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The First Global Merger Wave and the Enigma of Chinese Performance

  • Killian J. McCarthy (a1), Wilfred Dolfsma (a2) and Utz Weitzel (a3) (a4)

Abstract

The first five merger waves were US-led events. In this article we show that the largely over-looked sixth wave (2003–2008) emerged in all regions simultaneously. Because of this, and building upon interconnected literatures – which: (1) suggests that agency is a big predictor of merger performance; (2) distinguishes between three distinct governance traditions; and (3) argues that the Anglo-Saxon system puts the most effort into protecting investors and aligning interests, and the Confucian system the least – we predicted that Anglo-Saxon acquirers would create value in the sixth wave, and Confucian acquirers would destroy it. We find the opposite to be true and show that Chinese acquirers, in particular, created the most value in the sixth wave. In attempting to explain why, we find that China outperformed its Asian neighbors while doing the same thing, and outperformed its Western peers while doing what the literature suggests that they shouldn't do. This not only points to the limits of the generalizability of the existing literature, but supports the suggestion that Chinese acquirers are ‘different’. We call, therefore, for additional research into understanding Chinese and Confucian acquirers using the standard comparative merger data.

摘要:

前五次并购浪潮是美国领引的事件。在这篇文章中, 我们显示, 在很大程度上被忽视的第六次浪潮 (2003 - 2008) 同时出现在所有地区。因为这一点, 并基于相关文献, 即 (1) 提出代理商是并购绩效的一个大预测指标༛ (2) 区分三种不同的治理传统༛ (3) 认为, 盎格鲁 - 撒克逊系统最努力保护投资者和协调利益, 而儒家系统最少 ─我们预测, 盎格鲁-撒克逊收购者将在第六次浪潮中创造价值, 而儒家收购者会捣毁它。我们发现相反的是真实的, 并显示特别是中国收购者在第六次浪潮中创造了最大的价值。在试图解释为什么的时候, 我们发现, 中国做同样事情的表现优于其亚洲邻国, 并在做文献建议他们不应做的事情的方面优于西方同行。这不仅指出现有文献的普遍性局限, 而且支持中国收购者“与众不同”的提法。我们因此呼吁做附加研究, 用标准的可比较的并购数据去了解中国和儒家收购者。

पहली पांच औद्योगिक विलय की लहरें अमरीकी प्रभाव की घटनाएं थीं. इस शोध पत्र में हम ने मूलतः अनदेखी षष्टम विलय लहर (२००३-२००८) को देखा है जो सारे क्षेत्रों में एक साथ उभरी थी. इस कारण से और अंतःसंबंधित शोध साहित्य के आधार पर—जिसके अनुसार: (१) अभिकर्ता विलय के परिणाम का भविष्य सूचक है; (२) तीन नियत संचालन प्रणालियों में अभिन्न अंतर है; और (३) ऐंग्लो-सैक्सन व्यवस्था में निवेशक सुरक्षा के सबसे अधिक प्रयत्न होते हैं और कन्फ्यूशियन में सबसे अल्प—हम ने अनुमानित किया था की षष्टम विलय धारा में ऐंग्लो-सैक्सन अधिग्रहक मूल्य बढ़ाएंगे और कन्फ्यूशियन मूल्य घटाएंगे. इसके विपरीत हमारे शोध ने यह पाया की चीनी अधिग्रहकों ने विशेष तौर पर अधिग्रहीत कम्पनियों का मूल्य बढ़ाया. हमने यह भी पाया जहां चीनी कम्पनियों ने पडोसी देशों की कम्पनियों की तुलना में सामान्यतः अपेक्षित कदमों से अधिक मूल्य बढ़ाया, वहीँ पश्चिमी देशों की कम्पनियों की तुलना में अधिक मूल्य उन क़दमों से बढ़ाया जो शोध साहित्य के अनुसार नहीं लिए जाने चाहिए. इन परिणामों से न केवल उपलब्ध शोध साहित्य के सामान्यीकरण की सीमायें दिखती हैं वरन चीनी अधिग्रहकों के भिन्न होने के परिप्रेक्ष्य को भी बल मिलता है. इसी लिए चीनी और कन्फ्यूशियन अधिग्रहकों पर बेहतर समझ बनाने के लिए हम उपलब्ध विलय सम्बन्धी आंकड़ों पर और अधिक शोध के पक्षधर हैं.

SUMÁRIO:

As primeiras cinco ondas de fusões foram eventos liderados pelos Estados Unidos. Neste artigo, vamos mostrar que a sexta onda, em grande parte negligenciada (2003-2008), surgiu em todas as regiões simultaneamente. Devido a isso, e criando a partir de literatura correlata que: (1) sugere que a agência é um grande preditor do desempenho da fusão; (2) caracteriza-se por três distintas tradições de governança; e (3) argumenta que o sistema anglo-saxão aloca o máximo de esforço para proteger os investidores e alinhar interesses, enquanto o sistema confucionista, o mínimo – nós previmos que os adquirentes anglo-saxões criariam valor na sexta onda, e adquirentes confucionistas iriam destruí-lo . Achamos que o oposto é verdadeiro e mostramos que os adquirentes chineses, em particular, criaram o maior valor na sexta onda. Na tentativa de explicar a razão disso, nós concluímos que a China superou os seus vizinhos asiáticos ao fazerem a mesma coisa, e superaram seus pares ocidentais ao fazerem o que a literatura sugere que eles não façam. Isto não só aponta para os limites da generabilidade da literatura existente, mas também sustenta a sugestão de que os adquirentes chineses são “diferentes”. Convocamos, portanto, pesquisas adicionais para entender adquirentes chineses e confucionistas usando os dados comparativos padrão sobre fusões.

Аннотация:

Первые пять волн корпоративных слияний были возглавлены США. В данной работе мы показываем, что в целом неисследованная шестая волна (2003-2008) произошла во всех регионах одновременно. В этой связи, на основании соответствующей литературы, которая 1) предполагает, что агентность во многом предопределяет успех слияния; 2) проводит различие между тремя разными традициями управления; 3) утверждает, что англо-саксонская система более всего защищает и согласует интересы инвесторов, а конфуцианская система – менее всего; мы предположили, что англо-саксонские компании-приобретатели добьются успеха во время шестой волны, а конфуцианские компании-приобретатели потерпят неудачу. Мы приходим к выводу, что верно обратное, и показываем, что китайские компании-приобретатели, в особенности, добились самого большого успеха во время шестой волны. В попытке объяснить почему, мы доказываем, что Китай превзошел своих азиатских соседей, которые делали то же самое, а также опередил западных конкурентов, которые делали то, что, согласно литературе, они не должны были делать. Этот результат не только показывает, что существуют пределы для обобщения в существующей литературе, но и подтверждает предположение, что китайские компании-приобретатели отличаются. Соответственно, мы приходим к выводу, что необходимо провести дополнительные исследования китайских и конфуцианских компаний-приобретателей на основании стандартных сравнительных данных о слияниях.

Las cinco primeras olas de fusiones fueron eventos liderados por los Estados Unidos. En este artículo mostramos como la ampliamente observada sexta ola (2003-2008) surgió en todas las regiones simultáneamente. Debido a esto, y con base en las literaturas interconectadas –la cual: (1) sugiere que la agencia es un gran predictor del rendimiento de la fusión; (2) distingue entre tres diferentes tradiciones de gobernanza; y (3) sostiene que el sistema anglosajón pone el mayor esfuerzo en proteger inversionistas y en alinear intereses, y el sistema confucionista el menor – predecimos que los adquisidores anglosajones crearían valor en la sexta ola, y los adquisidores confusionistas lo destruirían. Encontramos todo lo contrario y mostramos que los adquisidores chinos, en particular, crearon mayor valor en la sexta ola. En un intento de explicar porque, encontramos que China superó a sus vecinos asiáticos haciendo lo mismo, y superó a sus pares occidentales haciendo lo que la literatura sugiere que no deben hacer. Esto no solamente alerta los limites de la generalización en la literatura existente, sino que apoya la sugerencia que los adquisidores chinos son “diferentes”. Hacemos un llamado, por ende, para investigación adicional en entender los adquisidores chinos y confusionistas usando datos comparativos estándar de fusiones.

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Corresponding author

Corresponding author: Killian J. McCarthy (k.j.mccarthy@rug.nl)

References

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