Why did the United Kingdom withdraw from its large military bases in the Arabian Peninsula and Southeast Asia during the Cold War? The installations in Aden and Singapore, which embodied Britain’s role ‘East of Suez’, had been maintained (and even expanded in the case of Aden) despite the UK retreating from most of its colonies in Africa and the Indian subcontinent in the wake of the Second World War. The current British Prime Minister believes that the drawdown was a mistake and is in the process of reversing it. On a visit to Bahrain just over four years ago, Boris Johnson (then Foreign Secretary) criticised the original decision to retrench and hailed the opening of the Royal Navy’s first base in the region since the early 1970s. In his speech, which focused on a series of Cabinet meetings in January 1968 that were held in the aftermath of a currency crisis, he accused the then Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, of caving to economic pressures, as well as Cabinet members, such as Roy Jenkins, who wanted Britain to retreat from ‘East of Suez’ and join the European Economic Community (EEC). Johnson’s interpretation – that retrenchment was the result of a financial woes and domestic politics – aligns with much of the historiography.

My article in the European Journal of International Security (EJIS) challenges much of the conventional wisdom on the nature, timing and motives for retrenchment. First, it is necessary to probe Johnson’s assertion that ‘we in the UK lost our focus on this part of the world’. In reality, Britain never lost an interest in intervening ‘East of Suez’. Consider, for example, its contribution to both Gulf wars or its involvement in the quashing of the Dhofar Rebellion in Oman. The real change made by the Wilson government was the abandonment of major garrisons in the Arabian Peninsula and Southeast Asia, notably Aden and Singapore. This is what is now being reversed by the current British government – through the opening of new facilities in Bahrain and Oman.

With regard to the timing of retrenchment, the article traces the decision-making process through the archival record and finds that senior ministers accepted the need to withdraw from these bases as early as June 1965. They were, however, unable to publicise this shift in strategic thinking, as Britain was duty-bound to assist the fledging Malaysian Federation in its ‘Confrontation’ with Indonesia. Ministers deemed it necessary to honour the UK’s alliances in the Asia-Pacific. The announcement was made in stages, beginning with Aden in February 1966 and then Singapore in July 1967 (following the abrupt end to the ‘Confrontation’ in August 1966). The timetable for retrenchment was ultimately accelerated in January 1968 due to the political fallout from the aforementioned currency crisis.

This chronological correction is important as it sheds light on the underlying rationale for the drawdown. The retreat from ‘East of Suez’ was not a knee-jerk reaction to a financial or domestic political crisis. This was a process which took place over several years. What, then, led policymakers to embrace retrenchment? Large military bases in the Arabian Peninsula and Southeast Asia had become strategically vulnerable. They were designed to serve as hubs from which to operate but had instead become targets for local nationalist and communist movements. Far from enhancing agility, the bases became a drag on resources. Thus, the rationale for preserving ‘East of Suez’ shifted over the course of the 1960s; British policymakers assessed that the blood and treasure required to maintain order was disproportionate to the benefits that could be accrued from a basing strategy. The choice was made to abandon ‘East of Suez’ and concentrate on NATO commitments in Europe.

The article then proceeds to test this argument against alternative explanations that have been proffered by other scholars. The explanatory power of Britain’s relative economic decline, the domestic political situation, as well as the EEC bid, are examined and found wanting. The reasons for Britain’s withdrawal from its major bases ‘East of Suez’ were primarily strategic. The implementation of the drawdown, however, was botched in 1968 as a phased and muted process of retrenchment turned into an ignominious rout.

The third and final section of the paper explores the lessons for the current generation of policymakers in London, who are charting a return ‘East of Suez’ under the banner of ‘Global Britain’. If there were indeed sound, strategic reasons for withdrawing in the first place, is it wise to reverse the decisions? The article examines the security environment in both the Arabian Peninsula and Southeast Asia today, as well as extant British capabilities. It argues that local conditions are not amenable to a return ‘East of Suez’ and that the UK’s ability to credibly do so is questionable. This section also considers the political and ethical questions arising from a return ‘East of Suez’. Does the British public, for example, know of and support a return to an ‘East of Suez’ basing strategy?

The government has thus far been reticent about the motives underpinning its return to a basing strategy. Is it about boosting the trade prospects of ‘Global Britain’, protecting the global commons, or doing something to maintain relevance in Washington as the United States looks further east? By opening new military bases without specifying their political purpose, the government risks putting the cart before the horse. It falls on those drafting the Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy to rectify this oversight.

– William James, Changing Character of War Centre, Pembroke College, Oxford

– James’ EJIS article is free to read until the end of February 2021