In Part I of this series on D.T. Suzuki's relationship with the Nazis, (Brian Daizen Victoria, D.T. Suzuki, Zen and the Nazis readers were promised a second part focusing primarily on Suzuki's relationship with one of wartime Japan's most influential Nazis, Count Karlfried Dūrckheim (1896-1988).

However, in the course of writing Part II, I quickly realized that the reader would benefit greatly were it possible to present more than simply Dürckheim's story in wartime Japan. That is to say, I recognized the importance, actually the necessity, of introducing Dürckheim's earlier history in Germany and the events that led to his arrival in Japan, not once but twice.

Welfare state research is at a theoretical impasse insofar as it does not systematically speak to the types of social policy effort that may have not only redistributive but also productive consequences. Cautioning against imprudent use of the social investment label this paper argues for a better understanding of how traditional social policies have enabled society’s adaptation to socioeconomic changes and prevented costly experiences of poverty. Synthesizing ideas drawn from development studies in the Global South and welfare state studies in the Global North, and elaborating on the inclusive strand of welfare developmentalism, the paper conceptualizes what allows existing social policies to be simultaneously protective and productive. It reviews current welfare state research and argues that developmentalist ideas help re-centre the (re)productive role of social policy. It proposes principles for thinking coherently about what makes existing welfare state policies developmental, challenging their characterization as exclusively passive or activating. Recognizing the productive impact of existing social policies requires that we explicitly rethink how welfare state policy effort is understood.

Chan and Seceleanu have shown that if a weighted shift operator on $\ell^p(\mathbb{Z})$, $1\leq p \lt \infty$, admits an orbit with a non-zero limit point then it is hypercyclic. We present a new proof of this result that allows to extend it to very general sequence spaces. In a similar vein, we show that, in many sequence spaces, a weighted shift with a non-zero weakly sequentially recurrent vector has a dense set of such vectors, but an example on $c_0(\mathbb{Z})$ shows that such an operator is not necessarily hypercyclic. On the other hand, we obtain that weakly sequentially hypercyclic weighted shifts are hypercyclic. Chan and Seceleanu have, moreover, shown that if an adjoint multiplication operator on a Bergman space admits an orbit with a non-zero limit point then it is hypercyclic. We extend this result to very general spaces of analytic functions, including the Hardy spaces.

Autism spectrum disorder is defined by the presence of sustained problems in areas of social cognition and social understanding alongside repetitive and/or restricted patterns of behaviour. Behavioural presentations and developmental trajectories in autism are highly heterogeneous. For most, characteristics variably continue across the lifespan, and, for many, they overlap with numerous overrepresented comorbid combinations spanning behavioural, psychiatric and somatic domains. The current autism diagnostic systems (DSM-5, ICD-11) reflect this heterogeneity, focusing on discerning different assistance needs and symptom severity combinations. An emerging view on the pluralisation of autism – ‘the autisms’ – based on different severity levels and different developmental trajectories is gaining popularity, bolstered by the introduction of the grouping ‘profound autism’ and observations of non-persistence of autism for some. We advance the case for expanding the definition of the plural autisms based also on the numerous different aetiological routes that can lead to autism. Various genetic conditions, susceptibility to infectious agents, non-infectious environmental exposures and immune-mediated occurrences have all been observed to culminate in a diagnosis of autism. As a triad, aetiology, presentation intensity and developmental trajectory offer new ways to classify the autisms, with potentially important implications for research and practice.

A vast amount of empirical and theoretical research on public good games indicates that the threat of punishment can curb free-riding in human groups engaged in joint enterprises. Since punishment is often costly, however, this raises an issue of second-order free-riding: indeed, the sanctioning system itself is a common good which can be exploited. Most investigations, so far, considered peer punishment: players could impose fines on those who exploited them, at a cost to themselves. Only a minority considered so-called pool punishment. In this scenario, players contribute to a punishment pool before engaging in the joint enterprise, and without knowing who the free-riders will be. Theoretical investigations (Sigmund et al., Nature 466:861–863, 2010) have shown that peer punishment is more efficient, but pool punishment more stable. Social learning, i.e., the preferential imitation of successful strategies, should lead to pool punishment if sanctions are also imposed on second-order free-riders, but to peer punishment if they are not. Here we describe an economic experiment (the Mutual Aid game) which tests this prediction. We find that pool punishment only emerges if second-order free riders are punished, but that peer punishment is more stable than expected. Basically, our experiment shows that social learning can lead to a spontaneously emerging social contract, based on a sanctioning institution to overcome the free rider problem.

The anthology Japan's household registration system and citizenship: Koseki, identification and documentation, David Chapman and Karl Jakob Krogness, eds. (Routledge 2014) provides a first, extensive, and critical overview of Japan's koseki system. Situated from the seventh century Taika Reforms until today at the center of Japanese governance and society, the koseki opens up for comprehensive and deep exploration the Japanese state, family, and individual, as well as questions relating to citizenship, nationality, and identity. The scope of potential koseki-related research is extensive and is relevant for many disciplines including history, sociology, law, ethnography, anthropology, cultural studies, literature and media studies, gender and queer studies. Given the koseki's origins in the household registration regimes of China and its subsequent influence on the household registration systems of Korea and Taiwan during the colonial period, the koseki also opens the way for comparative studies within and beyond East Asia.

We run an experiment in which students of different European nationalities are matched in groups of five and repeatedly choose with whom within their group they want to play a trust game. Participants observe of each other age, gender, nationality and number of siblings. The region of origin, “North” or “South” is a major determinant of success in the experiment. Participants tend to trust those they trusted before and who trusted them. We do not find evidence of regional discrimination per se. It is only the underlying and significant differences in behavior that translate through repeated interactions into differences in payoffs between the two regions.

Incentivized methods for eliciting subjective probabilities in economic experiments present the subject with risky choices that encourage truthful reporting. We discuss the most prominent elicitation methods and their underlying assumptions, provide theoretical comparisons and give a new justification for the quadratic scoring rule. On the empirical side, we survey the performance of these elicitation methods in actual experiments, considering also practical issues of implementation such as order effects, hedging, and different ways of presenting probabilities and payment schemes to experimental subjects. We end with a discussion of the trade-offs involved in using incentives for belief elicitation and some guidelines for implementation.

In recent work on non-cooperative network formation star-shaped networks play an important role. In a particular theoretical model of Bala and Goyal (2000) center-sponsored stars are the only strict Nash networks. In testing this theoretical model, Falk and Kosfeld (2003) do not find experimental evidence that players select the center-sponsored star. Based on a slight modification of Bala and Goyal's model, we design a network formation experiment in which, depending on link costs, periphery-sponsored stars and the empty network are the only strict Nash networks. We observe that almost all groups not only reach a strict Nash network once but also switch the center player in periphery-sponsored stars several times. The main innovation in our experiment is to use a continuous time framework which we believe to be a more realistic setting to study behavior in network formation situations and which makes coordination on stars much easier than simultaneous strategy adaptation in discrete time.

In an experimental evolutionary game framework we investigate whether subjects end up in a socially efficient state. We examine two games, a game where the socially efficient state is also an equilibrium and a game which has no equilibrium in pure strategies at all. Furthermore, we distinguish between a situation in which the subjects are completely informed about the payoff function and a situation in which they are incompletely informed. We observe that subjects spend the greater part of the time at or near the efficient state. If the efficient state is an equilibrium, they spend more time there than otherwise. Furthermore, incomplete information increases the time spent at the efficient state.

We present results from a pre-registered, well-powered $(N \gt 3,000,000)$ text message get-out-the-vote (GOTV) experiment, conducted during the 2019 European Parliament election in Sweden. Our findings suggest that a simple text message increases the likelihood of voting by 0.3 percentage points. Half of this effect spills over to untreated household members while workplace spillovers are near zero. Subsequent analysis reveals that the direct treatment effect is noticeably stronger among individuals with below-average voting propensities. Interestingly, within this same group, the household spillovers are significantly negative. We speculate and provide some indirect evidence, that these negative spillover effects may stem from the text message reminder influencing the behaviour of voters already motivated to vote. Above all, we propose that an increase in early voting, as opposed to voting on Election Day, among treated individuals may weaken the mechanisms thought to explain spillover effects since voters are less likely to bring their family members with them when voting early.