At the moment of its birth the interwar-period naval arms limitation process was considered one of the most important events in global diplomatic history. To many, it seemed to hold out the possibility of major powers reshaping their behavior in a more liberal, more rational, and less confrontational manner. When the Washington Conference concluded in 1922 its host, the US President Warren Harding, described the agreement as representing a “new and better epoch in human affairs”. The head of the British delegation, Arthur Balfour, claimed that the Washington treaties were “absolute unmixed blessing to mankind”.

History has been much less kind to the process. Its demise in 1936, followed shortly by the outbreak of the Second World War, has colored the view of many. Often this has led to the naval arms limitation process being labeled as idealistic on the part of the British and the Americans, one which led them to neglect their naval defenses in the Asia-Pacific region and delay their naval build-ups until too late in the day – resulting in catastrophe during the early stages of the conflict.

The process itself centered on four major conferences. These were the Washington Conference of 1921–22, the Geneva(or Coolidge) Conference of 1927, the First London Conference of 1930, and finally the Second London Conference of 1935–36. Philosophically, the naval arms limitation process aimed to prevent future conflict, using a multi-layered process. In the short term it was directed at averting a potential naval building race between the United States, the British Empire, and Japan.