency – through people's capacity to reason in particular ways. And consider other social sciences, such as anthropology. Here Tim Ingold (2011) argues that people construct their places of dwelling through conscious acts of “dialogic engagement”: they attend to, work with, and reflect on the things and persons around in ways that directs them in new trajectories, lines of action. All of this is a form of reasoning, Ingold claims.
The subtle differences between these various views notwithstanding, that people reason in a way that can be characterized as sociological, and that, as a result, the thing called society has the shape it has, is virtually commonplace in contemporary thinking. The word “theorizing,” however, has been ameliorated with alternate formulas by these (and other) authors. We have just listed some of the alternative words and phrases used: people enact their reasoning and they rationally engage their reasoning as part of how they produce dwellings. These and other formula stand as proxy for theorizing. One of the motivations for using alternatives is that many commentators, including those just mentioned, would appear to prefer keeping the term “theory” as a label for their own thinking rather than as one applicable to the non-professional arena. To put it directly, this move allows them to valorize what they do while giving lay persons’ actions a more prosaic, less consequential air.
Measuring retouch location and intensity on hafted bifaces is shown to be an effective technique for assessing artifact function. Unlike other areas of North America, where dart technology is replaced by arrow technology, Coalition Period occupations on the Pajarito Plateau of New Mexico contain both hafted biface forms used simultaneously. A stylistic analysis of dart points shows that hafted biface forms found in Coalition Period contexts were recycled from Middle and Late Archaic surface scatters. Furthermore, retouch location and intensity show that Coalition Period dart points were used for cutting and sawing activities and not as projectile technology.
In the American Southwest, and throughout North America, dart-sized hafted bifaces identified as projectile points, normally associated with sites dating to the Paleoindian and Archaic time periods, are regularly found on sites dating to the past thousand years (cf. Kohler 2004; Turnbow 1997). Late period points were likely small and designed to be attached to the smaller arrow foreshaft. Although researchers have noted the presence of dart-sized points in settings where the bow and arrow were likely used, few have addressed the question of the context of manufacture or use of these larger hafted bifaces. In the Northern Rio Grande, the presence of Scottsbluff, Jay, Bajada, and other large dart points dating to the Late Paleoindian and Archaic in Coalition and Classic period sites rarely elicits more than a description as a “curated” item or “heirloom,” or as a knife replicating an older style.
The aspect of Newton's Principia that has provoked the most controversy within the philosophy of science, other than his invocation of absolute space, time, and motion, has been his claim to have “deduced” the law of universal gravity from phenomena of orbital motion. In particular, a tradition that began with Pierre Duhem and continued with Karl Popper and then Imre Lakatos has argued that this claim is at best misleading (Duhem) and at worst a subterfuge (Lakatos). Among other reasons they have advanced against any such deduction is the objection that no deduction from consistent premises can yield a conclusion that entails one or more of these premises is false; yet one consequence of the law of universal gravity is that all the orbital phenomena from which Newton proceeds in his supposed deduction are, strictly, false. Duhem, Popper, and Lakatos insist, to the contrary, that only a hypothetico-deductive construal of Newton's evidence for universal gravity makes sense, Newton's outspoken objections to hypothetico-deductive evidence notwithstanding. More recently, Clark Glymour has offered a “bootstrapping” construal of Newton's evidence, proposing that it captures the logical force of the reasoning for universal gravitation in the Principia better than a straight-forward hypothetico-deductive construal can. Glymour too, however, sees no way around concluding that some of what Newton seems to think he is doing cannot be correct.
One issue this raises is understanding the reasoning Newton offers in arriving at the law of universal gravity and describes as a “deduction” from phenomena. Another is the extent to which such reasoning is cogent and illuminates scientific method. The simplest way to respond to these questions is to proceed step-by-step through Newton’s reasoning.
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