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The Washington Treaty era: neutralising the Pacific

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 May 2017

Christopher M. Bell
Affiliation:
Christopher M. Bell is Professor of History at Dalhousie University, Canada
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Summary

ABSTRACT.The 1922 Washington Treaty and its associated agreements “froze” the battlefleet strengths of Britain, the United States and Japan in the ratio 5:5:3. They also forbade the “fortification” of naval bases in the Western Pacific. The intention was to prevent a naval race such as seemed to have encouraged the First World War, and to keep potential enemies too far apart to attack one another. Initially it worked, but in the 1930s it kept Britain and the United States too far away to hamper Japanese aggression in China. Increasingly preoccupied with aggression in Europe, the Western powers attempted to deter Japan with inadequate forces, and long-range Japanese strikes inflicted heavy losses on both at the beginning of the Pacific War.

RÉSUMÉ.Le traité naval de Washington de 1922 et les termes en découlant « gelèrent » les forces des flottes de guerre de la Grande-Bretagne, des États-Unis et du Japon selon le ratio 5:3:3. Ils interdirent également la « fortification » des bases navales dans le Pacifique occidental. Visant à prévenir une course à la puissance maritime comme celle semblant avoir conduit à la première guerre mondiale, le traité avait également pour intention de garder des ennemis potentiels trop éloignés géographiquement pour pouvoir s'attaquer. Initialement, le plan fonctionna mais dans les années 30, la Grande-Bretagne et les États-Unis se retrouvèrent trop loin pour empêcher l'invasion japonaise en Chine. De plus en plus préoccupés par les conflits en Europe, les puissances occidentales tentèrent d'enrayer la menace de l'Empire du Japon avec des forces inadaptées et les frappes de longue portée japonaises infligèrent aux deux côtés de lourdes pertes au début de la guerre du Pacifique.

Japan's emergence as a first-class naval power around the beginning of the 20th century created serious, and increasingly complex, challenges for both Great Britain and the United States. The most dangerous maritime threats to Britain's extensive imperial and economic interests in the Far East had traditionally come from other European powers. Any immediate danger from a rising Japan was effectively neutralized by the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, concluded in 1902 and renewed in 1905 and 1911. The steady growth of Japan's power and suspicions of its long-term ambitions nevertheless fuelled concerns about its reliability as an ally. By 1918 British naval leaders believed that Japan hoped to exclude western powers from China and, in time, to obtain regional hegemony, goals that would eventually lead to war.

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Publisher: Boydell & Brewer
Print publication year: 2017

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