Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of illustrations
- List of contributors
- List of abbreviations
- General introduction and acknowledgements
- Introduction générale et remercients par
- Introduction (English)
- Introduction (français)
- The sea and seapower within the international system
- Germany, 1870–1914: a military empire turns to the sea
- The Imperial Japanese Navy, 1937–1942
- The US as a new naval power, 1890–1919
- World war suspended and resumed: Russia, 1919–1940
- Freedom and control of the seas, 1856–1919
- Unclos and the modern law of the sea
- New navies and maritime powers
- Britain, 1815–1850: naval power or sea power?
- Free trade, industrialization and the global economy, 1815–1914
- Coal and the sea
- Shipbuilding and power: some reflections
- Maintaining naval hegemony in the industrial age: Britain, 1850–1889
- Naval armaments races, 1889–1922
- The British Empire and the war at sea, 1914–1918
- Steaming worldwide waters: adaptation and transformation in the Netherlands
- Austria-Hungary: an inland empire looks to the sea
- The Ottoman Empire and the sea, 1789–1922
- Empire and trade without a major navy: Portugal
- Italy, 1861–1914: did the sea build a state and an empire?
- Imperial failure of the industrial age: Spain, 1805–1898
- Denmark: a small power with a growing shipping industry
- Sweden and the sea in the 19th century
- Navies, internal order and trade in South America, 1830–1914
- The sea and the American Civil War
- The wider Caribbean during the 19th and 20th centuries
- Ship canals
- Oil and water
- Imperial failure in the industrial age: China, 1842–1911
- China turns to the sea, 1912–1990
- India and the sea
- Les Îles d'Océanie et l'ouverture sur la mer à l'heure de la première mondialisation contemporaine
- Maritime labour
- Fisheries
- Geographical determinism and the growth of the American whaling and sealing industries
- La France et la mer, 1815–1914
- Russia tries the new naval technologies, 1815–1914
- The First World War and Japan: from the Anglo-Japanese Alliance to the Washington Treaty
- The sea in the Great War
- The Mediterranean and World War I
- Germany in World War One: naval strategy and warfare
- The sea in German grand strategy, 1919–1939/40
- The case of Germany in the first part of World War II, 1939–1942
- Britain on the defensive, 1939–1942
- Britain and the sea, 1943–1945
- The Washington Treaty era, 1919–1936: naval arms limitation
- The Washington Treaty era: neutralising the Pacific
- The United States and the Second World War
- The sea as a decisive factor in the Second World War
- The sea and the rise of the dictators: Italy, 1919–1940
- The Italian offensive, 1940–1941
- The sea and the Cold War
- NATO as a maritime alliance in the Cold War
- The sea and the Soviet Empire
- The sea and the economic slump, 1919–1939
- Océans et globalisation depuis 1945
- America's Pacific power in a global age
- Les nouvelles ressources océaniques
- Hiérarchies portuaires dans le monde et changements régionaux de connectivité maritime, 1890–2010
- Between empires and institutions: non-state actors and the sea since 1945
- The narcotics trade and the sea
- Climate change and world trade
- La France et la mer depuis 1945: une mutation inachevée
- Changes in naval power and seaborne trade in postwar Asian waters
- Looking to the future
- Conclusion(English)
- Conclusion(français)
- General conclusion
- Conclusion générale par
- Miscellaneous Endmatter 1
- Miscellaneous Endmatter 2
Germany in World War One: naval strategy and warfare
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 26 May 2017
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of illustrations
- List of contributors
- List of abbreviations
- General introduction and acknowledgements
- Introduction générale et remercients par
- Introduction (English)
- Introduction (français)
- The sea and seapower within the international system
- Germany, 1870–1914: a military empire turns to the sea
- The Imperial Japanese Navy, 1937–1942
- The US as a new naval power, 1890–1919
- World war suspended and resumed: Russia, 1919–1940
- Freedom and control of the seas, 1856–1919
- Unclos and the modern law of the sea
- New navies and maritime powers
- Britain, 1815–1850: naval power or sea power?
- Free trade, industrialization and the global economy, 1815–1914
- Coal and the sea
- Shipbuilding and power: some reflections
- Maintaining naval hegemony in the industrial age: Britain, 1850–1889
- Naval armaments races, 1889–1922
- The British Empire and the war at sea, 1914–1918
- Steaming worldwide waters: adaptation and transformation in the Netherlands
- Austria-Hungary: an inland empire looks to the sea
- The Ottoman Empire and the sea, 1789–1922
- Empire and trade without a major navy: Portugal
- Italy, 1861–1914: did the sea build a state and an empire?
- Imperial failure of the industrial age: Spain, 1805–1898
- Denmark: a small power with a growing shipping industry
- Sweden and the sea in the 19th century
- Navies, internal order and trade in South America, 1830–1914
- The sea and the American Civil War
- The wider Caribbean during the 19th and 20th centuries
- Ship canals
- Oil and water
- Imperial failure in the industrial age: China, 1842–1911
- China turns to the sea, 1912–1990
- India and the sea
- Les Îles d'Océanie et l'ouverture sur la mer à l'heure de la première mondialisation contemporaine
- Maritime labour
- Fisheries
- Geographical determinism and the growth of the American whaling and sealing industries
- La France et la mer, 1815–1914
- Russia tries the new naval technologies, 1815–1914
- The First World War and Japan: from the Anglo-Japanese Alliance to the Washington Treaty
- The sea in the Great War
- The Mediterranean and World War I
- Germany in World War One: naval strategy and warfare
- The sea in German grand strategy, 1919–1939/40
- The case of Germany in the first part of World War II, 1939–1942
- Britain on the defensive, 1939–1942
- Britain and the sea, 1943–1945
- The Washington Treaty era, 1919–1936: naval arms limitation
- The Washington Treaty era: neutralising the Pacific
- The United States and the Second World War
- The sea as a decisive factor in the Second World War
- The sea and the rise of the dictators: Italy, 1919–1940
- The Italian offensive, 1940–1941
- The sea and the Cold War
- NATO as a maritime alliance in the Cold War
- The sea and the Soviet Empire
- The sea and the economic slump, 1919–1939
- Océans et globalisation depuis 1945
- America's Pacific power in a global age
- Les nouvelles ressources océaniques
- Hiérarchies portuaires dans le monde et changements régionaux de connectivité maritime, 1890–2010
- Between empires and institutions: non-state actors and the sea since 1945
- The narcotics trade and the sea
- Climate change and world trade
- La France et la mer depuis 1945: une mutation inachevée
- Changes in naval power and seaborne trade in postwar Asian waters
- Looking to the future
- Conclusion(English)
- Conclusion(français)
- General conclusion
- Conclusion générale par
- Miscellaneous Endmatter 1
- Miscellaneous Endmatter 2
Summary
ABSTRACT.German plans for the High Seas Fleet on the outbreak of war rested on highly unrealistic assumptions. When these proved false, the fleet did little or nothing. Neither army nor navy contemplated joint action. Only the unexpected success of submarines seemed to offer hope of victory at sea, but that chance was thrown away by confused and irrational decisions based on political and psychological rather than strategic factors.
RÉSUMÉ.Lorsque la guerre éclata, les plans de l'Allemagne pour sa flotte de guerre(NDLT « Hochseeflotte ») ne reposaient que sur des présomptions profondément irréalistes. Lorsque celles-ci s'avérèrent fausses, la flotte ne fit rien ou très peu. Ni la marine ni l'armée n'envisagèrent une action conjointe. Seul le succès inattendu des sous-marins souleva l'espoir d'une victoire en mer, mais cette opportunité fut anéantie par des décisions confuses et irrationnelles, basées sur des facteurs psychologiques et politiques plutôt que stratégiques.
In October 1910 Tirpitz argued in an audience with Kaiser Wilhelm II that German naval policy had to aim at strengthening the German fleet to such an extent that
an attack would mean a great risk for Great Britain. This risk constitutes the basis of the imperial position of the German Reich and the peace-securing effect of our fleet. If the British fleet can achieve and maintain a permanent and structural strength sufficient to attack the German Reich without risk, then the fleet development was a historical mistake and Your Majesty's naval policy [Flottenpolitik] a historical fiasco.
This estimate became a reality almost four years later. During the July crisis of 1914 the anticipated deterrent effect of the High Seas Fleet(HSF) turned out to be a miscalculation, since Great Britain, relying on the superiority of its fleet and its worldwide strategic positions, did not regard the German fleet as an unpredictable risk for the security of its sea lines of communication.
THE HIGH SEAS FLEET: FROM A FAILED DETERRENT TO A FLEET-IN-BEING
In August 1914 the German Imperial Navy was under the spell of the great material superiority of the enemy. In the North Sea alone the Royal Navy had twenty-six modern capital ships(battleships and battle cruisers) compared to only eighteen equally modern units of the German Navy. The British superiority in older ships of the line as well as cruisers and torpedo boats was even more striking.
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- Information
- The Sea in History - The Modern World , pp. 446 - 457Publisher: Boydell & BrewerPrint publication year: 2017