Referencing their article in Volume 5, Number 1 of the European Journal of International Security, Soul Park and Kimberly Peh explore the nuances of North Korea’s nuclear diplomacy.

Relatively few states have attempted, much less succeeded, to develop nuclear weapons in the post-Cold War era. Despite its rarity, nuclear proliferation has garnered heightened interest from the international community, as witnessed in the recent outpouring of debates over North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. While critics assert that the Kim regime will never abandon its nuclear program, others argue that North Korea has, at minimum, undertaken some acts of restraint – a policy that holds back the state from furthering its proliferation activities. While the outcome of this latest round of engagement between Washington and Pyongyang remains to be seen, our study shows that Pyongyang has indeed displayed variations in its nuclear policy, including restraint both during negotiations and after agreements have been reached.

This observation is noteworthy given that North Korea is an adept nuclear hedger, a state that maintains nuclear capabilities that allows it to quickly advance its technical capacity and achieve the goals it seeks. That is, North Korea has possessed the relevant material and signaled the political intent for nuclearization, both of which subject the state to high economic and political costs from the international community. If restraining behavior is possible even in the case of North Korea – a hard nuclear hedger – the study of the conditions under which it occurs warrants greater scholarly and policy attention.

Drawing insights from prospect theory, we find that nuclear hedgers exercise restraint when the condition of asymmetric leveraging occurs: 1) when an adversary bears the heavier costs than the nuclear hedger to materialize negotiations; and 2) when the latter becomes confident about reaping gains when a deal is signed. These two interrelated conditions incentivize restraint because they jointly increase the likelihood that the adversary would remain engaged and the hedger’s probability of achieving its goals at the negotiation table. Through an in-depth case study analysis of both engagement phases leading up to and at the end of the 1994 Agreed Framework and the February 2007 Agreement, we find that North Korea has indeed reversed its nuclear capabilities to varying degrees whenever the US stepped back from its usual tough stance and promised to meet Pyongyang’s longstanding core demands of economic, political and diplomatic aid.

Theoretically, by focusing on the relationship between nuclear hedging and restraint, we clarify and outline one process along the proliferation continuum and show how nuclear hedgers can potentially initiate a course of reversal via restraint. Furthermore, by casting (de)nuclearization as a process, we also highlight the possibility that a full spectrum of policy options exists in dealing with nuclear proliferators. That is, beyond the oft-criticized policies like sanctions and appeasement, policymakers may do well to consider other means – such as reassurances – which can ameliorate conditions that encourage proliferation in the first place.

From the policy standpoint, understanding restraining behavior within the context of nuclear hedging also sheds light on Pyongyang’s seemingly inconsistent behaviors as it continues with its tough talk and provocations while maintaining a willingness to negotiate. As nuclear hedging remains an economically and politically risky strategy, aspirants must be reasonably motivated to incur such costs. If so, nuclear hedging is unlikely to end just because engagement has begun. Behaviors that allow hedgers to maintain their bargaining leverage are to be expected throughout negotiations. Subsequently, bargaining with nuclear hedgers should be understood as a process rather than a distinct outcome. Simply put, patience is key. No nuclear hedger would likely break free from its insecurities and reasons for proliferation without the resolution of the more fundamental causes. Hence, even if the goal of nuclear reversal appears futile vis-à-vis tough proliferators, the international community needs to remain committed to talks and to resolving disputes at the negotiation table so that the first step towards reversal – the achievement of nuclear restraint – is not wasted.

– Soul Park, Department of Political Science, National University of Singapore

– Kimberly Peh, Department of Political Science, University of Notre Dame

– Their EJIS article is available free of charge until the end of May 2020.