The 2015 Thomson-Reuters Journal Citation Impact Factor Scores were released in June. I am very pleased to share that the MOR 2-year Impact Factor increased to 2.738 from 2.442 in 2014 and that the MOR 5-year Impact Factor also increased from 3.078 to 3.657. I was especially pleased to note that the increase in Impact Factor from 2014 to 2015 was entirely due to a significant increase in citations. Although MOR's position in the Management category dropped by one place – it should be noted that the overall number of journals listed in the Management category increased from 185 to 192. I feel that a position of 33rd is still excellent for a young, specialized field journal in its twelfth year of publication.

This issue closes out a very active year for Management and Organization Review. In introducing this final issue of Volume 12, I wish to highlight two initiatives with this letter.

As I complete my third year as Editor-in-Chief of MOR and begin planning for my second term, I wanted to take the opportunity to express my appreciation and thanks for your support of MOR. Although MOR has expanded its editorial context to all transforming economies, China remains the core constituency of the journal.

Volume 12 of Management and Organization Review coincides with the new Chinese Year of the Monkey. May the Year of the Monkey bring all IACMR authors, readers, and friends much joy, peace, success, happiness, and good luck!

At the June 2016 meeting of the International Association for Chinese Management Research, MOR organized a symposium to discuss the mounting criticisms of empirical social science and subsequent changes, as part of ongoing discussions affecting journal reviewing policies. This article overviews the history of modern empirical social science as the foundation of management, organization, and strategy research and the criticism of social science research, which has reached the point that some critics refer to current publication norms as encouraging and enabling the publication of junk science. Most importantly, however, this article outlines MOR's strategy going forward and the new reviewing initiatives that MOR is implementing as of Volume 13 (2017).

The first five merger waves were US-led events. In this article we show that the largely over-looked sixth wave (2003–2008) emerged in all regions simultaneously. Because of this, and building upon interconnected literatures – which: (1) suggests that agency is a big predictor of merger performance; (2) distinguishes between three distinct governance traditions; and (3) argues that the Anglo-Saxon system puts the most effort into protecting investors and aligning interests, and the Confucian system the least – we predicted that Anglo-Saxon acquirers would create value in the sixth wave, and Confucian acquirers would destroy it. We find the opposite to be true and show that Chinese acquirers, in particular, created the most value in the sixth wave. In attempting to explain why, we find that China outperformed its Asian neighbors while doing the same thing, and outperformed its Western peers while doing what the literature suggests that they shouldn't do. This not only points to the limits of the generalizability of the existing literature, but supports the suggestion that Chinese acquirers are ‘different’. We call, therefore, for additional research into understanding Chinese and Confucian acquirers using the standard comparative merger data.

This study investigates the institutional influence on the location strategies of Chinese cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&A) during the period 1985–2011 across 150 economies using Heckman's two-stage model. The results suggest that Chinese Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) are ‘shortsighted’ and show perverse behaviour towards host country risk when deciding on the location of host country and volume of investment undertaken through M&As, which may damage the firm's long-term profitability.

This paper discusses some aspects of innovation in China. As China seeks to transition to a knowledge-based economy, it may become more important for China to develop innovative technologies to sustain economic growth. How do China's history, culture, institutions, and organizations aid or hinder innovation? How does China's national innovation system compare to the innovation culture in the US, as well as other developed and emerging economies? What are the prospects for the future of the Chinese national innovation system?

Our starting point is the Needham Puzzle – the paradox that while China was once a world leader in technological development, it fell behind; the Industrial Revolution happened in Europe rather than in China. Potential explanations for the Needham Puzzle may shed light on the challenges facing innovation in modern China. We identify three factors that might help explain the Needham Puzzle; assess how the Needham Puzzle and Chinese culture and history have affected the modern innovation system; discuss comparative aspects of innovation ecosystems in the United States and elsewhere; and suggest that Chinese innovation emphasizes exploitation and refinement of existing knowledge to the exploration and development of new knowledge. We also discuss implications for the future of innovation in China.

Outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) by Chinese firms has received considerable research attention recently (Li, Cui, & Lu, 2014; Lu, Liu, Wright, & Filatotchev, 2014; Xia, Ma, Lu, & Yiu, 2014). In particular, a number of studies have focused on cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&As) involving Chinese firms (Li, Li, & Wang, 2016; Li & Xie, 2013; Xie & Li, 2016; Zhang, Zhou, & Ebbers, 2011). Following Child and Marinova's (2014) suggestion that both the home and host country institutional contexts play important roles in determining M&A activity, Buckley and his colleagues have examined how China's ‘Go Global’ policy influences the location choices in Chinese acquisitions and also how host country political risks affect such activities (Buckley et al., 2016). They looked into national political and legal conditions (see also Meyer, Estrin, Bhaumik, & Peng, 2009), and also examined a large dataset on China's cross-border M&As. Much of the previous work in this area has focused on greenfield investments (Duanmu, 2012; Kang & Jiang, 2012), so the work of Buckley et al. (2016) has broken new ground.

The Needham Puzzle is part of a larger and very complex historical enigma. What explains the slow-down in scientific innovation in China about five hundred years ago? Also, after a recent forty-year period of growth not heavily dependent on spontaneous innovation, are such inherited influences returning to the surface as significant obstacles at a time when innovativeness is becoming more strategic?

Although McCarthy, Dolfsma, and Weitzel (2016) cover much ground in their study, in this commentary I focus on alternative explanations for the empirical results indicating that Chinese acquirers outperformed acquirers from other countries – particularly acquirers from the United States. First, based on research I have done with colleagues (e.g., Chen & Young, 2010; Young & McGuinness, 2001) and that of a doctoral student (Tang, 2016), I suggest that comparison of Chinese stock market reactions to merger announcements with stock market reactions to merger announcements from more mature markets, such as the United States, may create some misleading results. The Event Study Method (ESM) used in this study is a measure of investors’ short-term reactions to unanticipated events and it assumes that investors are capable of accurately evaluating such events (MacKinlay, 1997; McWilliams & Siegel, 1997). I suggest that, given the relative newness of Chinese stock markets, Chinese investors may have reacted more positively to merger announcements regardless of the mergers’ prospects for success. Second, similar to Shapiro and Li (2016), I suggest that stages of industry and organizational development better explain the actual motivation and success of Chinese acquirers than does a general theory of culture or corporate governance traditions.

This study provides new insight into the effectiveness of different knowledge acquisition strategies for organizations at different positions in a production network. Component specialists and systems integrators require a different knowledge repertoire in terms of knowledge depth and knowledge breadth. We show that a greater reliance on inter-organizational partnering than on intra-organizational acquiring is effective in the acquisition of knowledge breadth rather than knowledge depth. And the positive effect of a greater reliance on inter-organizational partnering on knowledge breadth is particularly strong for system integrators.

China, which was once a world champion in invention, has failed to maintain its global leadership in innovation after the middle of the Ming Dynasty (1368–1644). Today, frame-breaking innovations are more likely to originate from European and North American countries than from China. In the perspective article (Augier, Guo, & Rowen, 2016), the authors attribute this phenomenon, which is often referred to as the Needham Puzzle, to three reasons: (1) the Chinese did not develop a scientific method like that in the West; (2) lack of educational diversity and structural inertia in China; and (3) lack of openness to the outside world. The authors also attribute the US's leadership in innovation to its culture of encouraging experimentation, tolerating failure and accepting deviance, and to its institutional support for decentralization of and competition in R&D and basic research. This commentary aims to enrich this insightful analysis. We focus on (1) the reasons for the demise of Chinese leadership in science and technology since the middle of the Ming dynasty, and (2) the historical and cultural obstacles to the development of frame-breaking innovations in modern China.

An institutional perspective has been increasingly adopted in recent studies to explain various aspects of internationalization activities of firms from emerging economies (Meyer & Peng, 2016; Peng, Wang, & Jiang, 2008), particularly China (Cui & Jiang, 2012; Morck, Yeung, & Zhao, 2008). Scholars often claim that the role of institutions in emerging economy firms’ internationalization is understated, hence more research is needed. In this commentary, which reflects on the intended contributions and theoretical and empirical issues of Buckley, Yu, Liu, Munjal, and Tao (2016), I aim to extend a discussion on whether and when such institutional explanations can be overstated. I focus on three issues: (1) conceptualization of institutions, (2) theorizing institutional effects, and (3) testing institutional effects. On each of these issues, I start by providing an overview of some common challenges in the literature. I then focus specifically on the paper as an illustration of how some of these challenges may be manifested. This is then followed by some recommendations for future research. Overall, I argue that pitfalls related to the conceptualization, theorizing and testing of institutional effects can lead researchers to overstate the institutional effects on firm strategic behaviors. These pitfalls can be avoided if researchers clarify the theoretical boundary of the institutional argument they adopt, properly model the institutional effects while taking into consideration other theoretically relevant constructs and mechanisms, and employ empirical design to overcome measurement errors and selection biases when testing not only the statistical significance, but also substantive (economic) significance of institutional effects.

McCarthy, Dolfsma, and Weitzel (2016) raise the important and interesting question of why what the authors refer to as Confucian acquirers, and in particular Chinese acquirers, tended to create value over the last decade relative to Western companies. The analysis by McCarthy et al. (2016), while restricted to an empirical examination of mergers and acquisitions, calls into question the general relevance and validity of standard, Western-based economic and strategic thinking, and calls for further research into the nature of Chinese and Confucian thought and the degree to which they contribute to our understanding of merger outcomes in China, and perhaps elsewhere. At the most general level, McCarthy et al. (2016) challenge us to consider the question of whether different conceptual foundations are necessary to understand the behaviour and performance of Chinese and other Asian firms. At the heart of this question is the issue of whether there are unique country effects, or group-of-country effects, that determine to a substantial degree firm performance, and if so, what is the nature of these effects?

This study investigates the origins of discrete interpersonal emotions in team-member dyads using two independent samples from an education institute and a telecommunication services company in China. Results across both studies showed that the quality of team members’ dyadic relationships positively relates to interpersonal admiration, sympathy, and envy, and negatively relates to interpersonal contempt. Furthermore, teams’ cooperative goals moderate these dyad-level linkages. The association of relationship quality with interpersonal emotions is particularly pronounced in teams with less cooperative goals but buffered in teams with more cooperative goals. Finally, on the individual level of analysis, envy and contempt are inversely associated with team members’ work performance, objectively measured. These findings provide new insights about key antecedents and crucial moderators in the development of interpersonal emotions in Chinese work teams and reiterate the relevance of these emotions for tangible performance outcomes.

Knowledge has always been a strategic resource for firms; however, there is a lack of research regarding how a firm's knowledge management (KM) contributes to its capability catching-up and adaptation in emerging economies. This article focuses on the knowledge capability building of Chinese private firms that were set up in the 1990s and pays particular attention to how firms with limited resources and knowledge went on to achieve remarkable success. This paper presents its analysis through a multi-level co-evolutionary lens and a case study on the Li-Ning Company. The case study depicts the macro coevolution between the changing business environment and the firm's strategic choices, as well as the micro coevolution of the organizational strategy and the KM orientations, processes, and infrastructures within the firm. The research sheds light on the dynamic capability building trajectory for the firms in emerging economies.

Conventional wisdom suggests that new ventures can employ a combination of two general strategies to confront the challenges of operating in transition economies or regions known for their weak institutional conditions: These ventures may succeed by enacting a market-orientation strategy, which focuses on providing value to customers and implementing rapid responses to competitive situations. They can also engage in a more traditional political-networking strategy that engages government officials, which may yield public resources and enhance their organizational legitimacy. However, research results are inconclusive regarding the effectiveness of these strategies when they are combined in a hybrid form. We argue that the advantages of a hybrid strategy are contingent on the perception of a specific condition: dysfunctional competition. In our analysis of new venture performance in China, we show that political networking indeed amplifies the positive influence of market-orientation strategies on performance, but only in contexts where dysfunctional competition is perceived to be low. When such competition is high, political networking becomes counterproductive, diverting attention away from swift responses to market demands. By addressing how multiple strategies work together, we offer insights into the extent to which the effectiveness of hybrid strategies – incorporating both market-orientation and political-networking – depend on the context in which they are implemented.

The ownership structure of Chinese firms has experienced significant changes over the last three decades, including the development of a fast growing stock market through which a large number of domestic firms have become publicly traded corporations. These changes have drawn increasing attention from researchers of corporate governance. In this article, we review the empirical research on corporate governance in China, with a focus on the internal and external governance mechanisms that have been investigated and the findings about the effectiveness of these mechanisms. On the basis of our review of 132 studies, we summarize the major findings and discuss the limitation of agency theory in understanding the governance issue in Chinese firms. We offer several ideas (e.g., the importance of the social context, new conceptualization of governance, different outcomes of governance, and data/method issues) for a new agenda to guide future research in the corporate governance of firms operating in the Chinese and other emerging economy contexts.

We synthesize the literature on Chinese multinational enterprises (MNEs) and find that much of the prior research is based on as few as a dozen case studies of Chinese firms. They are so case-specific that it has led to a misplaced call for new theories to explain Chinese firms’ internationalization. In an attempt to better relate theory with empirical evidence, we examine the largest 500 Chinese manufacturing firms. We aim to find out the number of Chinese manufacturing firms to be true MNEs by definition, and to examine their financial performance relative to global peers using the financial benchmarking method. We develop our theoretical perspectives from new internalization theory. We find that there are only 49 Chinese manufacturing firms to be true MNEs, whereas the rest are purely domestic firms. Their performance is poor relative to global peers. Chinese MNEs have home country bound firm-specific advantages (FSAs), which are built upon home country-specific advantages (home CSAs). They have not yet developed advanced management capabilities through recombination with host CSAs. Essentially, they acquire foreign firms to increase their sales in domestic market, but they fail to be competitive internationally and to achieve superior performance in overseas operations. Our findings have important strategic implications for managers, public policy makers, and academic research.