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Index

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 March 2018

Ashley Thomas Lenihan
Ashley Thomas Lenihan
Affiliation:
London School of Economics and Political Science

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Type
Chapter
Information
Balancing Power without Weapons
State Intervention into Cross-Border Mergers and Acquisitions
 , pp. 351 - 360
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2018
Creative Commons
Creative Common License - CCCreative Common License - BYCreative Common License - NC
This content is Open Access and distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence CC-BY-NC 4.0 https://creativecommons.org/cclicenses/

Index

3Com, 262
3Leaf Systems, 9
Abbot Laboratories, 14
Accelero Capital Holdings, 15
Adler and Barnett, 72, 137
ADM, 16
advanced industrial states, 6, 16, 20, 52, 59, 214, 291
AIG, 8, 164
Aixtron, 10–11, 36, 290
Alcatel, 52, 196, 216–231. See also Alcatel/Lucent case
Alcatel Alenia Space, 220, 226, 227
Alcatel/Lucent case, 52, 200, 216–230, 244–246, 255, 275, 285, Figures 9, 28, 30, 34
Alcoa, 2, 143
Algeria, 274
Alliant Techsystems, 14
Allstream, 15
Alstom, 3, 5, 102
Aluminum Corporation of China. See Chinalco
American International Group. See AIG
AMF, 100–101
Amoco, 99, 128
AP Moller-Maersk, 177
Arcelor, 11, 54, 263
Archer Daniel Midland. See ADM
Argentina
FDI law/regulation
national security and, 32
Arktikgaz, 207
ARM Holdings, 249
AstraZeneca, 212–213
ASX, 15
Australia, 72, 181
Australian companies, 1, 15–16. See also Macquarie/PCCW case, Macquarie
China and, 140–143, 147, 289
concept of national security and, 37
FDI
intervention on national security grounds and, 13
FDI law/regulation
national interest and, 14–16, 59
national security and, 14–16, 32, 37, 59
Austria
Austrian companies, 12
FDI law/regulation
national security and, 32
Autorité des Marchés Financiers. See AMF
Aventis, 5
Avio, 13
Azerbaijan, 109, 124
BAE Systems, 12, 54, 198, 211–212, 264, 265. See also Finmeccanica/BAE Systems case, BAE Systems/UDI case
BAE Systems North America, 198, 264
BAE Systems North America. See BAE Systems
BAE Systems/UDI case, 198, 264, 265, Figure 9
balance of power, 1, 2, 5, 18, 22, 38, 40, 41, 123, 296
balancing, 17, 21, 23, 31, Figure 3
external balancing, 41
hard balancing, 43
internal balancing, 41
non-military internal balancing, 5–6, 22–25, 31, 40–55, 60–62, 70, 75, 80, 83–84, 90, 93, 97–98, 104, 126, 133, 134, 147, 158, 163–165, 185, 196, 199, 216, 245, 255, 259, 268, 269, 271, 278–279, 283–287, 291–297, Figures 3, 4, 5, 33
definition of, 5–6
overbalancing, 22–24, 62, 93, 97, 158, 163, 165–166, 182, 185, 292–294, 300. See also DPW/P&O case
strategic sectors and, 99
theory of, 40–55, 60
versus soft balancing, 43
overbalancing, 158
soft balancing, 5, 43–44, Figure 3
underbalancing, 40, 93, 148, 158, 187
Bangladesh, 109
Beida Jade Bird, 15
Belarus, 274
Belgium, 271–272, 275, 277
Belgian companies, 271, 277
Bell Laboratories, 220–222, 224, 227–228
BHP Billiton, 1–2, 15, 142–143
board resolution, 51–52, 67, 200
Boeing, 169
bounded intervention. See also bounded interventionby country, andcross-border M&A: bounded intervention
BP, 99, 128
Brawley, 42–43, 270
Brazil, 290
Brazilian companies, 1
British Petroleum. See BP
Bulgari, 12
Bundesdruckerei, 12
Cadbury, 212
Canada, 72, 181
Canadian companies, 10, 15, 16, 122
China and, 289
concept of national security and, 32
FDI
intervention on national security grounds and, 13
FDI law/regulation
national security and, 14–15, 32, 59
net benefit and, 14–15, 59
strategic sectors and, 15
Canyon Bridge, 10, 36
Carlyle Group, 13
CATIC, 36, 128
CDP Equity, 3
Centrica, 212
Ceres Marine Terminals, 177
CFIUS, 7–11, 17, 34–36, 51–52, 110–117, 122, 126, 127–128, 131–133, 135–137, 140, 145, 159–162, 164–167, 173, 176, 178–180, 183, 185, 200, 203, 222–225, 227–230, 232–235, 238, 240–242, 255–256, 262, 288–289, 295
CGG, 255–257. See also CGG/Veritas case
CGG/Veritas case, 255–257, 278–279, Figures 9, 30
Check Point, 8, 93, 134–140. See also Check Point/Sourcefire case
Check Point Software Technologies. See Check Point
Check Point/Sourcefire case, 99, 134–140, 147, 223, 285, Figures 9, 26, 27, 34
ChemChina, 150
Chevron, 109–110, 115–117, 128–133
China, 6, 43, 59–60, 99, 171, 181, 213, 223, 227, 233, 244, 290–291, 296
Australia and, 140–147
bounded intervention by, 199, 203–206
Chinese companies, 2–3, 8–11, 13, 15–16, 121, 160, 175, 177, 289–290, 301. See also Lenovo, PCCW, CNOOC
concept of national security and, 6, 32, 37
economic nationalism and, 13, 141, 143–145, 147
economic patriotism and, 13
FDI
formal veto and, 203
intervention on national security grounds and, 13. See also China: unbounded intervention by
levels of, 53, 99, 214
FDI law/regulation, 144–145, 201–206
anti-trust review and, 146, 202
institutionalization and, 52–53, 201, 202, 203, 214
national security and, 13, 32, 37, 145, 199, 202–206
transparency and, 53
Germany and, 289, 290
going out strategy, 289
Israel and, 137
national champions and, 122, 144
nationalism and, 291
strategic investment and, 1, 36, 117, 282, 289–290
strategic sectors and, 13, 99, 145, 201–202, 203, 214
UK and, 289–290
unbounded intervention by, 99, 140–147, 203–205. See also Macquarie/PCCW case
US and, 8–11, 36, 39, 45, 109–134, 231–244, 245, 246, 262, 289–290. See also CNOOC/Unocal case, Lenovo/IBM case
China National Aero-Technology Import and Export Corporation. See CATIC
China National Offshore Oil Corporation, 3, 8, 109, 121. See also CNOOC
China Netcom, 140–141, 144, 147
China Petroleum & Chemical Corp., 122
China Venture Capital Fund. See CVCF
China IC Industry Investment Fund, 10
Chinalco, 2, 143
CITGO, 99, 128, 177
Citigroup, 257
Clearwire, 9
CNOOC, 3, 8, 40, 93, 109–134, 222–223, 226, 228. See also CNOOC/Unocal case
CNOOC/Unocal case, 98, 109–134, 139, 147, 148, 165, 166, 170, 175, 186, 219, 222–223, 226, 228, 231–232, 234, 236, 238–240, 243–244, 246, Figures 9, 26, 27, 34
Coca Cola, 13
Committee on Foreign Investments in the United States. See CFIUS
Compagnie Générale de Géophysique. See CGG
COSCO, 128, 175, 177
Credit Suisse, 257
cross-border M&A. See also foreign direct investment
as a driver of globalization, 2–3, 18–23
bounded intervention . See Chapter 5, and bounded interventionby country
definition of, 6, 51–53, 196–199, Figure 5
definition of, 17
economic interdependence and, 18–23
general regulation of, 17–18
global levels of, 19–21
globalization and, 18–23, 293
internal intervention . See Chapter 6, and internal interventionby country
definition of, 55, Figure 5
intervention as tool of statecraft, 31, 62
intervention on national security grounds and. See FDI: intervention on national security grounds by country
intervention on national security grounds and the primary hypothesis, 2–3, 47, 55, 255, 257
intervention within security communities and. See FDI: intervention within security communitiesby country
national security risks and, 3, 7–8, 32–38
non-military internal balancing and, 4–5, 16, 24
politicization of foreign takeovers, 20, 165, 169, 185, 186, 284, 293, 299–300. See also FDI: politicizationby country
sovereign right to veto, 44, 50–51, 94–95, 96, 101, 105, 292, 299. See also FDI: formal veto by country, international law: sovereign right to veto foreign takeovers, and i.e. US: FDI: presidential veto
unbounded intervention . See Chapters 3 and 4, and unbounded interventionby country
definition of, 6, 50, 94–97, Figure 5
cross-shareholding, 55, 268
CSX, 177
Cuba, 223, 227
CVCF, 10
Danone, 3, 5, 93, 100–109. See also PepsiCo/Danone case
Distrigaz, 277
Doncasters, 184–185
DPW, 3, 8, 93, 158–186. See also DPW/P&O case
DPW/P&O case, 24, 97, 111, 137, 158–186, 219, 220, 222–223, 226, 228, 236, 284, 287, 293, 300, Figures 9, 26
Dubai International Capital, 184–185
Dubai Ports World. See DPW
E.ON, 11
EADS, 12, 221
economic interdependence, 281
and conflict, 4, 24, 62, 287–291
and cross-border M&A, 18–23
and power, 31, 38–40, 287–291
economic nationalism, 196, 219
definition of, 26
resurgance and non-military internal balancing, 291–293
economic security, 51, 127–128, 170, 199, 205, 222, 238, 284
EDF, 12, 213
Edison, 12
Electrabel, 271, 275
Emcore, 9
Endesa, 11
Enel, 207, 271–272, 274–278
Eni, 207, 277
EniNeftegaz, 207
EU, 4, 13, 20, 59–60, 72, 106, 206, 212, 263, 272–274, 290–291
bounded intervention by, 52
economic liberalism and, 22, 281
economic nationalism and, 73, 263
European Commission, 4, 11, 12, 47, 105, 223, 230, 273, 275–277
European companies, 5, 15, 221, 273
European Court of Justice, 11
European Parliament, 273
FDI
intervention within security communities and, 4, 11, 12, 45, 80, 286, 287
levels of, 99
FDI law/regulation, 12, 101
institutionalization and, 52, 214
national security and, 4–5
liberal economic order and, 292
strategic sectors and, 290
Europe, 19, 274
China and, 290
SWFs and, 79
European Economic Area, 13
European Free Trade Association, 12
evergreen clause, 52, 218, 224–225, 227, 229, Figure 15
Exon-Florio, 7, 36, 110, 111
export control, 35, 99, 124, 138, 140, 147, 198, 200, 225, 241
Finland
FDI law/regulation
national security and, 13, 32
Finmeccanica, 211–212, 220. See also Finmeccanica/BAE Systems case
Finmeccanica/BAE Systems case, 211–212, Figure 9
FINSA, 9, 34, 111, 164, 295
FirstGold, 9
Fluxys, 277
Fond Stratégique d'Investissement, 3, 5
Fondo Strategico Italiano. See CDP Equity
foreign direct investment. See also FDI and FDI law/regulation by country
definition of, 17
general regulation of, 17–18
implications of, 17
Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007. See FINSA
France, 12, 60, 98, 268, 271–279, 299
concept of national security and, 23, 32, 37
economic nationalism and, 5, 106–108, 148, 219, 273, 275, 277, 285, 300
economic patriotism and, 5, 107–108
FDI
formal veto and, 101, 105
intervention on national security grounds and, 3. See also France: internal intervention by, and France: unbounded intervention by
intervention within security communities and, 4, 286
FDI law/regulation, 98
national security and, 32, 37, 101–102
French companies, 3, 5, 11–13, 213, 216, 263. See also Suez, GdF, CGG, Alcatel, and Danone
internal intervention by, 270–278. See also GdF/Suez case
Italy and, 12–13, 272–278
national champions and, 3, 5, 23, 100, 104–106, 109, 229, 270–271, 273, 275, 278
nationalism and, 291
populism and, 292
strategic sectors and, 3, 5, 6, 101–102, 105, 220, 226, 268, 275
SWFs and, 3, 5
unbounded intervention by, 100–109, 263. See also PepsiCo/Danone case
US and, 100–109, 185, 216–231, 246, 255–257
Fujian Grand Chip Investment Fund. See Grand Chip
Gaz de France. See GDF
Gazprom, 207, 212, 274
GdF, 268, 271–278. See also GdF/Suez case
GdF/Suez case, 268, 271–279, Figure 9
Gemalto, 12
General Electric, 3, 13, 102
Georgia, 124
Germany, 12
China and, 289–290
concept of national security and, 32
FDI
formal veto and, 290
intervention on national security grounds and, 10, 290
intervention within security communities and, 4, 12, 286
FDI law/regulation
national security and, 12, 32
German companies, 4, 10–12, 36, 268, 290
internal intervention by, 270
national champions and, 4, 5, 268, 270
populism and, 292
strategic investment in WWI and, 7
strategic sectors and, 12
SWFs and, 12
US and, 7, 39
Gilpin, 17, 21, 38
Glencore, 269
Global Crossing, 251
global financial crisis, 4, 19–20, 57, 290, 293–296
Global War on Terror, 8, 158, 161, 163, 165, 168–169, 172–174, 181, 184
globalization
backlash against, 19–21, 23, 293
defined, 18
Go Scale Capital, 26
golden share, 213, 275, 277, 278
definition of, 275
government investment corporations, 79
Graham and Krugman, 17
Graham and Marchick, 7, 16, 19, 301
Graincorp, 16
Grand Chip, 10, 36, 290
great powers, 6, 19, 21, 39, 46, 103, 138, 171, 225, 239, 282, 288, 296
greenfield investment, 17–19, 213
Groupe Danone. See Danone
Grundman and Roncka, 47–48, 110, 264
Haier, 126, 154, 236
HBOS, 249
hegemony, 43, 60, 219, 225, 290
benign liberal hegemon, 21, 35, 281, 292
Hinkley Point C, 213, 290
Hirschman, 38–39
hostile takeover
definition of, 26
Huawei, 9, 262, 289, 301
Huiyuan Juice, 13
Hungary
FDI law/regulation, 12
nationalism and, 291
populism and, 292
Husky Energy, 122
Hutchinson Whampoa, 160, 244, 251
IBM, 126–127, 196, 231–244. See also Lenovo/IBM case
Identrust, 10
Ikenberry, 21, 281, 292
Inchcape Shipping Services. See ISS
India, 11, 171, 181, 263, 290
concept of national security and, 32
Indian companies, 10, 263
nationalism and, 291
Indonesia, 109, 125
industrializing states, 6, 16, 59, 291
institutional investor, 1, 54, 56, 229, 260–261, 279, 302
international law
sovereign right to veto foreign takeovers, 2–3, 32–34
international system, 2, 18, 22, 24, 31–32, 36–37, 39–41, 43, 62, 93, 143, 171, 225, 281–282, 288, 291–292
inward foreign direct investment, 5, 18, 72, 75, 82, 86–87, 89, 215
Iran, 123, 223, 225–228, 241–242
Iraq, 242
Israel, 160, 168, 174
Israeli companies, 8, 168. See also Check Point
US and, 99, 134–140, 147
ISS, 177
Istithmar, 177
Italy, 12–13, 43, 271–278
concept of national secuirty and, 23, 37
FDI
intervention within security communities and, 4, 286
FDI law/regulation, 3–4
national security and, 32, 37
France and, 12–13, 272–278
internal intervention by, 270
Italian companies, 3, 12–13, 207, 211, 271. See also Enel, Finmeccanica
national champions and, 5, 23, 270
strategic sectors and, 3–4, 268
SWFs and, 3–4
Japan, 106
Abenomics and, 291
concept of national security and, 32, 37
economic populism and, 291
FDI
intervention on national security grounds and, 13–14
FDI law/regulation
national security and, 14, 32, 37
Japanese companies, 9, 14, 177
nationalism and, 291
strategic sectors and, 268
US and, 7, 16, 39, 126–127, 236
JP Morgan, 257–258. See also JP Morgan/Troika Dialog case
JP Morgan/Troika Dialog case, 257–258, 278–279, Figure 9
J-Power, 14
Keohane and Nye, 24, 38–39, 287
Kidman & Company, 16
KKR, 149
Korea
FDI law/regulation
national security and, 32
Kraft, 212
L-3 Communications, 265
Lattice Semiconductor, 10–11, 36, 290
Legend Holdings, 231–232, 241
Lenovo, 126, 196, 231–244. See also Lenovo/IBM case
Lenovo/IBM case, 215, 231–246, Figures 9, 28, 34
liberal economic order, xi, 4, 21, 281, 292–293, 295
Libya, 260
limited facility clearance, 52, 200
Lincoln Mining, 10
Lithuania
concept of national security and, 37
FDI law/regulation
national security and, 32, 37
Lloyds TSB, 249
Lucent Technologies, 196, 216–231. See also Alcatel/Lucent case
Lumileds Holding, 26
MacDonald Detweiller. See MDA
Macquarie, 13, 93, 140–147. See also Macquarie/PCCW case
Macquarie/PCCW case, 99, 140–147, 202, Figures 9, 26, 27, 34
MAMCO, 36, 128
Manitoba Telecom Services, 15
Maytag, 126, 127
MDA, 15
Mexico, 125
FDI law/regulation
national security and, 32
miscalculation, 22–23, 165, 185, 292, 294, 296
mitigation, 6, 9, 11, 15, 24, 35, 44, 49, 50, 53, 56, 77, 85, 87–89, 90, 167, 178, 185, 196–199, 200, 203–205, 207, 209, 211–213, 218, 220, 222–224, 226–227, 229, 231, 234, 237, 239–240, 243–246, 259, 283–285, 288–289, 292. See also bounded intervention
mitigation measures, 51–53, 200, 218, 229, 235, 242. See also Voting Trust AgreementProxy Agreement, evergreen clause, Security Control Agreement, National Security Agreement, Special Security Agreement, limited facility clearance, board resolution
Mittal, 11, 54, 263
MOL, 12
Moran, 38, 264
MTU Aero Engines, 149
Mubadala Development, 13
Myanmar, 109, 223, 227
national champions, 5, 25, 42, 46, 55, 73, 79, 95, 257–258, 267–268. See also national championsby country
national security
concept of, 6–7, 32–34. See also concept of national securityby country
sectors, commonly identified, 57–59. See also strategic sectors
risks and cross-border M&A, 34–38
National Security Agreement, 200, 226, 263, 264, Figure 15
nCipher, 155
Netherlands
concept of national security and, 32
Dutch companies, 11, 12
populism and, 292
New Zealand, 72
concept of national security and, 37
FDI law/regulation
national security and, 32, 37
Nexen, 26
non-military internal balancing . See balancing: non-military internal balancing
North Korea, 223, 227, 242
Northwest Nonferrous, 9
Norway, 177, 274
Nye, 19, 43, 291–293
OMV, 12
P&O, 3, 8, 93, 158–186. See also DPW/P&O case
Parmalat, 12
PCCW, 13, 93, 140–147. See also Macquarie/PCCW case
PDVSA, 99, 128
Peninsular & Oriental Steam Navigation Company. See P&O
PepsiCo, 3, 93, 100–109. See also PepsiCo/Danone case
PepsiCo/Danone case, 59, 98, 100–109, 134, 148, 219, 225–226, 275, 285, 299, Figures 9, 26, 27, 34
Petróleos de Venezuela. See PDVSA
Petrovax Pharm, 14
Pfizer, 212
Philippines, 109
Philips, 26
Piaggio Aero, 13
poison pill, 14, 276
Poland
FDI law/regulation
national security and, 12
strategic sectors and, 12
Polaris, 10
populism, 291–292
Porsche, 268
PotashCorp, 15
power, 1, 17, 19, 22, 31, 36, 43, 49, 60, 62
definition of, 5, 65
economic interdependence and, 38–40
economic power, 5, 6, 22, 31, 38–40, 42, 45–46, 61, 89, 95, 145, 199, 225, 263, 269, 270, 275, 278, 282, 286–288, 290–291, 295
hard power, 6, 39
military power, 6, 21–22, 31, 38, 42, 46, 118, 145, 171, 199, 269, 282, 286, 288, 291
relative economic power, 39, 45, 72, 86–87, 89, 103, 105, 108, 119, 133, 171–172, 215, 251, 290
relative military power, 45, 65, 72, 75, 82, 83, 85–87, 89, 103, 171, 215, 259
relative power, xi, 5, 6, 22–24, 38, 40–44, 46, 61, 82–83, 89, 93, 95, 103, 134, 138, 147, 171, 197, 215, 239, 269, 279, 282–283, 289, 301
rising power, 39, 43, 99, 138, 171, 215, 269, 286
social power, 134, 269, 288
soft power, 226, 288
Procon Mining and Tunneling, 10
protectionism, 5, 22, 37, 46, 72, 107, 114, 147, 168, 181, 183, 205, 228, 238, 245, 272, 287
Proxy Agreement, 52, 67, 200
PSA International, 160, 177
Ralls, 10, 27, 36
Rio Tinto, 1, 142
Royal Dutch Shell. See Shell
Rusal, 269. See also Rusal/Sual case
Rusal/Sual case, 269, Figure 9
Russia, 37, 43, 59–60, 244, 260, 263, 274, 275, 290, 296
China and, 290
concept of national security and, 32
economic nationalism and, 257, 258
FDI
formal veto and, 209
intervention on national security grounds and, 13, 14, 207, 209. See Russia: internal intervention by
levels of, 53, 99
FDI law/regulation, 206–210
anti-trust review and, 206
institutionalization and, 52–53, 206, 214
national security and, 14, 32, 199, 206
transparency and, 53
internal intervention by, 268–270. See also Rusal/Sual case
national champions and, 258, 270
nationalism and, 291
no intervention by, 257–258. See also JP Morgan/Troika Dialog case
Russian companies, 212, 263, 274. See also Sual, Rusal, Troika Dialog
strategic investment and, 282
strategic sectors and, 99, 206, 207–209, 214
unbounded intervention by, 99
US and, 257–258
SafeNet, 155
Sagem, 12
security community. See also FDI: intervention within security communitiesby country
definition of, 72
Security Control Agreement, 52, 67, 200
Segeo, 275
sensitive industries. See strategic sectors
sensitive sectors. See strategic sectors
September 11, 2001, 7, 19, 43, 51, 57–58, 80, 160, 163, 168, 172–174
Sequoia Voting Systems, 8
Severstal, 263
SGX, 15
Shambaugh, 38
Shell, 15
Shuanghui International Holdings, 150
Sinomach, 10
Smartmatic, 8
Smithfield Foods, 150
Société Générale, 5
Softbank, 9, 249
Sourcefire, 8, 93, 134–140. See also Check Point/Sourcefire case
sovereign wealth funds, 3, 5, 12, 79, 160, 171–172, 184, 260, 282, 289, 294, 302
Spain
FDI
intervention within security communities and, 4, 11, 286
internal intervention by, 270
national champions and, 5, 270
Spanish companies, 11
strategic sectors and, 268
SPE, 277
Special Security Agreement, 52, 54, 67, 200, 224, 226
Sprint, 9
SSA Marine, 177
state-owned enterprises, 10, 15, 36, 208, 289, 301
state-owned national oil companies, 121–122
strategic sectors, 5, 42, 79, 99, 199, 264, 268–269, 278, 288, Figure 10. See also strategic sectorsby country
commonly identified, 57–59
concept of, 6–7
Sual, 269. See also Rusal/Sual case
Sudan, 123, 223, 227
Sudanese companies, 122
Suez, 268, 271–278. See also GdF/Suez case
superpower, 104, 118, 228
Sweden, 216
Switzerland
Swiss companies, 257, 269
Syngenta, 150
Synopec, 122
Syria, 223, 227, 291
systemic change, 287–291
Tangshan Caofeidian Investment Corporation. See TCIC
target company
definition of, 26
TCI, 14
TCIC, 9
Telespazio, 220, 226–227
Temasek, 160
Texaco, 129
Thailand, 109
Thales, 220–221, 226
Thunder FZE, 159, Figure 26
TPG Newbridge, 141
Troika Dialog, 257–258. See also JP Morgan/Troika Dialog case
Turkey, 124
Tyson, 38–39, 72, 301
UAE, 8. See also DPW/P&O case
concept of national security and, 32
UAE companies, 13. See also DPW
US and, 39–40, 158–186
UDI, 198, 264, 265. See also BAE Systems/UDI case
UK, 8, 12, 162, 166–167, 169, 181, 244, 289
bounded intervention by, 211–212. See also Finmeccanica/BAE Systems case
Brexit and, 4, 11, 20, 212, 286, 291
concept of national security and, 32
economic nationalism and, 11, 170, 292
FDI law/regulation, 210–213
anti-trust review and, 210
national security and, 32, 199, 210–213, 290
public interest test and, 210–213
nationalism and, 291
strategic sectors and, 211
UAE and, 170–173
UK companies, 12, 14, 161, 177, 184, 212–213. See also DPW/P&O case, P&O, BAE Systems
national champions and, 165, 170
Ukraine, 274, 290
unbounded intervention. See also unbounded interventionby country, andcross-border M&A: unbounded intervention
United Defense Industries. See UDI
United Kingdom. See UK
Unocal, 3, 8, 40, 93, 109–134, 228. See also CNOOC/Unocal case
US, 12, 16, 23, 59–60, 206, 213, 244, 284, 288–290, 296, 300
American companies, 2, 7–11, 13–14, 212, 216–218, 257, 288. See also JP Morgan, Veritas, UDI, Lucent Technologies, IBM, Sourcefire, PepsiCo, Unocal
anti-globalization and, 20
bounded intervention by, 198, 216–244. See also Lenovo/IBM case, Alcatel/Lucent case, BAE Systems/UDI case
China and, 8–11, 36, 39, 45, 109–134, 231–246, 262, 289–290
concept of national security and, 6, 32, 34–37, 57
economic nationalism and, 118, 126–128, 133, 139, 158, 165, 169–170, 179, 185–186, 219, 222, 225, 228–234, 236–239, 243–245, 284
FDI
composition of, 18–19
intervention on national security grounds and, 3, 7–11, 47–48, 51, 54. See also US: bounded intervention by, US: unbounded intervention by, US: no intervention by
levels of, 57, 99
levels of cross-border M&A and, 18–19
politicization and, 51, 114, 127, 137, 164–165, 169, 171, 175, 179–180, 183, 185–186, 220, 222–223, 228, 243, 284, 300
presidential veto and, 9–11, 36, 128, 136, 161, 163, 290
retroactive reviews and, 8–10
FDI law/regulation, 110–112
anti-trust review and, 110, 232
greenfield investment and, 17–19
institutionalization and, 34, 52, 200–201, 214, 295
national security and, 7–8, 9, 32, 34–35, 51–52, 54, 110–112, 199, 200–201, 264
transparency and, 34, 201
France and, 100–109, 185, 216–231, 246, 255–257
Germany and, 39
hegemony, 43
economic, 290
liberal hegemon, 21, 35, 281, 292
hyperpuissance, 104, 109
interest groups and, 47
Israel and, 134–140
Japan and, 7, 16, 39, 126–127, 236
national champions and, 127–128, 134, 139, 228–229, 236–237
nationalism and, 291
no intervention by, 99, 127–128, 255–257. See also CGG/Veritas case
overbalancing by. See DPW/P&O case
populism and, 291
Russia and, 257–258
strategic sectors and, 7, 35–36, 124, 135–136, 140, 147, 198, 216–223, 227, 230, 233, 241, 244, 255, 265, 289
SWFs and, 79
UAE and, 39–40, 158–186
unbounded intervention by, 99, 109–128, 134–140, 158–186. See also DPW/P&O case, Check Point/Sourcefire case, US: FDI: presidential vetoes by, CNOOC/Unocal case
unilateralism, 43
Vale, 1, 25
Venezuela, 8, 106
US and, 8
Venezuelan companies, 8, 99, 122, 128, 177
Veritas, 255–257. See also CGG/Veritas case
Vneshtorgbank. See VTB
Voting Trust Agreement, 52, 67, 200
VTB, 257
VW, 4, 26, 268
Walt, 41, 43–44
Waltz, 24, 38–39, 41–42, 44, 158, 269–270, 287
white knight, 5, 25, 107, 268
definition of, 26, 268
Xugong, 13
Yukos, 207
ZIM, 168
ZTE, 289

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  • Index
  • Ashley Thomas Lenihan, London School of Economics and Political Science
  • Book: Balancing Power without Weapons
  • Online publication: 30 March 2018
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  • Index
  • Ashley Thomas Lenihan, London School of Economics and Political Science
  • Book: Balancing Power without Weapons
  • Online publication: 30 March 2018
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  • Index
  • Ashley Thomas Lenihan, London School of Economics and Political Science
  • Book: Balancing Power without Weapons
  • Online publication: 30 March 2018
Available formats
×