Judicial research from a cross-national perspective has been a relatively neglected subject among American scholars. Since the founding of Law and Society Review, approximately twenty-two articles have appeared on comparative judicial topics, with one issue (summer 1978) devoted exclusively to a European sociology of law. Of these articles, five address African problems. In fifteen years of International and Comparative Law Quarterly, only seven articles treat the African judiciary. A perusal of the British Journal of Law and Society reveals a similar neglect of the cross-national perspective. More revealing, in two of the respected comparative politics journals, Comparative Politics and Comparative Political Studies, only 0.3 percent of the total number of articles published between 1968 and 1981 dealt with judicial systems. Out of twenty-nine subject headings, courts and constitutions finished in a tie for last place-only 7.1 percent of all articles (Sigelman and Gadbois, 1983: 293-94).

Unfortunately, the journals specializing in African affairs offer us no more enlightenment about judicial systems on that continent. While the prestigious Journal of Modern African Studies has published approximately ten articles on judicial issues, the other journals have been decidedly remiss. Two specialized journals are devoted to the topic: Journal of African Law and African Law Studies. Competent articles have been published in these outlets but, due to their general inaccessability, they have failed to become part of the research knowledge on African political systems.

Why has there been a relative neglect of cross-national studies of the African judiciary? This article first provides explanations for why these institutions have not enjoyed scholarly visibility.

International Organisations and Peace Enforcement. The Politics of International Legitimacy. By Katharina P. Coleman. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007. 360p. $85.00 cloth, $36.99 paper.

Since the 1990s, international and regional organizations have engaged in a record 17 peace enforcement operations, multilateral military interventions to end violent conflict within a country. In her excellent book, Katharina P. Coleman seeks to explain why states choose to act either through the auspices or with the explicit consent of an international organization. Using a comparative case method, she explores state motivations in the Nigerian intervention in Liberia under the Economic Community of West African States; the U.S.-led operation in Kosovo under NATO; the interventions of Australia in East Timor under the United Nations; and South Africa's intervention in Lesotho and Zimbabwe's actions in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, both under the SADC (Southern African Development Community).

The undisputed proliferation of international organizations has been interpreted in several ways by members of the scholarly community. Probably most see the explosion in numbers and kinds of actors as a peripheral development; in the realist and neo-realist tradition, the primacy of the state and the state system remains largely unaffected. Others are sceptical of what the trend means and so have developed research agendas examining more closely international organization influence on states and impact on issues. Yet few international relations scholars have paid attention to what this proliferation means for relations among various organizations and its effects on states. However, with so many of these organizations involved in economic development activities, it is very likely that these organizations willingly and sometimes unwittingly encounter each other particularly in Third World countries. Rumours abound of IGOs and NGOs ‘stumbling over each other’ in the capitals of Sahelian countries vying for the attention of too few government officials, leading to negative impacts on policy. In Indo-China, Gordenker finds ‘increasing friction and clogging’ from the rapid expansion of United Nations High Commission for Refugees activities, as they intersect with the International Red Cross, Unicef, and private voluntary organizations. Yet not all interaction is conflictual. Nongovernmental aid agencies in Thailand co-operate closely, as do the International Monetary Fund and World Bank in Kenya.

Surprisingly little systematic research has been completed on evaluating the impact of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) at a time when participation in their activities has come under close scrutiny. Both theoretical weaknesses and methodological inadequacies plague researchers who are interested in the effects of outcomes on affected parties, be they intergovernmental organizations, governments or, ultimately, individuals. In this paper, we examine the problems confronting this type of research and assess the strategies so far employed to overcome some of these shortcomings. We shall also examine some approaches appropriate to generating hypotheses concerning IGO impact and propose a comprehensive framework suitable for further research.

Little is known about the impact of international organizations. Neither a rudimentary theory of IGO impact exists nor are there sufficient case studies to develop meaningful generalizations. To answer the question whether they make a difference, the effect of intergovernmental organization (IGO) policies must be evaluated.

Discussions of international commodity organizations often compare the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and the Intergovernmental Council of Copper Exporting Countries (CIPEC), yet few researchers have examined CIPEC. A comparison of environmental characteristics of copper and petroleum suggests that although copper producers' collusion is possible, it is problematical and depends on political as well as economic factors. Since its formation in 1967, CIPEC members have been engaged in a gradual process of institution-building, although a lack of institutional leadership has hampered collective policy making. Substantively, CIPEC has dealt primarily with three issues: nationalization, technical pricing arrangements, and market regulatory policies. Until 1974, CIPEC members proved incapable of adopting a regulatory policy; they fostered the illusion of impending action and cooperation. Faced with deteriorating market conditions and stimulated by OPEC's success, CIPEC members have initiated a joint policy. The future of CIPEC will depend on its institutional flexibility as well as on decisions of nonmember producers and developed consumer countries.